Citations of work:

Alia Martin & Laurie R. Santos (2014). The Origins of Belief Representation: Monkeys Fail to Automatically Represent Others’ Beliefs.

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  1.  8
    Social Cognition, Mindreading and Narratives. A Cognitive Semiotics Perspective on Narrative Practices From Early Mindreading to Autism Spectrum Disorder.Claudio Paolucci - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    Understanding social cognition referring to narratives without relying on mindreading skills has been the main aim of the Narrative Practice Hypothesis proposed by Daniel Hutto and Shaun Gallagher. In this paper, I offer a semiotic reformulation of the NPH, expanding the notion of narrative beyond its conventional common-sense understanding and claiming that the kind of social cognition that operates in implicit false belief task competency is developed out of the narrative logic of interaction. I will try to show how experience (...)
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    What Do Monkeys Know About Others’ Knowledge?Lindsey A. Drayton & Laurie R. Santos - 2018 - Cognition 170:201-208.
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    Young Children's Conceptions of Knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.
    How should knowledge be analyzed? Compositionally, as having constituents like belief and justification, or as an atomic concept? In making arguments for or against these perspectives, epistemologists have begun to use experimental evidence from developmental psychology and developmental linguistics. If we were to conclude that knowledge were developmentally prior to belief, then we might have a good basis to claim that belief is not a constituent of knowledge. In this review, I present a broad range of developmental evidence from the (...)
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  4. Factive and Nonfactive Mental State Attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.
    Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters for mental state (...)
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    Cognition Without Cortex.Onur Güntürkün & Thomas Bugnyar - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):291-303.
  6.  20
    Corvids Infer the Mental States of Conspecifics.Ashley Keefner - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):267-281.
    It is well known that humans represent the mental states of others and use these representations to successfully predict, understand, and manipulate their behaviour. This is an impressive ability. Many comparative psychologists believe that some non-human apes and monkeys attribute mental states to others. But is this ability unique to mammals? In this paper, I review findings from a range of behavioural studies on corvids, including food caching, food recaching and food sharing studies. In order to protect their caches from (...)
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