In 1943, Henryk Grossman sent a draft of the study, eventually published in two parts as ‘The Evolutionist Revolt against Classical Economics’, to Max Horkheimer for comment. His very hostile response, Grossman’s drafts and the published study cast light not only on the changing relationship between Grossman and Horkheimer but also on the distance between Grossman’s classical Marxism and nascent mature Critical Theory. Grossman’s study identified the emergence of the idea of successive economic systems in the work of Condorcet, Henri (...) Saint-Simon and Simonde de Sismondi in France, James Steuart and Richard Jones in England, culminating in Marx’s formulations which entailed the role of class struggle and capitalism’s tendency to break down. Hegel was not an influence on Marx’s conception of modes of production. In addition to a series of spurious and minor criticisms, Horkheimer objected that Grossman’s approach was positivist, that it misconceived Hegel’s philosophy, and that it amounted to a conventional history of ideas. In response, Grossman made some changes in his study, but these were designed to strengthen his main arguments and successfully reaffirmed his Marxist approach in the face of Horkheimer’s criticisms. (shrink)

This article draws on Elias’s observations on the origins of political economy and sociology as well as his theory of involvement and detachment to supplement standard accounts of the history of sociology. It shows how, in the 1840s, sociology bifurcated into two tracks. Track I was the highly ‘involved’ partisan track associated with Marx and Engels and track II was the relatively ‘detached’, non-partisan track pursued by Saint-Simon, Comte, Lorenz von Stein and others. These two tracks continue to shape contemporary (...) sociology as basic orientations. The polarization of class conflict predicted in Marx’s theory is contrasted with the class interdependence model in Lorenz von Stein, in particular. Elias’s work is understood as a synthesis of later developments in track II in which he strongly reaffirmed the historical separation of sociology from philosophy. Elias’s work is presented as a central theory of society and as a promising alternative to the prevailing practice of theoretical eclecticism in sociology. (shrink)

Lenin’s State and Revolution is not only a project for imminent revolutionary policy and not only a legitimization argument for a revolutionary dictatorship, but also a theory of state and theory of democracy. Lenin points at the reduplication of state organs that is inherent in a democratic state. While the Russian revolutionary thinks of this reduplication as something transitory, we today increasingly see it as a durable condition coterminous with the late-modern democratic state. I use Lenin’s treatise as a point (...) of inspiration to briefly characterize my dialectical theory of state. (shrink)

An extended review essay on Andrew Feenberg's Heidegger and Marcuse that argues that the concept of negation in Hegel is distinct from that in Heidegger which makes such an attempted synthesis problematic.

Marx’ın nesne ve yöntem tartışmalarının dar kalıbıyla açıklanamayan tek bilimi, insani ihtiyaçlara yanıt vermeyi amaçlaması bakımından bir idealdir. Frankfurt Okulu’nun eleştirel toplum analizi tam olarak bu ideali gerçekleştirme denemesidir. Frankfurt Okulu, mevcut toplumsal yapı ile insani gereksinimler arasındaki ilişkiyi bir bilinç geliştirime sorunu olarak görmekte ve bu soruna aydınlanmacı eleştiri fikrini tarihsel materyalizmin temel savlarıyla birleştirerek çözüm sunmaktadır. Bu girişim, eleştiriyi epistemolojinin alanı dışına taşıdığı gibi tarihi de doğru biçimde toplumun ontolojik zemini haline getirmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Horkheimer, Adorno ve Marcuse’ün (...) bu amaç doğrultusunda sundukları katkılarda, tarih ve toplum ilişkisi bakımından bir boşluk olduğu ve bu boşluğun Benjamin’in tarihe yönelik tezleriyle tamamlanıp tamamlanamayacağı tartışılmaktadır. (shrink)

Bu makale Herbert Marcuse ve Ernst Bloch'un bellek ve sanat üzerine düşüncelerini ve Freud’un bu düşünceler üzerindeki etkilerini inceliyor. Marcuse’nin Eros ve Uygarlık: Freud Üzerine Felsefi Bir İnceleme’si ve Bloch'un Umut İlkesi bu yazının temel referans noktaları olacaktır. Ayrıca, Marcuse'nin ve Bloch'un bellek ve sanat üzerine düşüncelerini şu edebi metinlere referans vererek inceleyeceğim: Rainer Maria Rilke'den Orpheus’a Soneler ve Johann Wolfgang von Goethe'den Faust I ve II. Bu makale iki bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm Marcuse ve Orpheus’a Soneler’e ayrılmıştır. İkinci bölüm (...) Bloch ve Faust I ve II ile ilgilidir. Tüm alıntıları Bloch'un Das Prinzip Hoffnung ve Geist der Utopie, ve Rilke'nin Sonette an Orpheus metinlerinden çevirdiğimi bilgilerinize sunarım. (shrink)

The author makes an introduction to non-standard analysis, then extends the dialectics to “neutrosophy” – which became a new branch of philosophy. This new concept helps in generalizing the intuitionistic, paraconsistent, dialetheism, fuzzy logic to “neutrosophic logic” – which is the first logic that comprises paradoxes and distinguishes between relative and absolute truth. Similarly, the fuzzy set is generalized to “neutrosophic set”. Also, the classical and imprecise probabilities are generalized to “neutrosophic probability”.

This paper consists of an introduction to the life and work of Iring Fetscher by the interviewer, followed by a conversation with Fetscher, and notes. In the interview, Fetscher discusses his relationship to Marxism, Hegelianism, Lukács, and the Frankfurt School, as well as his critique of Althusser. The contribution of Fetscher, an extremely well-known German specialist on Soviet and Marxist thought, is here discussed in greater detail than anywhere else to date in the English-language scholarly literature.

In this paper James’s pluralism is examined in light of his critiques of ‘intellectualism’ and monistic idealism in order to elucidate his relationship to Hegel. Contrary to the strong anti-Hegelianism found throughout the writings of James, Hegel’s dialectic and speculative logic are able to give a rational account of the continuity of objects and relations within experience that James struggled to articulate in A Pluralistic Universe. Neither James nor Hegel is an absolute pluralist or monist due to the interdependence of (...) the concepts of unity and plurality, aptly described by Hegel in his Logic, and alluded to by James in various places throughout his work. Thus, the ambiguity of the nature of James’s pluralism previously noted by scholars is explained, and the relevance of Hegel and dialectic for pragmatist theory is elucidated. (shrink)