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Wittgenstein and finitism

Synthese 105 (2):141 - 176 (1995)

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  1. Wittgenstein on Pseudo-Irrationals, Diagonal Numbers and Decidability.Timm Lampert - 2008 - In The Logica Yearbook 2008. London: pp. 95-111.
    In his early philosophy as well as in his middle period, Wittgenstein holds a purely syntactic view of logic and mathematics. However, his syntactic foundation of logic and mathematics is opposed to the axiomatic approach of modern mathematical logic. The object of Wittgenstein’s approach is not the representation of mathematical properties within a logical axiomatic system, but their representation by a symbolism that identifies the properties in question by its syntactic features. It rests on his distinction of descriptions and operations; (...)
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  • Cahiers D'ÉPistÉMologie.Mathieu Marion - unknown
    Cette publication, la trois cent vingt-troisième de la série, a été rendue possible grâce à la contribution financière du FQRSC (Fonds québécois de recherche sur la société et la culture).
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  • La historia y la gramática de la recursión: una precisión desde la obra de Wittgenstein.Sergio Mota - 2014 - Pensamiento y Cultura 17 (1):20-48.
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  • Wittgenstein, Ramsey and British Pragmatism.Mathieu Marion - 2012 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2).
  • Misunderstanding Gödel: New Arguments About Wittgenstein and New Remarks by Wittgenstein.Victor Rodych - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (3):279–313.
    The long‐standing issue of Wittgenstein's controversial remarks on Gödel's Theorem has recently heated up in a number of different and interesting directions [, , ]. In their , Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam purport to argue that Wittgenstein's‘notorious’ “Contains a philosophical claim of great interest,” namely, “if one assumed. that →P is provable in Russell's system one should… give up the “translation” of P by the English sentence ‘P is not provable’,” because if ωP is provable in PM, PM is (...)
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  • The Hidden Set-Theoretical Paradox of the Tractatus.Jing Li - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):159-164.
    We are familiar with various set-theoretical paradoxes such as Cantor's paradox, Burali-Forti's paradox, Russell's paradox, Russell-Myhill paradox and Kaplan's paradox. In fact, there is another new possible set-theoretical paradox hiding itself in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. From the Tractatus’s Picture theory of language we can strictly infer the two contradictory propositions simultaneously: the world and the language are equinumerous; the world and the language are not equinumerous. I call this antinomy the world-language paradox. Based on a rigorous analysis of the Tractatus, with (...)
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  • Wittgenstein and Logic.Montgomery Link - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):41-54.
    In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. (...)
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  • Misunderstanding Gödel: New Arguments About Wittgenstein and New Remarks by Wittgenstein.Victor Rodych - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (3):279-313.
    The long‐standing issue of Wittgenstein's controversial remarks on Gödel's Theorem has recently heated up in a number of different and interesting directions [,, ]. In their, Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam purport to argue that Wittgenstein's‘notorious’ “Contains a philosophical claim of great interest,” namely, “if one assumed. that →P is provable in Russell's system one should… give up the “translation” of P by the English sentence ‘P is not provable’,” because if ωP is provable in PM, PM is ω ‐inconsistent, (...)
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