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  1. What Ontological Arguments Don’T Show.Mylan Engel - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (1):97-114.
    Daniel Dombrowski contends that: a number of versions of the ontological argument [OA] are sound; the deity whose existence is most well established by the OA is the deity picked out by Hartshorne’s neoclassical concept of God; skeptics who insist that the OA only shows that “if God exists, then God exists necessarily” are contradicting themselves, and the OA is worth a great deal since it effectively demonstrates the rationality of theism. I argue that theses and are clearly false and (...)
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  • Existence as a Perfection.Michael Wreen - 2017 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 20 (1):161-172.
    This paper is a defense of the view that existence is a perfection. Anselm’s First Ontological Argument is referred to throughout. Two major objections are advanced: the ‘perfect island’ objection and the ‘perfect devil’ objection. A rebuttal of both, based on Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, is tendered, but itself faces a major objection. Two lines of defense against this objection are possible. The first is sympathetically explained but it is argued that it ultimately fails. The second, which focuses on the (...)
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  • Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument.Graham Oppy - 2004 - Philo 7 (2):203-211.
    This paper is a reply to Robert Maydole’s “The Modal Perfection Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being,” published in Philo 6, 2, 2003. I argue that Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument fails, and that there is no evident way in which it can be repaired.
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  • Two Types of Ontological Frame and Gödel’s Ontological Proof.Sergio Galvan - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2):147--168.
    The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the concept of ontological frame. Secondly, two models are distinguished on this structure. The first one is connected to Kant’s concept of possible object and the second one relates to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source of possibility is the mere logical consistency of the notions involved, so that possibility coincides with analytical possibility. Kant, instead, argues that consistency is only a necessary component of possibility. According to Kant, something is (...)
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  • Giving the Ontological Argument Its Due.C’Zar Bernstein - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):665-679.
    In this paper, I shall present and defend an ontological argument for the existence of God. The argument has two premises: possibly, God exists, and necessary existence is a perfection. I then defend, at length, arguments for both of these premises. Finally, I shall address common objections to ontological arguments, such as the Kantian slogan, and Gaunilo-style parodies, and argue that they do not succeed. I conclude that there is at least one extant ontological argument that is plausibly sound.
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  • A Simpler Free Will Defence.C’Zar Bernstein & Nathaniel Helms - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):197-203.
    Otte :165–177, 2009) and Pruss :400–415, 2012) have produced counterexamples to Plantinga’s famous free will defence against the logical version of the problem of evil. The target of this criticism is the possibility of universal transworld depravity, which is crucial to Plantinga’s defence. In this paper, we argue that there is a simpler and more plausible free will defence that does not require the possibility of universal transworld depravity or the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. We assume only that (...)
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  • More Than One Flaw: Reply to Millican.Graham Oppy - 2007 - Sophia 46 (3):295-304.
    Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004) claims to have detected ‘the one fatal flaw in Anselm’s ontological argument.’ I argue that there is more than one important flaw in the position defended in Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004). First, Millican’s reconstruction of Anselm’s argument does serious violence to the original text. Second, Millican’s generalised objection fails to diagnose any flaw in a vast range of ontological arguments. Third, there are independent reasons for thinking that Millican’s generalised objection is unpersuasive.
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  • Higher-Order Ontological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1066-1078.
    This paper discusses recent work on higher-order ontological arguments, including work on arguments due to Gödel, Maydole and Pruss. After setting out a range of these arguments, the paper seeks to highlight the principal difficulties that these kinds of arguments confront. One important aim of the paper is to cast light on Gödel's ontological argument by way of an examination of a range of related higher-order arguments.
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  • Pruss's Ontological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (3):355-363.
    First, I suggest that it is possible to make some further improvements upon the Gödelian ontological arguments that Pruss develops. Then, I argue that it is possible to parody Pruss's Gödelian ontological arguments in a way that shows that they make no contribution towards 'lowering the probability of atheism and raising the probability of theism'. I conclude with some remarks about ways in which the arguments of this paper can be extended to apply to the whole family of Gödelian ontological (...)
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  • A Gödelian Ontological Argument Improved.Alexander R. Pruss - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (3):347-353.
    Gödel's ontological argument is a formal argument for a being defined in terms of the concept of a positive property. I shall defend several versions of Gödel's argument, using weaker premises than Anderson's (1990) version, and avoiding Oppy's (1996 and 2000) parody refutations.
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