The representative institutions of democratic government require the public sphere; but this in turn rests on the fellow‐feeling of citizens. In this article, I explore some recent ways of fleshing out Mill’s thought that patriotic fellow‐feeling is instrumental for a form of trust that the public sphere requires. Deliberation, argument and negotiation in the public sphere require a willingness to discuss, alter one’s position, compromise with others, and do so in good faith and in the belief that other participants are (...) broadly also taking part in the same fashion. Since politics is a realm in which interests and identities clash, we have at least a prima facie reason to worry that others may in fact not be trustworthy in the desired way. Some potential for distrust is inherent in political deliberation, since it presupposes that there is some important conflict or disagreement that needs to be overcome through discussion: in other words, that I cannot simply rely on others to further my interests for the right reasons, or at all. While trust seems inherently problematic, political dialogue in the public sphere seems to require it from those who take part. I look at four accounts of the basis of democratic trust, viz. the communitarian, the ‘societal culture’ account, the public culture account, and what is known as the ‘constitutional patriotism’ account. In outline, my argument is that all four accounts fail to explain the basis of trust in the democratic sphere. I conclude that sharing a national identity still leaves the politics of trust to be negotiated by the participants concerned. (shrink)

Given the recent ethics scandals in the United States, there has been a renewed focus on understanding the antecedents to ethical decision-making in the research literature. Since ethical norms and standards of behavior are not universally consistent, an individual’s choice of referent may exert a large influence on his/her ethical decision-making. This study used a social identity theory lens to empirically examine the relative influence of the macro- and micro-level variables of national culture and peers on an individual’s intention to (...) behave ethically. Our sample consisted of respondents from Germany, Italy, and Japan. The results indicated that both national culture and peers were found to act as significant referents in ethical decision-making dilemmas. Although peers exerted a much stronger influence on an individual’s ethical decision-making, the impact of peers varied depending on the national culture levels of individualism and power distance. (shrink)

Given the immense mobilizing power possessed by the rhetoric of nationalism, as well as the many resources which can be tapped by groups which successfully establish national claims, it is not surprising that we have recently seen such a resurgence in nationalist discourse. One of the things which may surprise us, however, is the growing breadth in thetypesof groups which now launch such claims. No longer is the discourse of nationalism limited to use by ethnic groups and territorial populations. Recently (...) it has come to be deployed by groups which we would normally tend to look upon as social movements. There has been a growing realization of the way in which constituencies such as Blacks, gays and lesbians, Chicano/as, and so on, make up distinct peoples, with cultures, public institutions, dialects, tastes, and social practices that set them off from the people or peoples around them. (shrink)

What are the respective roles and responsibilities of global, national, and local communities as well as individuals themselves to address health deprivations and avert health threats? This article offers the beginnings of a theory of global health justice, arguing for universal ethical norms (general duty) with shared global and domestic responsibility (specific duties) for health. It offers a global minimalist view I call ‘ provincial globalism ’ as a mean between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, in which a provincial consensus must accompany (...) a global consensus on health morality. This minimalist account asserts global and national duties to promote human flourishing and, more specifically, individuals’ central health capabilities. In this view, justice requires prioritizing responsibilities through shared health governance to reduce shortfall inequalities in central health capabilities — a general duty to reduce premature mortality and escapable morbidity. It examines the difficulties presented by the philosophical principles of connectedness, causality, remediation, partiality, and capacity in the allocation of responsibility for global health. It offers a theory of responsibility allocation based on a functional, health agency centered and homeostatic balanced understanding of the analytical components required to solve global health problems and parcels out roles and responsibilities at the global, national, local, and individual levels accordingly. Allocations of responsibility rest on the effectiveness and special obligations of different actors, respecting self-determination by groups and individuals and seeking voluntary commitments . This view understands that the remedy for global health problems must be sustainable to take nations and the global health community to a new global health equilibrium that remedies current problems and prepares for new health threats to come. (shrink)

Since the early 1970s, internal power sharing has remained central to the attempt to reach a political settlement on the constitutional structures for governing Northern Ireland. Even in the face o...

(2001). Hollis, Rousseau and Gyges' ring. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 4, Trusting in Reason: Martin Hollis and the Philosophy of Social Action, pp. 55-68. doi: 10.1080/13698230108403364.

