Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Adequate Moods for Non-Eu Decision Making in a Sequential Framework.Nathalie Etchart - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (1):1-28.
    In a dynamic (sequential) framework, departures from the independence axiom (IND) are reputed to induce violations of dynamic consistency (DC), which may in turn have undesirable normative consequences. This result thus questions the normative acceptability of non expected-utility (non-EU) models, which precisely relax IND. This paper pursues a twofold objective. The main one is to discuss the normative conclusion: usual arguments linking violations of DC to departures from IND are shown to be actually based on specific (but usually remaining implicit) (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rejoinder.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):309.
  • What Are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments From the Sequential-Decision Setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.
    There are at least two plausible generalisations of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: cumulative prospect theory (which relaxes the independence axiom) and Levi’s decision theory (which relaxes at least ordering). These theories call for a re-assessment of the minimal requirements of rational choice. Here, I consider how an analysis of sequential decision making contributes to this assessment. I criticise Hammond’s (Economica 44(176):337–350, 1977; Econ Philos 4:292–297, 1988a; Risk, decision and rationality, 1988b; Theory Decis 25:25–78, 1988c) ‘consequentialist’ argument for the SEU (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Distinguishing Indeterminate Belief From “Risk-Averse” Preferences.Katie Steele - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):189-205.
    I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief, such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does not explain how an agent may come to have (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations