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  1. Minds, Brains, and Capacities: Situated Cognition and Neo-Aristotelianism.Hans-Johann Glock - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    This article compares situated cognition to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian approaches to the mind. The article distinguishes two components in this paradigm: an Aristotelian essentialism which is alien to situated cognition and a Wittgensteinian “capacity approach” to the mind which is not just congenial to it but provides important conceptual and argumentative resources in defending social cognition against orthodox cognitive science. It focuses on a central tenet of that orthodoxy. According to what I call “encephalocentrism,” cognition is primarily or even exclusively a (...)
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  • Agency and Reductionism About the Self.Marko Jurjako - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. Rijeka: University of Rijeka. pp. 255-284.
    Abstract The goal of this chapter is to provide an opinionated overview of the psychologically based account of personal identity and the role of agency within such an account. I describe the essential points of the psychological criterion of personal identity. Then, I discuss how the psychological criterion is related to the Reductionist View of personal identity and whether it is committed to what Derek Parfit names the Extreme Claim. I further discuss how the agency-based views of personal identity can (...)
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  • Religious Experience: Learning and Meaning.Peter Jarvis - 2008 - Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 25 (2-3):65-72.
    Some experiences, especially the ones that generate in the subject a feeling of creature-consciousness can be described as nothing less than awe-inspiring. Otto spoke of such experiences in relation to the notion of the numinous. Experiences have levels. Reaching the level where we are made aware of our true identity as creatures can gainfully inform our choices and learning. We remain however at the point where we can recognise that such experiences themselves point to a logic of meaning. The meanings (...)
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  • A Non-Reductive Science of Personality, Character, and Well-Being Must Take the Person's Worldview Into Account.Artur Nilsson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Why Does Descartes Say That He is Not His Body in the Second Meditation?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper contests a standard interpretation of how Descartes comes to the conclusion that he is not his body in the second meditation. I propose an alternative interpretation in its place.
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  • Consciousness.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Heather Salazar (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind. Quebec: Rebus Foundation Publishing. pp. 41-48.
    The term “consciousness” is very often, though not always, interchangeable with the term “awareness,” which is more colloquial to many ears. We say things like “are you aware that ...” often. Sometimes we say “have you noticed that ... ?” to express similar thoughts, and this indicates a close connection between consciousness (awareness) and attention (noticing), which we will come back to later in this chapter. Ned Block, one of the key figures in this area, provides a useful characterization of (...)
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  • Acerca da Taxonomia Do Mental Para Contextos Que Requerem Neutralidade.Filipe Lazzeri - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):365-392.
    Ordinary psychological predicates, and the phenomena we report to by means of them, can be grouped together into different categories. For instance, it is usual to group together phenomena such as belief and expectancy in a category of ‘propositional attitudes’, whereas sensations, like pain and itch, in a distinct one. Which taxonomy of the mental would be plausible to be adopted in contexts such as those of introductory books to the philosophy of mind, i.e., when we need to set out (...)
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  • The Psychology of Worldviews: Toward a Non-Reductive Science of Personality.Artur Nilsson - unknown
    Persons are not just mechanical systems of instinctual animalistic proclivities, but also language-producing, existentially aware creatures, whose experiences and actions are drenched in subjective meaning. To understand a human being as a person is to understand him or her as a rational system that wants, fears, hopes, believes, and in other ways imbues the world with meaning, rather than just a mechanical system that is subject to the same chains of cause and effect as other animals. But contemporary personality psychology (...)
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  • O Que É Behaviorismo Sobre a Mente?Filipe Lazzeri - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):249-277.
    It is common to find depictions of behaviorist approaches to the mind as approaches according to which mental events are “dispositions for behavior.” Moreover, it is sometimes said that for these approaches the dispositions are for publicly observable behaviors, or even “purely physical movements,” thereby excluding from being constitutive of mental events any internal bodily happening, besides any movement not taken as “purely physical.” In this paper I aim to pinpoint problems in such widespread depictions of behaviorism about the mind, (...)
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  • Cartesianism and Intersubjectivity in Paranormal Activity and the Philosophy of Mind.Steve Jones - 2017 - Film-Philosophy 21 (1):1-19.
    Over the last century within the philosophy of mind, the intersubjective model of self has gained traction as a viable alternative to the oft-criticised Cartesian solipsistic paradigm. These two models are presented as incompatible inasmuch as Cartesians perceive other minds as “a problem” for the self, while intersubjectivists insist that sociality is foundational to selfhood. This essay uses the Paranormal Activity series (2007–2015) to explore this philosophical debate. It is argued that these films simultaneously evoke Cartesian premises (via found-footage camerawork), (...)
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  • É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?Tárik de Athayde Prata - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):255-276.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p255 O artigo investiga se o naturalismo biológico (a solução de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo) pode ser considerado uma concepção fisicalista acerca da mente. Apesar de defender um fisicalismo a respeito dos particulares (seção 2), Searle adere ao argumento básico dos dualistas para a irredutibilidade das propriedades mentais (seção 3), e não consegue fundamentar sua alegação de que tal irredutibilidade é compatível com o fisicalismo (seção 4). Desse modo, sua teoria da mente se revela como um dualismo de (...)
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  • O que há de reducionismo no naturalismo biológico de Searle?Tárik De Athayde Prata - 2015 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 27 (42):875.
    O artigo tem como objetivo geral determinar se o naturalismo biológico é uma forma de fisicalismo ou de dualismo. Após uma exposição das semelhanças da teoria com o fisicalismo reducionista, é examinada a visão de Searle sobre a redução causal, e discutida uma maneira como sua concepção acerca das capacidades causais da consciência e do cérebro pode ser reformulada para não comprometê-lo com o reducionismo.
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  • Animal Minds: A Non-Representationalist Approach.Hans-Johann Glock - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):213-232.
    Do animals have minds? We have known at least since Aristotle that humans constitute one species of animal. And some benighted contemporaries apart, we also know that most humans have minds. To have any bite, therefore, the question must be restricted to non-human animals, to which I shall henceforth refer simply as "animals." I shall further assume that animals are bereft of linguistic faculties. So, do some animals have minds comparable to those of humans? As regards that question, there are (...)
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  • Observações sobre o Behaviorismo Teleológico: Parte I.F. Lazzeri - 2013 - Acta Comportamentalia 21 (2).
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  • Books Received. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (4):525-530.
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  • Books Received. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):397-398.
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  • Qualia and Conscious Machines.Pentti O. A. Haikonen - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):225-234.