Nardin uses the Eastern European experience of the late 1980s and the works of Adam Michnik and Vaclav Havel to demonstrate the traditional cosmopolitan Kantian notion of morality in the "appeal to universal human values." Nardin uses three major elements to argue the impossibility of such a concept: "the law of nature," based on Stoic and Judeo-Christian foundation, focusing on reason and rationality of the individual rather than custom or divine authority; the uniqueness of various cultures challenging the universal "cosmopolitan" (...) outlook on morality; and the differences among universal principles of morality relative to personal human experiences throughout time. Nardin concludes that the moral renewal in Eastern Europe is evidence that destructive consequences of moral diversity do not preclude a civil society once agreements on authoritative principles and laws are institutionalized. Each individual's own ethical conduct and internal moral guidance offer the basis for criticism and reform of law through membership in particular communities and common humanity. (shrink)

Justice is important, but so is peaceful cooperation. In this article, I argue that if one takes seriously the autonomy of individuals and groups and the fact of moral pluralism, a just system of cooperation cannot guarantee peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. As a response to this consideration, I develop a contractarian theory that can secure peace in a pluralistic world of autonomous agents, assuming that the agents who exist in this world expect that peaceful cooperation is the most (...) beneficial form of interaction for them in the long run. The theory specifies the restrictions on the behavior of autonomous individual and collective agents that are indispensable for peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. In particular, I argue for the need of (i) a globally valid rule of conflict resolution to settle all intra- and inter-group conflicts that cannot be resolved locally, (ii) a world court to apply this rule in cases where local group authorities are inadequate to do so, and to serve as a final court of appeal, and (iii) a world police to enforce the rule. (shrink)

McMahan challenges the assumption that respect for self-determination requires an almost exceptionless doctrine of nonintervention by first defining the notions of "intervention" and "self-determination," and then analyzing Walzer's doctrine of nonintervention.

When should burdened social practices be granted special accommodation? One issue of concern—raised by Okin and others—is that some social practices involve domination, and so the accommodation of those practices might (inadvertently, perhaps) support social injustice. Suppose one wants to take this concern very seriously. Starting from the assumption that freedom from domination is an especially important value, this article examines whether cultural accommodation would ever be advisable. Approaching the problem of multicultural accommodation from this point of view greatly clarifies (...) the debate and yields some interesting results. In particular, the discussion concludes that there are circumstances under which the goal of minimizing domination itself would be furthered by policies of special accommodation. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that at least some states possess a moral right against external intervention in their domestic affairs and all human rights violations give members of the international community reasons to undertake preventive or remedial action against offending states. No state, however, currently protects or could reasonably be expected to protect its subjects’ human rights to a perfect degree. In view of this reality, many have found it difficult to explain how any existing or readily foreseeable state could (...) enjoy a moral right of nonintervention without denying the normative force of human rights. This article seeks to reconcile these apparently incompatible commitments by arguing that, in addition to acting in defense of human rights, outsiders must be appropriately responsive to individuals’ distinct and potentially countervailing interests in collective self-determination. I show that, under certain demanding but not unrealistic conditions, individuals’ interests in self-determination are of sufficient weight not simply to ground a judgment against intervention in particular cases but to generate arobust right of nonintervention on the part of some states that nevertheless fail to secure perfect protection of their subjects’ human rights. (shrink)

David Miller argues that national identity is indispensable for the successful functioning of a liberal democracy. National identity makes important contributions to liberal democratic institutions, including creating incentives for the fulfilment of civic duties, facilitating deliberative democracy, and consolidating representative democracy. Thus, a shared identity is indispensable for liberal democracy and grounds a good claim for self-determination. Because Miller’s arguments appeal to the instrumental values of a national culture, I call his argument ‘instrumental value’ arguments. In this paper, I examine (...) the instrumental value arguments and show that they fail to justify a group’s right to self-determination. (shrink)

Allen Buchanan proposes a methodological framework with which theorists may evaluate different theories of secession, including the National Self-Determination theory. An important claim he makes is, because the right to secede is inherently institutional, any adequate theory of secession must include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality. Because the National Self-Determination theory blatantly lacks such an analysis, Buchanan concludes that this theory is inherently flawed. In this paper, I consider Buchanan’s framework and the responses from supporters of (...) national self-determination theory. I try to clarify the confusion shared by both parties. I conclude that, although Buchanan’s theory of institutional morality is sound, his critiques of the national self-determination theory fails. (shrink)

