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  1. The Mental Life of Some Animals.Mark Rowlands - 1994 - Between the Species 10 (3):4.
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  • Wittgenstein and Animal Minds.Joseph J. Lynch - 1996 - Between the Species 12 (1):10.
  • The Unity of Unconsciousness.Tim Crane - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1):1-21.
    What is the relationship between unconscious and conscious intentionality? Contemporary philosophy of mind treats the contents of conscious 10 intentional mental states as the same kind of thing as the contents of un- conscious mental states. According to the standard view that beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes, for example, the contents of these states are propositions, whether or not the states are conscious or unconscious. I dispute this way of thinking of conscious and unconscious content, and propose an alternative, (...)
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  • The Ethics of Cooperation in Business.Yotam Lurie - 2016 - Open Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):166-175.
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  • Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1997 - Dissertation, University of California Berkeley
    In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another.
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  • Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom: Philosophical Controversies.Anna Dutkowska & Zbigniew Wróblewski - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (3):101-122.
    The central issue in the debate on animal minds is the issue of mindreading. This complicated cognitive ability belongs to the key elements of social cognition — as a form of adapting to specific circumstances connected with living in groups, it enables the reading of the mental states of other individuals, e.g. intentions, desires, and beliefs as well as the adaptation of one’s own behavior to this information. The primary purpose of the article is to present the main philosophical controversies (...)
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  • A Matter of Opinion.Keith Frankish - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):423-442.
    This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of human psychology. It takes its start from Daniel Dennett.
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  • A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.
  • Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives.Daniel D. Hutto, Mitchell Herschbach & Victoria Southgate - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):375-395.
    Human beings, even very young infants, and members of several other species, exhibit remarkable capacities for attending to and engaging with others. These basic capacities have been the subject of intense research in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind over the last several decades. Appropriately characterizing the exact level and nature of these abilities and what lies at their basis continues to prove a tricky business. The contributions to this special issue investigate whether and to (...)
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  • Cognition, Representations and Embodied Emotions: Investigating Cognitive Theory.Somogy Varga - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):165-190.
    Cognitive theory (CT) is currently the most widely acknowledged framework used to describe the psychological processes in affective disorders like depression. The purpose of this paper is to assess the philosophical assumptions upon which CT rests. It is argued that CT must be revised due to significant flaws in many of these philosophical assumptions. The paper contains suggestions as to how these problems could be overcome in a manner that would secure philosophical accuracy, while also providing an account that is (...)
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  • Why We Can't Say What Animals Think.Jacob Beck - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):520–546.
    Realists about animal cognition confront a puzzle. If animals have real, contentful cognitive states, why can’t anyone say precisely what the contents of those states are? I consider several possible resolutions to this puzzle that are open to realists, and argue that the best of these is likely to appeal to differences in the format of animal cognition and human language.
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  • Helpful “Talk” on What to “Do”.D. R. Griffin - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):609.
  • Dolphin Natures, Human Virtues: MacIntyre and Ethical Naturalism.Shane Nicholas Glackin - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 39 (3):292-297.
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  • Is Coma Morally Equivalent to Anencephalia?Anthony Serafini - 1993 - Ethics and Behavior 3 (2):187 – 198.
  • Kognitive Theorie, Mentale Repräsentationen Und Emotionen. Philosophie Und Therapeutische Praxis.Somogy Varga - 2012 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (6):937-954.
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  • Patients with Ventromedial Frontal Damage Have Moral Beliefs.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):617 – 627.
    Michael Cholbi thinks that the claim that motive internalism (MI), the thesis that moral beliefs or judgments are intrinsically motivating, is the best explanation for why moral beliefs are usually accompanied by moral motivation. He contests arguments that patients with ventromedial (VM) frontal brain damage are counterexamples to MI by denying that they have moral beliefs. I argue that none of the arguments he offers to support this contention are viable. First, I argue that given Cholbi's own commitments, he cannot (...)
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  • The Mental States of Persons and Their Brains.Tim Crane - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:253-270.
    Cognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.
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  • Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought?Jacob Beck - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):218-229.
    This paper surveys and evaluates the answers that philosophers and animal researchers have given to two questions. Do animals have thoughts? If so, are their thoughts conceptual? Along the way, special attention is paid to distinguish debates of substance from mere battles over terminology, and to isolate fruitful areas for future research.
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  • Belief Attribution in Animals: On How to Move Forward Conceptually and Empirically. [REVIEW]Robert W. Lurz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):19-59.
    There is considerable debate in comparative psychology and philosophy over whether nonhuman animals can attribute beliefs. The empirical studies that suggest that they can are shown to be inconclusive, and the main philosophical and empirical arguments that purport to show they cannot are shown to be invalid or weak. What is needed to move the debate and the field forward, it is argued, is a fundamentally new experimental protocol for testing belief attribution in animals, one capable of distinguishing genuine belief-attributing (...)
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  • The Nature of Thought.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.
  • Tacit Beliefs and Other Doxastic Attitudes.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):95-117.
  • Dolphin Natures, Human Virtues: Macintyre and Ethical Naturalism.Shane Nicholas Glackin - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 39 (3):292-297.
    Can biological facts explain human morality? Aristotelian ‘virtue’ ethics has traditionally assumed so. In recent years Alasdair MacIntyre has reintroduced a form of Aristotle’s ‘metaphysical biology’ into his ethics. He argues that the ethological study of dependence and rationality in other species—dolphins in particular—sheds light on how those same traits in the typical lives of humans give rise to the moral virtues. However, some goal-oriented dolphin behaviour appears both dependent and rational in the precise manner which impresses MacIntyre, yet anything (...)
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