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Colin McGinn (2004). Consciousness and its Objects.

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  1.  71
    Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):81-93.
    I argue that metaphysicians of mind have not done justice to the notion of accessibility between possible worlds. Once accessibility is given its due, physicalism must be reformulated and conceivability arguments must be reevaluated. To reach these conclusions, I explore a novel way of assessing the zombie conceivability argument. I accept that zombies are possible and ask whether that possibility is accessible from our world in the sense of ‘accessible’ used in possible world semantics. It turns out that the question (...)
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    Zombie-Like or Superconscious? A Phenomenological and Conceptual Analysis of Consciousness in Elite Sport.Gunnar Breivik - 2013 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 40 (1):85-106.
    According to a view defended by Hubert Dreyfus and others, elite athletes are totally absorbed while they are performing, and they act non-deliberately without any representational or conceptual thinking. By using both conceptual clarification and phenomenological description the article criticizes this view and maintains that various forms of conscious thinking and acting plays an important role before, during and after competitive events. The article describes in phenomenological detail how elite athletes use consciousness in their actions in sport; as planning, attention, (...)
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  3.  99
    Précis of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism.Derk Pereboom - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):715-727.
    Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism has three parts. The first (Chapters 1–4) develops a response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments against physicalism, one that features the open possibility that introspective representations represent mental properties as having features they actually lack. The second part (Chapters 5 and 6) proposes a physicalist version of a Russellian Monist answer to these arguments, the core of which is that currently unknown intrinsic physical properties provide categorical bases for known physical properties and also (...)
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  4. Are Emotions Perceptual Experiences of Value?Demian Whiting - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):93-107.
    A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by ‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with ‘emotional perception’. But I (...)
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  5. A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
    Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative (...)
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  6.  36
    What Kind of Philosopher Was Locke on Mind and Body?K. I. M. Han-kyul - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):180-207.
    The wide range of conflicting interpretations that exist in regard to Locke's philosophy of mind and body (i.e. dualistic, materialist, idealistic) can be explained by the general failure of commentators to appreciate the full extent of his nominalism. Although his nominalism that focuses on specific natural kinds has been much discussed, his mind-body nominalism remains largely neglected. This neglect, I shall argue, has given rise to the current diversity of interpretations. This paper offers a solution to this interpretative puzzle, and (...)
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  7. What Kind of Philosopher Was Locke on Mind and Body?Han-Kyul Kim - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):180-207.
    The wide range of conflicting interpretations that exist in regard to Locke's philosophy of mind and body (i.e. dualistic, materialist, idealistic) can be explained by the general failure of commentators to appreciate the full extent of his nominalism. Although his nominalism that focuses on specific natural kinds has been much discussed, his mind-body nominalism remains largely neglected. This neglect, I shall argue, has given rise to the current diversity of interpretations. This paper offers a solution to this interpretative puzzle, and (...)
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    What Is It Like to Be Someone Else?Daniel T. Linger - 2010 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 38 (2):205-229.
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    What Is It Like to Be Someone Else?Daniel T. Linger - 2010 - Ethos 38 (2):205-229.
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  10.  83
    Précis of Ignorance and Imagination. [REVIEW]Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):748-755.
  11.  60
    Response to Alter and Bennett. [REVIEW]Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):775-784.
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  12. Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Unpublished:1-13.
    According to the zombie conceivability argument, phenomenal zombies are conceivable, and hence possible, and hence physicalism is false. Critics of the conceivability argument have responded by denying either that zombies are conceivable or that they are possible. Much of the controversy hinges on how to establish and understand what is conceivable, what is possible, and the link between the two—matters that are at least as obscure and controversial as whether consciousness is physical. Because of this, the debate over physicalism is (...)
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    From the Inside: Consciousness and the First‐Person Perspective.Mark Rowlands - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
    To adopt a first-person perspective on consciousness is typically understood as a matter of inwardly engaging one's awareness in such a way as to make one's conscious states and their properties into objects of awareness. When awareness is thus inwardly engaged, experience functions as both act and object of awareness. As objects of awareness, an experience-token and its various properties are items of which a subject is aware. As an act of awareness, an experience-token is that in virtue of which (...)
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  14. Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence.Adam Pautz - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.
    H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness.
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  15. Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
    Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to the argument, the Physicalist can (...)
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