David Rodin argues that the right of national-defence as conceived in international law cannot be grounded in the end of defending the lives of individuals. Firstly, having this end is not necessary because there is a right of defence against an invasion that threatens no lives. However, in this context we are to understand that 'defending lives' includes defending against certain non-lethal threats. I will argue that threats to national-self determination and self-government are significant non-lethal threats to the wellbeing of (...) individuals that can justify lethal defensive force. Therefore the end of defending individuals can ground a right of national-defence against a 'bloodless invasion'. Secondly, Rodin argues that defending lives is not a sufficient condition for military action to be national self-defence, because humanitarian intervention is military action to defend individuals, and such action is in deep tension with national self-defence. I will argue that a reductive account, grounded in claims of need and threats of harm, can justify principles of both intervention and non-intervention on the same grounds; that is, protecting the wellbeing of individuals. (shrink)

This paper is an introduction to a special issue on Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Liberal Democracy. It attempts to describe the state of the debate on issues of multiculturalism and nationalism within liberal-democratic theory. I suggest that there may be an emerging consensus on liberal culturalism – the view that certain group-specific rights or policies aimed at recognizing or accommodating ethnic and national groups are legitimate so long as they operate within certain constraints of liberal justice. I explore the possible reasons (...) for this emerging consensus (including the lack of clear alternatives), and conclude with some suggestions about the likely avenues for future research in this area. (shrink)

En los últimos 15 años se han dado una multitud de esfuerzos para elaborar normas internacionales sobre los derechos de las minorías, tanto en el nivel mundial como en el nivel regional. Mundialmente, la ONU adoptó una Declaración sobre los Derechos de las Personas Pertenecientes a Minorías Nacionales o Étnicas, Religiosas y Lingüísticas en 1992, y está debatiendo un Proyecto de la Declaración sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas. Otras organizaciones internacionales como la Organización Mundial del Trabajo y el (...) Banco Mundial, también han elaborado normas sobre los derechos de las minorías. Algunas organizaciones, como la Organización de Estados Americanos y el Consejo de Europa, también han redactado declaraciones de nivel regional. (shrink)

Genocide is the deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, of a people. Typically, it is a crime that is committed by a people. In this essay, I propose an analysis of the concept of an ethnic identity group, which is, I argue, the concept of ethnicity at issue in many important discussions of group rights, group acts, and the moral responsibility of group members for the acts of the groups to which they belong. I develop the account of collective (...) agency presupposed by this analysis and explore its implications for assessments of individual moral responsibility for genocide. I argue, further, that among other advantages over culturalist approaches to questions about group rights, the approach that follows from the concept of an ethnic identity group sheds light on the specific moral wrong of genocide. I reply to individualist objections to the idea that ethnic group membership may be morally significant and argue that morally adequate responses to genocide presuppose acknowledgment of the fact that groups act and are acted upon in morally significant ways. (shrink)

We examine the association between societal trust and the levels of CEO compensation and the proportion of equity-based compensation of 897 firm-years from 18 countries over the 2007–2013 period. We find both the levels of CEO compensation as well as the proportion of equity-based compensation to be lower in countries with higher levels of societal trust. This suggests that costly regulations on CEO compensation may not be as necessary in jurisdictions with higher levels of societal trust. We also examine the (...) association between pay disparity and societal trust. Consistent with our finding of lower pay at the CEO rank, we find pay disparities are lower in countries with higher levels of societal trust. (shrink)

This paper identifies three sets of problems of a specific ethico-political type, generated by the interrelationship between ethics and politics in the areas of world justice and global politics. One instance in which this interrelationship is tested is that of the conflict of duties and values as it appears in the particular domain of the relations amongst sovereign nation states as well as between them and other social groups. Following the general Introduction, the main body of the paper contains the (...) following three sections. (1) Without elaborating on the detailed mechanics of Kant's theory of perpetual peace, Section II discusses criticisms against the Kantian version of world peace in the context of which the first problem is encountered. The problem identified here is the ambiguity as to whether the establishment of a federated kind of peaceful co-existence between sovereign nations depends on the moral improvement of mankind or whether it is the other way round--i.e. whether ethical progress is a necessary presupposition or, rather, a consequence of political peace. That is, what is here identified as worrying is that the direction of dependence is not clear in such a proposal. Furthermore, such an approach, when applied to certain cases of inter-state differences, yields a rather alarming result as to the de-politicization of national states (Section II.2). (2) Yet such a type of international federalism requires a certain, peculiar, kind of legal enforcement of order without recourse to a supra state. So a re-examination of the notion of a legal order in general is needed. Given these requirements, Section III moves on to discuss moral conflict from the standpoint of relativism as it appears in the ethical and in the legal spheres. The second of our problems, identified in this section, is that, before discussing world justice we must first acknowledge the special relation and asymmetry between ethical standards and legal rules required by such a world order. (3) Finally, Section IV asks whether, given the above two problems, it is possible to envisage theoretically the logical possibility of moral conflict-resolution by postulating unchanging and encompassing super-norms of conduct. These special norms, if possible, would be able to direct action unequivocally when confronted with ethical or other dilemmas of duties (involving equally valid but conflicting demands among sovereign nations). This is the third problem. The Conclusion offers an evaluation of the whole discussion. These three ethico-political problems are shown to be interrelated. The overall thrust of the discussion is that it points to a number of philosophical difficulties in understanding the changing role of national states in a globalized political, economic and cultural environment. Accordingly, such difficulties have repercussions for any moral criticism of issues of world justice and global politics. I must make clear at the outset, though, that the discussion does not concern international relations theories per se. (shrink)

