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The rationality of being guided by rules

In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 222--39 (2004)

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  1. Collective acts.Paul Weirich - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):223-241.
    Groups of people perform acts. For example, a committee passes a resolution, a team wins a game, and an orchestra performs a symphony. These collective acts may be evaluated for rationality. Take a committee’s passing a resolution. This act may be evaluated not only for fairness but also for rationality. Did it take account of all available information? Is the resolution consistent with the committee’s past resolutions? Standards of collective rationality apply to collective acts, that is, acts that groups of (...)
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  • Descriptive Rules and Normativity.Adriana Placani - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (57):167-180.
    This work offers a challenge to the orthodox view that descriptive rules are non-normative and passive in their role and usage. It does so by arguing that, although lacking in normativity themselves, descriptive rules can be sources of normativity by way of the normative attitudes that can develop around them. That is, although descriptive rules typically depict how things are, they can also play a role in how things ought to be. In this way, the limited role that this type (...)
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  • La paradoja de la superfluidad del derecho y el valor epistemológico de la democracia.Ezequiel Monti - 2015 - Análisis Filosófico 35 (1):133-157.
    En este trabajo, analizo críticamente la tesis de Nino según la cual el valor epistémico de la democracia soluciona la paradoja de la superfluidad del derecho. En este sentido, examino dos cuestiones. Primero, si el valor epistémico de la democracia es una razón para creer que tenemos razones para actuar de conformidad con las leyes democráticas. Segundo, si el valor epistémico de la democracia es una razón para actuar de conformidad con las leyes democráticas independientemente de los méritos del caso (...)
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  • The Problem of Rational Compliance with Rules.Ben Eggleston - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):19-32.
    The problem of rational compliance with rules is the problem of how it can be rational for an agent to follow a rule with a purely consequentialist justification in a case in which she knows that she can do more good by breaking it. This paper discusses two ways in which responses to this problem can fail to address it, using Alan Goldman’s article “The Rationality of Complying with Rules: Paradox Resolved” as a case study.
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