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Colin McGinn (1984). Wittgenstein on Meaning.

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  1. What is the Normativity of Meaning?Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):219-238.
    There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle (...)
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    Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism.Alexander Miller - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):323-336.
    In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances to (...)
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  3.  35
    Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem or New?Alexander Miller & Ali Saboohi - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):171-178.
    It has recently been claimed that there is a “new hard problem” for physicalism. The new hard problem, according to Goff, is based on “semantic phenomenology”, the view that conscious perceptual experience represents linguistic expressions as having determinate meanings. Goff argues that Kripke’s rule-following argument demonstrates that it is particularly difficult for a physicalist to account for semantic phenomenology. In this paper, we argue that Goff’s discussion of semantic phenomenology fails to uncover a “new” hard problem for physicalism and there (...)
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    Heidegger's Ereignis and Wittgenstein on the Genesis of Language.Richard McDonough - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):416-431.
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  5.  20
    Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism.James Connelly - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):559 - 585.
    Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein?s apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of ?p? is true and p in ?136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of the (...)
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  6.  79
    Dynamics, Brandom-Style.Bernhard Nickel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):333-354.
    Abstract This paper discusses the semantic theory presented in Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit . I argue that it is best understood as a special version of dynamic semantics, so that these semantics by themselves offer an interesting theoretical alternative to more standard truth-conditional theories. This reorientation also has implications for more foundational issues. I argue that it gives us the resources for a renewed argument for the normativity of meaning. The paper ends by critically assessing the view in both (...)
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  7.  36
    Locke and the Primary Signification of Words: An Approach to Word Meaning.Timothy Pritchard - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):486-506.
    Locke’s claim that the primary signification of (most) words is an idea, or complex of ideas, has received different interpretations. I support the majority view that Locke’s notion of primary signification can be construed in terms of linguistic meaning. But this reading has been seen as making Locke’s account vulnerable to various criticisms, of which I consider two. First, it appears to make the account vulnerable to the charge that an idea cannot play the role that a word meaning should (...)
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    Meaning is Normative: A Response to Hattiangadi. [REVIEW]James Connelly - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):55-71.
    Against a broad consensus within contemporary analytic philosophy, Hattiangadi (Mind and Language 21(2):220–240, 2006 , 2007 ) has recently argued that linguistic meaning is not normative, at least not in the sense of being prescriptive. She maintains, more specifically, that standard claims to the effect that meaning is normative are usually ambiguous between two readings: one, which she calls Prescriptivity , and another, which she calls Correctness . According to Hattiangadi, though meaning is normative in the uncontroversial sense specified in (...)
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  9. A New Look at the Problem of Rule-Following: A Generic Perspective.Kai-Yuan Cheng - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):1 - 21.
    The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of rule-following—notably discussed by Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 1982) and Wittgenstein (Philosophical investigations, 1953)—from the perspective of the study of generics. Generics are sentences that express generalizations that tolerate exceptions. I first suggest that meaning ascriptions be viewed as habitual sentences, which are a sub-set of generics. I then seek a proper semantic analysis for habitually construed meaning sentences. The quantificational approach is rejected, due to its (...)
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  10.  35
    Rules and Talking of Rules.Bernhard Weiss - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):229-241.
    I argue that a practice can only be taken to be one of apparent rule following if it contains a practice of policing moves within the practice. So the existence of an apparently rule-governed practice entails the existence of, what I call, a policing practice. I then argue that this entailment cannot be reconciled with a non-factualist construal of the policing practice. Thus non-factualism about the policing practice is false. Factualism about the policing practice entails realism about rules. So I (...)
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    Are There Real Rules for Adding?Jennifer L. Woodrow - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (3):455-477.
    ABSTRACT: I argue that mathematical norms are real. Semantic norms, including mathematical norms for adding, are governed by social practices of undertaking and attributing meaning, and this fact has obscured the objectivity of norms from view. However, a conception of human normativity that takes as its starting point that humans are part of the world undercuts the misconception that our practices are not sufficient to ground real meaning. RÉSUMÉ : J’affirme que les normes sémantiques, y compris les normes mathématiques pour (...)
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    Thoughts and Oughts.Mason Cash - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):93 – 119.
