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Colin McGinn (1996). The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.

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  1.  92
    The Idols of Inner-Sense.Chad Kidd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1759-1782.
    Many philosophers hold one of two extreme views about our capacity to have phenomenally conscious experience : either that inner-sense enables us to know our experience and its properties infallibly or the contrary conviction that inner-sense is utterly fallible and the evidence it provides completely defeasible. Both of these are in error. This paper presents an alternative conception of inner-sense, modeled on disjunctive conceptions of perceptual awareness, that avoids both erroneous extremes, but that builds on the commonsense intuitions that motivate (...)
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    Olfactory Experience II: Objects and Properties.Clare Batty - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1147-1156.
    The philosophy of perception has been dominated by vision, with very little discussion of the chemical senses – olfaction and gustation. In this second entry of a pair on olfactory experience, I consider what olfaction has to tell us about two issues: the nature of perceptual objects and the nature of perceptual properties and, in particular, the secondary qualities. Given the scant work on olfaction in the philosophical literature, my discussion not only surveys what philosophers have said about olfaction so (...)
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    Olfactory Experience I: The Content of Olfactory Experience.Clare Batty - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1137-1146.
    Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision. Recently, however, philosophers have been turning their attention to the ‘other modalities’. In a pair of entries, I consider olfaction—a sense modality that, along with gustation, has been largely overlooked by philosophers. In this first entry, I consider the challenge that olfactory experience presents to upholding a representational view of the sense modalities. It is common for philosophers to think that visual experience is world‐directed and, in particular, that it (...)
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  4. Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague?Michael V. Antony - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.
    are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some of those conditions cannot be met with conscious state. I conclude that conscious state (...)
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