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Consciousness in Contemporary Science

Oxford University Press (1988)

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  1. The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind.Stan Klein - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory 2 (4):355-376.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer is secured. I (...)
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  • Epi-Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Bruce Mangan - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):689-690.
  • Comparing Direct and Indirect Measures of Sequence Learning.Jimenez Luis, Mendez Castor & Cleeremans Axel - 1996 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 22 (4):948-969.
    Comparing the relative sensitivity of direct and indirect measures of learning is proposed as the best way to provide evidence for unconscious learning when both conceptual and operative definitions of awareness are lacking. This approach was first proposed by Reingold & Merikle (1988) in the context of subliminal perception. In this paper, we apply it to a choice reaction time task in which the material is generated based on a probabilistic finite-state grammar (Cleeremans, 1993). We show (1) that participants progressively (...)
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  • The Intricate Relationships Between Monitoring and Control in Metacognition: Lessons for the Cause-and-Effect Relation Between Subjective Experience and Behavior.Asher Koriat, Hilit Ma'ayan & Ravit Nussinson - 2006 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 135 (1):36-69.
  • Does Cognitive Neuropsychology Have a Future?J. T. L. Wilson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):456-457.
  • Précis of From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure.Tim Shallice - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):429-438.
  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • Naturalizing Idealizations: Pragmatism and the Interpretivist Strategy.Bjørn Ramberg - 2004 - Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (2):1-63.
    Following Quine, Davidson, and Dennett, I take mental states and linguistic meaning to be individuated with reference to interpretation. The regulative principle of ideal interpretation is to maximize rationality, and this accounts for the distinctiveness and autonomy of the vocabulary of agency. This rationality-maxim can accommodate empirical cognitive-psychological investigation into the nature and limitations of human mental processing. Interpretivism is explicitly anti-reductionist, but in the context of Rorty's neo-pragmatism provides a naturalized view of agents. The interpretivist strategy affords a less (...)
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  • Some Ethical Implications of Neursciences.Charles Susanne & M. Szente - 1997 - Global Bioethics 10 (1-4):111-121.
    The new methods of modern sciences can contribute to understand the genesis of mental illness, the disturbances in brain chemistry, physiology, anatomy or genetical information underlying different diseases of the nervous system. Understanding mental illness is not only challenging to science, but is also of great social importance. Moreover, the new developments of neurosciences put new lights on discussions such as brain-mind concepts, unity of mind, definition of consciousness and even definition of the person.For the majority of the scientists, it (...)
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  • The Construction of Subjective Experience: Memory Attributions.Colleen M. Kelley & Larry L. Jacoby - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (1):49-68.
  • Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
    This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences,1991, pp.651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics (...)
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  • Consciousness: Limited but Consequential.Timothy D. Wilson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):701-701.
  • No Conscious or Co-Conscious?Graham F. Wagstaff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):700-700.
  • Consciousness May Still Have a Processing Role to Play.Robert Van Gulick - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):699-700.
  • Attention is Necessary for Word Integration.Geoffrey Underwood - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):698-698.
  • Damn! There Goes That Ghost Again!Keith E. Stanovich - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):696-698.
  • Dissociating Consciousness From Cognition.David Spiegel - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):695-696.
  • Developing Concepts of Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):694-695.
  • A Lawful First-Person Psychology Involving a Causal Consciousness: A Psychoanalytic Solution.Howard Shevrin - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):693-694.
  • Isn't the First-Person Perspective a Bad Third-Person Perspective?W. Schaeken & G. D'Ydewalle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-693.
  • A Limitation of the Reflex-Arc Approach to Consciousness.J. Steven Reznick & Philip David Zelazo - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-692.
  • Reasons for Doubting the Existence of Even Epiphenomenal Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):691-692.
  • The Processing of Information is Not Conscious, but its Products Often Are.George Mandler - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):688-689.
  • Consciousness is King of the Neuronal Processors.William A. MacKay - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):687-688.
  • Consciousness: Only Introspective Hindsight?Dan Lloyd - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):686-687.
  • Conscious Functions and Brain Processes.Benjamin Libet - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):685-686.
  • Understanding Awareness at the Neuronal Level.Christof Koch & Francis Crick - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683-685.
  • Is Consciousness Information Processing?Raymond Klein - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683-683.
  • Velmans's Overfocused Perspective on Consciousness.Marcel Kinsbourne - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):682-683.
  • Consciousness, Analogy and Creativity.Mark T. Keane - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):682-682.
  • Limits of Preconscious Processing.Albrecht Werner Inhoff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-681.
  • Epiphenomenalism and the Reduction of Experience.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-680.
  • Has Consciousness a Sharp Edge?Robert A. M. Gregson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679-680.
  • What is the Relation Between Language and Consciousness?Jeffrey A. Gray - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679-679.
  • Memory with and Without Recollective Experience.John M. Gardiner - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):678-679.
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  • Dream Processing.David Foulkes - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):678-678.
  • Observing Protocol.Judith Economos - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):677-677.
  • Conscious Acts and Their Objects.Fred Dretske - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):676-677.
  • Hydrocephalus and “Misapplied Competence”: Awkward Evidence for or Against?N. F. Dixon - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):675-676.
  • On the Premature Demise of Causal Functions for Consciousness in Human Information Processing.Dale Dagenbach - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):675-675.
  • Consciousness and Making Choices.Raymond S. Corteen - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):674-674.
  • Consciousness and Content in Learning: Missing or Misconceived?Richard A. Carlson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):673-674.
  • Conscious Influences in Everyday Life and Cognitive Research.Kenneth S. Bowers - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):672-673.
  • Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
  • A Curious Coincidence? Consciousness as an Object of Scientific Scrutiny Fits Our Personal Experience Remarkably Well.Bernard J. Baars - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):669-670.
  • Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
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  • From Hand to Mouth.Patricia M. Greenfield - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):577-595.
  • The Comparative Simplicity of Tool-Use and its Implications for Human Evolution.Thomas Wynn - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):576-577.
  • Objects Are Analogous to Words, Not Phonemes or Grammatical Categories.Michael Tomasello - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):575-576.