This paper provides an argument in favour of federal institutional design on the basis that it is more congenial to the preservation and promotion of normatively desirable societal diversity than its unitary alternative. Seeking inspiration in the work of three of the most influential liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century: John Stuart Mill; Alexis de Tocqueville; and Lord Acton, I construct a novel case for federalism that focuses on the inherent benefits of a dual/multi-layered governmental structure. Section one argues for (...) the value of diversity, stating that it can both improve the authenticity of individually exercised autonomy, and improve the quality of individually espoused moral views. Section two considers the potential dangers posed by the unitary state to the flourishing of diversity through the centralisation of key institutions. Section three shows how the federal model sidesteps these pitfalls, and offers a more auspicious environment for the cultivation and enjoyment of diversity. (shrink)

Many existing defenses of group rights seem to rely on the notion of group freedom. To date, however, no adequate analysis of this notion has been offered. Group freedom is best understood in terms of processes of social categorization that are embedded in social mechanisms. Such processes often give rise to group-specific constraints and enablements. On the proposed social mechanism account, group rights are demands for group freedom. Even so, group rights often serve to eradicate individual unfreedom. Furthermore, generic measures (...) sometimes provide the most appropriate solution to a problem of group unfreedom. (shrink)

Most Third World feminists consider nationalism as detrimental to feminism. Against this general trend, I argue that “polycentric” nationalism has potentials for advocating feminist causes in the Third World. “Polycentric” nationalism, whose proper goal is the attainment and maintenance of national self-determination, is still relevant in this neocolonial age of capitalist globalization and may serve feminist purposes of promoting the well-being of the majority of Third World women who suffer disproportionately under this system.

This article considers whether the international legal human rights system founded on liberal individualism, as endorsed by liberal theorists, can function as a fair universal legal regime. This question is examined in relation to the collective right to self-determination demanded by indigenous peoples, who are paradigmatic decent nonliberal peoples. Indigenous peoples’ collective right to self-determination has been internationally recognized in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was adopted by the United Nations in 2007. This historic event may (...) seem to exemplify the international legal human rights system’s ability to function as a truly global legal regime applicable cross-culturally to all well-ordered societies, whether liberal or nonliberal. The article argues, however, that the collective right to self-determination advocated by indigenous peoples for the sake of cultural integrity is inconsistent with the international legal human rights system founded on liberal individualism. By showing the plausibility of indigenous peoples’ defense of their cultural integrity, this article suggests that the international legal human rights system ought to be reconceptualized to reflect a genuine international consensus on human rights among all well-ordered societies if it is to function as a just mechanism for global governance. (shrink)

National minority women’s defense of nonliberal minority cultures that encompass sexist customs and rules has greatly perplexed liberal theorists. Many attempted to resolve this puzzle by attributing constrained agency to such women and dismissing their defense as unreasonable. This article argues that this liberal assessment of minority women’s position is philosophically indefensible and that the failure of mainstream liberalism to make sense of these women’s response indicates not that these women’s agency is compromised but rather that the liberal conception of (...) agency as autonomy at the heart of the liberal framework has limits in its crosscultural applicability. A conception of agency, valuational agency, that illuminates minority women’s agency is proposed as a more plausible alternative for radically pluralistic societies. -/- . (shrink)

Over the last decade, states have increasingly emphasised the importance of integration, and translated it into legal regulations that demand integration from immigrants. This paper criticises a specific aspect to this development, namely the tendency to make permanent residency dependent on language skills and, as such, seeks to raise doubts as to the moral acceptability of the requirement of linguistic integration. The paper starts by arguing that immigrants after a relatively short period of time acquire a moral claim to permanent (...) residency in their host country. Accordingly, states may not limit residency at their discretion. Nevertheless, three arguments may seem promising for defending the requirement of linguistic integration: that the immigrants’ moral claim conflicts with a stronger moral claim on the part of the larger society, and this makes an infringement of the immigrants’ claim proportionate; that language requirements may be legally demanded as a precondition for permanent residency for the immigrants’ own sake; and that language requirements are defensible, as far as immigrants may be understood to have consented to such regulation upon entry to the country. This paper argues that all three must be rejected. (shrink)

