En distintos momentos de su producción intelectual, Agustín se refirió al asunto de la música. En este artículo mostraremos que Agustín uso dos esquemas conceptuales distintos para describir el fenómeno de la música práctica en su relación con el mundo espiritual, el esquema de las Artes Liberales y el de la teoría del signo, y que en virtud de ello la música sería concebida de dos modos diferentes: como vestigium y como signum del mundo espiritual, respectivamente. Al final del artículo (...) analizaremos la diferencia entre las dos concepciones considerando tres elementos: la naturaleza de la relación entre mundo material y espiritual, el contenido espiritual al que remite y la noción de belleza que implica. (shrink)

This is a genealogical study that traces a “broadly Cartesian” pattern of argumentation: from Augustine’s scriptural semiotic to the “narrowly Cartesian” practice of foundationalism to Charles Peirce’s pragmatic and reparative semiotic. The essay argues (1) that Augustine transformed Stoic logic into a scriptural semiotic; (2) that this semiotic breeds both Cartesian foundationalism and the pragmatic semiotic that repairs it; (3) that Peirce’s semiotic displays the latter. In sum, Augustine’s inquiry risks foundationalism but also breeds a self-corrective “reparative reasoning.” This reasoning (...) is at once scriptural and philosophic. (shrink)

Augustine famously claims every word is a name. Some readers take Augustine to thereby maintain a purely referentialist semantic account according to which every word is a referential expression whose meaning is its extension. Other readers think that Augustine is no referentialist and is merely claiming that every word has some meaning. In this paper, I clarify Augustine’s arguments to the effect that every word is a name and argue that ‘every word is a name’ amounts to the claim that (...) for any word, there exist tokens of that word which are autonymous nouns. Augustine takes this to be the result of universal lexical ambiguity or equivocity and I clarify how Augustine’s account of metalinguistic discourse, which is one of the most detailed to have survived from antiquity, differs from some ancient and modern theories. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 55, Issue 4, pp 307 - 339 This article puts forward an analysis of the theory of signs contained in the _Prodidagmata ad logicam Aristotelis_, a compendium on logic written by the Flemish philosopher and Louvain professor Laurentius Ghiffene. Focusing on Ghiffene’s definition and division of a sign and his account of the problem of self-reference, the author argues that Ghiffene positioned himself in the tradition of the Conimbricenses and relied extensively on their influential commentary on Aristotle’s (...) _Organon_, published in 1606. The aim of the present contribution is to shed new light on the teaching of logic at Louvain during the years immediately preceding the rise of modern philosophy, an episode in the university’s history which remains almost entirely unstudied. (shrink)

One of the leading concerns animating current philosophy of mind is that, no matter how good a scientific account is, it will leave out what its like to be conscious. The challenge has thus been to study or at least explain away that qualitative dimension. Pursuant with that aim, I investigate how philosophy of signs in the Peircean tradition can positively reshape ongoing debates. Specifically, I think the account of iconic or similarity-based reference we find in semiotic theory offers a (...) more promising variant of the phenomenal concept strategy. Philosophers who endorse this strategy think that the difficulties we have fitting conscious qualia into a scientific picture may owe to the peculiar nature of indexical concepts. They point to the fact that, when we try to convey the feel of our experiences, we employ context-dependent gestures and/or utterances that are indexed to perspectives unique to each person. However, according to the theory I defend, there are three ways signs can refer, namely by convention, causal contact, and similarity. Since similarity is not reducible to proximity, I argue that a theory of reference that turns on shared quality can bypass some of the implausible consequences that plague indexical accounts. In the first chapter, I describe the apparatus needed to make sense of this claim. In the second chapter, I present my account of iconic reference. In the third chapter, I justify my reliance on a distinction that is less than real yet more than nominal. In the fourth chapter, I sketch a trinitarian metaphysics well-suited to house the foregoing account of qualia. (shrink)