In this article, the logical implications of a right to life are examined. It is first argued that the prohibition of Termination of life on request confers an inalienable right to life. A right is inalienable if it cannot legitimately be waived or transferred. Since voluntary euthanasia entails waiver of the right to life, the inalienability yields that it cannot be justified. Therefore, any ethical position that is in favor of voluntary euthanasia has to argue that the right to life (...) is an inalienable right and accept the conclusion that killing on request is justified. (shrink)

Some rights are so important for human autonomy and well-being that many scholars insist they should not be waived, traded, or abandoned. Privacy is a recent addition to this list. At the other end of the spectrum is the belief that privacy is a mere unimportant interest or preference. This paper defends a middle path between viewing privacy as an inalienable, non-waivable, non-transferrable right and the view of privacy as a mere subjective interest. First, an account of privacy is offered (...) that clarifies the concept and demonstrates how privacy is directly related to human health and well-being. Second, along with considering and rejecting several accounts for why privacy might be considered an inalienable right, an argument is offered for why it is morally permissible to waive, transfer, abandon, or alienate privacy. (shrink)

There is a particular moral theory in which human rights are conceived as indestructible rights. Using Dworkin’s words we could say this is a good way of taking rights seriously. However, we may also ask whether there is another way of taking rights as seriously as Dworkin says without being a supporter of that theory. From this point of view, perhaps human rights cannot be considered neither as absolute ; nor universally valid ; and not even inalienable. Can this proposal (...) be seen as another way of taking rights seriously? (shrink)

I. Introduction Two kinds of remedies have traditionally been employed for breach of contract: legal relief and equitable relief. Legal relief normally takes the form of money damages. Equitable relief normally consists either of specific performance or an injunction – that is, the party in breach may be ordered to perform an act or to refrain from performing an act. In this article I will use a “consent theory of contract” to assess the choice between money damages and specific performance. (...) According to such a theory, contractual obligation is dependent on more fundamental entitlements of the parties and arises as a result of the parties' consent to transfer alienable rights. My thesis will be that the normal rule favoring money damages should be replaced with one that presumptively favors specific performance unless the parties have consented to money damages instead. The principal obstacle to such an approach is the reluctance of courts to specifically enforce contracts for personal services. The philosophical distinction between alienable and inalienable rights bolsters this historical reticence, since a right to personal services may be seen as inalienable. I will then explain why, if the subject matter of a contract for personal services is properly confined to an alienable right to money damages for failure to perform, specific enforcement of such contracts is no longer problematic. Finally, I shall consider whether the subject matter of contracts for corporate services is properly confined to money damages like contracts for personal services, or whether performance of corporate services can be made the subject of a valid rights transfer and judicially compelled in the same manner as contracts for external resources. (shrink)

Wollen (2022) is a critique of deontological libertarianism, the version of this philosophy predicated upon private property rights and the non-aggression principle. The launching pad for this article of his is the difficulty faced by conjoined twins, who diverge sharply in their view of their desirable future. The present rejoinder maintains that this author’s critique fails; further, that it really has little or nothing to do with conjoined twins per se, but, rather, aims at an entirely different challenge, that of (...) the tie or the dead heat. This latter is a critique that all political economic philosophies face, without exception, and libertarianism does no worse on this challenge than any other, the critique of Wollen to the contrary notwithstanding. (shrink)

If one has a right merely in virtue of being a person, she cannot lose that right as long as she remained a person – or so I argue. After sketching out what I mean by “natural rights,” “inalienable rights,” and “nonforfeitable rights,” I give some reasons to think any instance of the first would also have to be an instance of the latter two. I then respond to critiques of inalienability by A. John Simmons and Andrew Jason Cohen. After (...) which, I apply the argument given for why natural rights would have to be inalienable as a reason to think they would also have to be nonforfeitable. Then I respond to the idea that the nonforfeitability of natural rights would conflict with self-defense by outlining an alternate account of self-defense. In closing, I consider some potential implications of the inalienability and nonforfeitability of natural rights, should such natural rights exist. (shrink)