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  1. Non-Declarative Sentences and the Theory of Definite Descriptions.John Michael Kuczynski - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (1):119-154.
    This paper shows that Russell’s theory of descriptions gives the wrong semantics for definite descriptions occurring in questions and imperatives. Depending on how that theory is applied, it either assigns nonsense to perfectly meaningful questions and assertions or it assigns meanings that diverge from the actual semantics of such sentences, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for. Given that Russell’s theory is wrong for questions and assertions, it must be wrong for assertoric statements; for the semantics of (...)
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  • Counterfactuals, the Discrimination Problem and the Limit Assumption.José Díez - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):85-110.
    The aim of this paper is to identify what I take to be the main conceptual problem in Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals when the Limit Assumption is not satisfied, what I call the Discrimination Problem , and to present and discuss a modification of Lewis’ semantics that aims at solving DP. First, I outline Lewis’ semantics, highlighting the aspects that will be relevant for our discussion. Second, I present DP and discuss it with a heuristic example. Third, I present the (...)
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  • Supervenience, Dependence, Disjunction.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
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  • Formal Operations and Simulated Thought.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):221-234.
    A series of representations must be semantics-driven if the members of that series are to combine into a single thought: where semantics is not operative, there is at most a series of disjoint representations that add up to nothing true or false, and therefore do not constitute a thought at all. A consequence is that there is necessarily a gulf between simulating thought, on the one hand, and actually thinking, on the other. A related point is that a popular doctrine (...)
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  • Are Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Converse Relations?Gilberto Gomes - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):375 – 387.
    Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B . The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in (...)
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  • Putting Inferentialism and the Suppositional Theory of Conditionals to the Test.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Freiburg
    This dissertation is devoted to empirically contrasting the Suppositional Theory of conditionals, which holds that indicative conditionals serve the purpose of engaging in hypothetical thought, and Inferentialism, which holds that indicative conditionals express reason relations. Throughout a series of experiments, probabilistic and truth-conditional variants of Inferentialism are investigated using new stimulus materials, which manipulate previously overlooked relevance conditions. These studies are some of the first published studies to directly investigate the central claims of Inferentialism empirically. In contrast, the Suppositional Theory (...)
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  • A Non-Test for Ambiguity.Arnold M. Zwicky & Jerrold M. Sadock - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):185 - 187.
    In a recent article in this journal, Roberts suggests a semantic method for distinguishing ambiguity and generality, a method which is intended to avoid the problems that others such as Zwicky and Sadock, Hintikka, and McCawley have found in making such a decision. Roberts claims that his test derives its validity from the observation that an ambiguous expression has a disjunction of meanings, whereas a general expression has but one meaning.
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  • A Non-Test for Ambiguity.Arnold M. Zwicky & Jerrold M. Sadock - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):185-187.
    In a recent article in this journal, Roberts suggests a semantic method for distinguishing ambiguity and generality, a method which is intended to avoid the problems that others such as Zwicky and Sadock, Hintikka, and McCawley have found in making such a decision. Roberts claims that his test derives its validity from the observation that an ambiguous expression has a disjunction of meanings, whereas a general expression has but one meaning.
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  • Ambiguity Vs. Generality: Removal of a Logical Confusion.Lawrence Roberts - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):295 - 313.
    Ambiguous terms are applicable to different kinds of things, but so are general terms, since a general kind may include various species. Thus a bank may be the side of a river or a certain kind of financial institution, and an animal may be a dog or a cat. Similarly, an ambiguous sentence is true in different kinds of situations, and so is a general sentence in that different specific situations may make the same general sentence true. Thus the sentence, (...)
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  • Ambiguity Vs. Generality: Removal of a Logical Confusion.Lawrence Roberts - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):295-313.
    Ambiguous terms are applicable to different kinds of things, but so are general terms, since a general kind may include various species. Thus a bank may be the side of a river or a certain kind of financial institution, and an animal may be a dog or a cat. Similarly, an ambiguous sentence is true in different kinds of situations, and so is a general sentence in that different specific situations may make the same general sentence true. Thus the sentence, (...)
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  • On the Presuppositions of Number Sentences.Katharina Felka - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1393-1412.
    This paper is concerned with an intuitive contrast that arises when we consider sentences containing empty definite descriptions. A sentence like ‘The king of France is bald’ appears neither true nor false, while a sentence like ‘My friend was visited by the king of France’ appears false. Recently, Stephen Yablo has suggested an account of this intuitive contrast. Yablo’s account is particularly interesting, since it has important consequences for the ontological commitments of number sentences like ‘The number of planets is (...)
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  • Pragmatic Meaning and Non-Monotonic Reasoning: The Case of Exhaustive Interpretation.Katrin Schulz & Robert van Rooij - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (2):205 - 250.
    In this paper an approach to the exhaustive interpretation of answers is developed. It builds on a proposal brought forward by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984). We will use the close connection between their approach and McCarthy's (1980, 1986) predicate circumscription and describe exhaustive interpretation as an instance of interpretation in minimal models, well-known from work on counterfactuals (see for instance Lewis (1973)). It is shown that by combining this approach with independent developments in semantics/pragmatics one can overcome certain limitations of (...)
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  • Justification Through Biological Faith: A Rejoinder. [REVIEW]Robert J. Richards - 1986 - Biology and Philosophy 1 (3):337-354.
    Though I have not found enough of the latter to test out this bromide, I am sensible of the value bestowed by colleagues who have taken such exacting care in analyzing my arguments. While their incisive observation and hard objections threaten to leave an extinct theory, I hope the reader will rather judge it one strengthened by adversity. Let me initially expose the heart of my argument so as to make obvious the shocks it must endure. I ask the reader (...)
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  • Imperative Frames and Modality.Per Durst-Andersen - 1995 - Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (6):611 - 653.
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  • What Are Negative Existence Statements About?Jay David Atlas - 1988 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):373 - 394.
  • Expressive Power and Incompleteness of Propositional Logics.James W. Garson - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):159-171.
    Natural deduction systems were motivated by the desire to define the meaning of each connective by specifying how it is introduced and eliminated from inference. In one sense, this attempt fails, for it is well known that propositional logic rules underdetermine the classical truth tables. Natural deduction rules are too weak to enforce the intended readings of the connectives; they allow non-standard models. Two reactions to this phenomenon appear in the literature. One is to try to restore the standard readings, (...)
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  • Gavagai Again.Robert Williams - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):235 - 259.
    Quine (1960, "Word and object". Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ch. 2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. 'Rabbit' might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous 'argument from below' to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the (...)
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  • Gavagai Again.John Robert Gareth Williams - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):235-259.
    Quine (1960, Word and object. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, ch. 2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. ‘Rabbit’ might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous ‘argument from below’ to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the matter (...)
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  • Scalar Implicatures in Complex Sentences.Uli Sauerland - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (3):367-391.
    This article develops a Gricean account for the computation of scalarimplicatures in cases where one scalar term is in the scope ofanother. It shows that a cross-product of two quantitative scalesyields the appropriate scale for many such cases. One exception iscases involving disjunction. For these, I propose an analysis that makesuse of a novel, partially ordered quantitative scale for disjunction andcapitalizes on the idea that implicatures may have different epistemic status.
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  • A Case for a Heretical Deontic Semantics.Walter Edelberg - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (1):1 - 35.
  • Relevance Differently Affects the Truth, Acceptability, and Probability Evaluations of “and”, “but”, “Therefore”, and “If–Then”.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, David Kellen, Hannes Krahl & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):449-482.
    In this study we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and ‘and’/‘but’/‘therefore’ sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege-Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across (...)
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  • The Inscrutability of Reference.Robert Williams - 2005 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
    The metaphysics of representation poses questions such as: in virtue of what does a sentence, picture, or mental state represent that the world is a certain way? In the first instance, I have focused on the semantic properties of language: for example, what is it for a name such as ‘London’ to refer to something? Interpretationism concerning what it is for linguistic expressions to have meaning, says that constitutively, semantic facts are fixed by best semantic theory. As here developed, it (...)
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  • The Price of Inscrutability.J. R. G. Williams - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.
  • The Philosophy of Alternative Logics.Andrew Aberdein & Stephen Read - 2009 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 613-723.
    This chapter focuses on alternative logics. It discusses a hierarchy of logical reform. It presents case studies that illustrate particular aspects of the logical revisionism discussed in the chapter. The first case study is of intuitionistic logic. The second case study turns to quantum logic, a system proposed on empirical grounds as a resolution of the antinomies of quantum mechanics. The third case study is concerned with systems of relevance logic, which have been the subject of an especially detailed reform (...)
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  • Sú pojmy dostatočná podmienka a nutná podmienka pre empirickú oblasť symetrické?František Gahér - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3):331-350.
    The expressions sufficient condition and necessary condition are frequently used in various areas in sciences as well as in everyday usage; therefore, they might be taken as expressing well defined notions which should not lead to any serious misunderstandings when used. According to the widely accepted definitions of both concepts, the concept of sufficient condition and that of necessary condition imply their symmetry : if one thing poses a sufficient condition to another thing, the latter is a necessary condition for (...)
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  • Names.Sam Cumming - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):561-586.
    Recently, von Fintel (2001) and Gillies (2007) have argued that certain sequences of counterfactuals, namely reverse Sobel sequences, should motivate us to abandon standard truth conditional theories of counterfactuals for dynamic semantic theories. I argue that we can give a pragmatic account of our judgments about counterfactuals without giving up the standard semantics. In particular, I introduce a pragmatic principle governing assertability, and I use this principle to explain a variety of subtle data concerning reverse Sobel sequences.
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  • The Relevance of Relevance for Fiction.Anne Reboul - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):729.
  • Formal Analysis of Meaning in Natural Languages.Ljiljana Šarić - 2006 - Prolegomena 5 (1):65-88.
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  • ONLY: An NPI-Licenser and NPI-Unlicenser.Yimei Xiang - 2017 - Journal of Semantics 34 (3):447-481.
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  • The Effect of Premise Order in Conditional Reasoning: A Test of the Mental Model Theory.Vittorio Girotto, Alberto Mazzocco & Alessandra Tasso - 1997 - Cognition 63 (1):1-28.
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  • Gramatická Forma, Logická Forma a Neúplné Symboly.Stephen Neale - 2005 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 11 (3):294-334.
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  • On Interpreting “Interpretive Use”.N. V. Smith - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):734.
  • The Information Needed for Inference.Carlota S. Smith - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):733.
  • A New Semantics for Vagueness.Joshua D. K. Brown & James W. Garson - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):65-85.
    Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative (...)
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  • Rationality as an Explanation of Language?Stuart J. Russell - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):730.
  • Presumptions of Relevance.Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):736.
  • How Relevant?Pieter A. M. Seuren - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):731.
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  • Relevance Must Be to Someone.Yorick Wilks - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):735.
  • Literalness and Other Pragmatic Principles.François Recanati - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):729-730.
  • Inference and Information.Philip Pettit - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):727.