The secession of prosperous regions may negatively affect the redistributive scheme of an established state. As a consequence, the capacity of its welfare system to support the inhabitants of poorer regions may be significantly reduced. Some authors assert that affluent groups who opt for full political independence violate duties of solidarity. This objection to the secession of prosperous regions can be based on different views of distributive justice. Here, following a distinction that has been introduced by Allen Buchanan, ‘subject centred’ (...) and ‘justice as reciprocity’ theories are explored. It is argued that both theories fail to support the case against the secession of wealthy groups. ‘Subject centred’ theories cannot explain special duties toward compatriots, whereas ‘justice as reciprocity’ theories cannot justify restrictions on exit rights. However, this does not mean that separatists have no moral duties vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. They are obliged to dissolve the political union in a fair way, e.g., by accepting responsibility for some share of the public debts. (shrink)

This paper is motivated by Davis’ [14] theory of the individual in economics. Davis’ analysis is applied to health economics, where the individual is conceived as a utility maximiser, although capable of regarding others’ welfare through interdependent utility functions. Nonetheless, this provides a restrictive and flawed account, engendering a narrow and abstract conception of care grounded in Paretian value and Cartesian analytical frames. Instead, a richer account of the socially embedded individual is advocated, which employs collective intentionality analysis. This provides (...) a sound foundation for research into an approach to health policy that promotes health as a basic human right. (shrink)

All theories of the right to secede either understand the right as a remedial right only or also recognize a primary right to secede. By a right in this context is meant a general, not a special, right (one generated through promising, contract, or some special relationship). Remedial Right Only Theories assert that a group has a general right to secede if and only if it has suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of last resort.1 Different (...) Remedial Right Only Theories identify different injustices as warranting the remedy of secession. (shrink)

In her article,?Beyond the Cultural Argument for Liberal Nationalism?, Margaret Moore provides a critique of this argument, and commends, as an alternative, an identity?based approach to liberal nationalism. Moore draws a distinction between identity and culture, and suggests that liberal nationalism should be founded on the former rather than the latter. This article argues, by contrast, that although identity and culture need to be distinguished, they are not as dissociable as Moore contends. It argues that the distinction between identity and (...) culture is of a kind resembling that between types and tokens? between abstractions and their instances. In so far as culture and language are tangible means by which we express our identity, then identity can be viewed as a type, which cultural components? like language? can instantiate as tokens. A defence of liberal nationalism, even if its starting point is identity, has to incorporate in its main argument an appeal to culture and language to make a case for the right to self?determination of peoples. (shrink)

The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a hugely consequential one in the contemporary world, appearing to grant nation-states both jurisdiction-type rights and rights of ownership over the resources to be found in their territories. But the normative justification for that doctrine is far from clear. This article elucidates the best arguments that might be made for permanent sovereignty, including claims from national improvement of or attachment to resources, as well as functionalist claims linking resource rights to key (...) state functions. But it also shows that these defences are insufficient to justify permanent sovereignty and that in many cases they actually count against it as a practice. They turn out to be compatible, furthermore, with the dispersal of resource rights away from the nation-state which global justice appears to demand. (shrink)

The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a hugely consequential one in the contemporary world, appearing to grant nation-states both jurisdiction-type rights and rights of ownership over the resources to be found in their territories. But the normative justification for that doctrine is far from clear. This article elucidates the best arguments that might be made for permanent sovereignty, including claims from national improvement of or attachment to resources, as well as functionalist claims linking resource rights to key (...) state functions. But it also shows that these defences are insufficient to justify permanent sovereignty and that in many cases they actually count against it as a practice. They turn out to be compatible, furthermore, with the dispersal of resource rights away from the nation-state which global justice appears to demand. (shrink)

This essay develops a detailed account of the features that make a group susceptible to the harm of genocide. If the members of a group consent to a life in common, if the culture of the group is comprehensive, and if the social structure of the group is such that membership cannot easily be renounced, then the flourishing of the group's culture and social ethos will have profound and far‐reaching effects on the well‐being of its individual members. Systematic destruction of (...) cultural and social institutions under these conditions will eventuate in individuals suffering the harms and deprivations peculiar to the crime of genocide. The later sections of the essay illustrate and further defend the thesis that “social death” is the harm that distinguishes genocide from other forms of political violence. (shrink)