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  1. Nonreductive Materialism and Mental Causation.Ausonio Marras - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):465-93.
    The aim of this paper is to defend a version of nonreductive materialism against the epiphenomenalist objection to which Davidson's anomalous monism has often been held to be vulnerable. After considering a number of options for dealing with the objection, I argue that an appeal to the notion of strong supervenience (properly explicated) can both rebut a common form of the "property" ("type") epiphenomenalist objection and provide a grounding for the causal relevance ("efficacy") of mental properties.
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  • Interdiscourse or Supervenience Relations: The Primacy of the Manifest Image.J. Brakel - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):253 - 297.
    Amidst the progress being made in the various (sub-)disciplines of the behavioural and brain sciences a somewhat neglected subject is the problem of how everything fits into one world and, derivatively, how the relation between different levels of discourse should be understood and to what extent different levels, domains, approaches, or disciplines are autonomous or dependent. In this paper I critically review the most recent proposals to specify the nature of interdiscourse relations, focusing on the concept of supervenience. Ideally supervenience (...)
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  • The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties.Ausonio Marras - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):389-400.
    I argue that (strong) psychophysical supervenience, properly understood as a metaphysical dependence or determination relation, helps to account for the causal/explanatory relevance of mental properties because (1) it blocks a standard epiphenomenalist objection to the effect that an event's mental properties are 'screened off' by their physical properties: (2) it accounts for the _causal (and not merely _normative or merely _nomological) status of commonsense psychological generalizations; (3) it accounts for the _nonredundancy and _irreducibility of psychological explanations.
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  • The Explanatory Virtue of Abstracting Away From Idiosyncratic and Messy Detail.Christopher Clarke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1429-1449.
    Some explanations are relatively abstract: they abstract away from the idiosyncratic or messy details of the case in hand. The received wisdom in philosophy is that this is a virtue for any explanation to possess. I argue that the apparent consensus on this point is illusory. When philosophers make this claim, they differ on which of four alternative varieties of abstractness they have in mind. What’s more, for each variety of abstractness there are several alternative reasons to think that the (...)
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  • How to Define Levels of Explanation and Evaluate Their Indispensability.Christopher Clarke - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
    Some explanations in social science, psychology and biology belong to a higher level than other explanations. And higher explanations possess the virtue of abstracting away from the details of lower explanations, many philosophers argue. As a result, these higher explanations are irreplaceable. And this suggests that there are genuine higher laws or patterns involving social, psychological and biological states. I show that this ‘abstractness argument’ is really an argument schema, not a single argument. This is because the argument uses the (...)
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  • The Correlation Argument for Reductionism.Christopher Clarke - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):76-97.
    Reductionists say things like: all mental properties are physical properties; all normative properties are natural properties. I argue that the only way to resist reductionism is to deny that causation is difference making (thus making the epistemology of causation a mystery) or to deny that properties are individuated by their causal powers (thus making properties a mystery). That is to say, unless one is happy to deny supervenience, or to trivialize the debate over reductionism. To show this, I argue that (...)
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  • Causal Overdetermination and Kim’s Exclusion Argument.Michael Roche - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):809-826.
    Jaegwon Kim’s influential exclusion argument attempts to demonstrate the inconsistency of nonreductive materialism in the philosophy of mind. Kim’s argument begins by showing that the three main theses of nonreductive materialism, plus two additional considerations, lead to a specific and familiar picture of mental causation. The exclusion argument can succeed only if, as Kim claims, this picture is not one of genuine causal overdetermination. Accordingly, one can resist Kim’s conclusion by denying this claim, maintaining instead that the effects of the (...)
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  • From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind 102 (408):555-86.
  • Defending Non-Epiphenomenal Event Dualism.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.
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  • Ce que l'on peut apprendre sur les chauves-souris à l'aide d'une télé couleur.Paul Dumouchel - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):493-.
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  • Materialism, Functionalism, and Supervenient Qualia.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.
    Qualia are phenomenal properties of sensations and perceptual states: they are whatever it is that gives such states their “felt,” qualitative character. (In speaking of sensations, I speak of course not of mental objects or mental contents, but of mental events—of sensings, not sensa.).
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  • Towards a New Philosophy of Positive Economics.Don Ross & Chantale LaCasse - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (3):467-.
  • The Debate on Mental Causation: Davidson and His Critics.Ausonio Marras - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (1):177-.
  • Consciousness and Reduction.Ausonio Marras - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):335-361.
    among them Joseph Levine, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson and Jaegwon Kim?have claimed that there are conceptual grounds sufficient for ruling out the possibility of a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Their claim assumes a functional model of reduction which requires an a priori entailment from the facts in the reduction base to the phenomena to be explained. The aim of this paper is to show that this is an unreasonable requirement?a requirement that no reductive explanation in science should be expected (...)
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  • Defending Non-Epiphenomenal Event Dualism.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.
  • Supervenience, Metaphysical Reduction, and Metaphysics of Properties.Giovanna Hendel - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):99-118.
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