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Lying: Knowledge or belief?

Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460 (2021)

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  • The false belief: its epistemic and normative characteristics.А. А Шевченко - 2023 - Siberian Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):5-16.
    The article considers lying as an epistemic attitude, analyzes its structural and substantive characteristics. In particular, it considers the pragmatic consequences of using false beliefs, primarily in scientific practice. It is shown that in a number of cases false epistemic attitudes can play a positive role, mainly as temporary hypothetical or counterfactual assumptions, as well as positive illusions. The paper also analyzes two alternative approaches towards false beliefs: “knowledge-first epistemology” of T. Williamson and “action-first epistemology” in line with epistemic pragmatism. (...)
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  • Group Assertions and Group Lies.Neri Marsili - 2023 - Topoi 42 (2):369-384.
    Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to (...)
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  • The myth of true lies.Jesper Kallestrup - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):451-466.
    Suppose you assert a proposition p that you falsely believe to be false with the intention to deceive your audience. The standard view has it that you lied. This paper argues against orthodoxy: deceptive lying requires that p be in actual fact false, in addition to your intention to deceive by means of untruthfully asserting that p. We proceed as follows. First, an argument is developed for such falsity condition as the non-psychological component of lying. The problem with the standard (...)
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  • Happy Unhappiness (and Other Stratified Contradictions).Franca D’Agostini - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2423-2440.
    Stratified properties such as ‘happy unhappiness’, ‘ungrounded ground’, ‘fortunate misfortune’, and evidently ‘true falsity’ may generate dialetheias (true contradictions). The aim of the article is to show that if this is the case, then we will have a special, conjunctive, kind of dialetheia: a true state description of the form ‘Fa and not Fa’ (for some property F and object a), wherein the two conjuncts, separately taken, are to be held untrue. The particular focus of the article is on happy (...)
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  • Lying, hedging, and the norms of assertion.Noah Betz-Richman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).
    The concept of lying is generally assumed to be closely related to the concept of assertion. However, the literature on lying has focused almost exclusively on lies expressed by unqualified assertions. Sometimes a speaker chooses to qualify her assertion by hedging, making her utterance a hedged declarative. This paper defends the thesis that lies can be expressed by untruthful hedged declaratives, and explores the implications of this thesis for the definition of lying. Many standard approaches to the definition of lying (...)
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