    Many now accept the thesis that norms are somehow constitutively involved in people's contentful intentional states. I distinguish three versions of this normative thesis that disagree about the type of norms constitutively involved. Are they objective norms of correctness, subjective norms of rationality, or intersubjective norms of social practices? I show the advantages of the third version, arguing that it improves upon the other two versions, as well as incorporating their principal insights. I then defend it against two serious challenges: (...)
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  13. Kripke's Paradox and the Church-Turing Thesis.Mark Sprevak - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):285-295.
    Kripke (1982, Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) presents a rule-following paradox in terms of what we meant by our past use of “plus”, but the same paradox can be applied to any other term in natural language. Many responses to the paradox concentrate on fixing determinate meaning for “plus”, or for a small class of other natural language terms. This raises a problem: how can these particular responses be generalised to the whole of natural language? (...)
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  14.  33
    The Community View Revisited.Claudine Verheggen - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):612-631.
    Joining a vast Wittgensteinian anti-theoretical movement, John Canfield has argued that it is possible to read the claims that (1) “language is essentially communal” and (2) “it is conceptually possible that a Crusoe isolated from birth should speak or follow rules” in such a way that they are perfectly compatible, and, indeed, that Wittgenstein held them both at once. The key to doing this is to drain them of any theoretical content or implications that would put each claim at odds (...)
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  15. Kripke's Second Paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201.Samuel Weir - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (2):172–178.
    The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it. -/- In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain why it (...)
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  16. Concept Nativism and the Rule Following Considerations.M. J. Cain - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (38):77-101.
    In this paper I argue that the most prominent and familiar features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations generate a powerful argument for the thesis that most of our concepts are innate, an argument that echoes a Chomskyan poverty of the stimulus argument. This argument has a significance over and above what it tells us about Wittgenstein’s implicit commitments. For, it puts considerable pressure on widely held contemporary views of concept learning, such as the view that we learn concepts by constructing (...)
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  17. Is Meaning Normative?Anandi Hattiangadi - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
    Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern (...)
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  18.  39
    Stroud on Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Community.Claudine Verheggen - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (1):67-85.
    According to Barry Stroud, Wittgenstein thought that language is social only in this minimal way: we cannot make sense of the idea of someone having a language unless we can describe her as using signs in conformity with the linguistic practices of some community. Since a solitary person could meet this condition, Stroud concludes that, for Wittgenstein, solitary languages are possible. I argue that Wittgenstein infact thought that language is social in a much more robust way. Solitary languages are not (...)
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  19. Rule-Following and Externalism.Alexander Miller - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.
    John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
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  20.  37
    How to Talk to Yourself or Kripke's Wittgenstein's Solitary Language Argument and Why It Fails.William Max Knorpp - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):215-248.
  21.  78
    Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning.Claudine Verheggen - 2003 - Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):285–310.
  22. The Norms of Thought: Are They Social?Pascal Engel - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.
    A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that (...)
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  23.  41
    Externalism and Scientific Cartesianism.Graeme R. Forbes - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):196-205.
  24.  24
    Nothing is Concealed: De-Centring Tacit Knowledge and Rules From Social Theory.Nigel Pleasants - 1996 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):233–255.
    The concept of “tacit knowledge” as the means by which individuals interpret the “rules” of social interaction occupies a central role in all the major contemporary theories of action and social structure. The major reference point for social theorists is Wittgenstein's celebrated discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. Focusing on Giddens' incorporation of tacit knowledge and rules into his “theory of structuration”, I argue that Wittgenstein's later work is steadfastly set against the “latent cognitivism” inherent in the idea of (...)
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  25.  23
    Learning From Experience: A Commentary on Baddeley and Weiskrantz (Eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control.Bill Brewer - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):181-193.
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  26.  75
    Electric Brain Fields and Memory Traces: Wittgenstein and Gestalt Psychology.Michel Hark - 1995 - Philosophical Investigations 18 (2):113-138.
  27.  8
    Wittgenstein on the Mind.Grant Gillett - 1994 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):103 – 115.
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  28.  88
    Recent Work on Wittgenstein, 1980–1990. [REVIEW]David G. Stern - 1994 - Synthese 98 (3):415-458.
    While Wittgenstein wrote unconventionally and denied that he was advancing philosophical theses, most of his interpreters have attributed conventional philosophical theses to him. But the best recent interpretations have taken the form of his writing and his distinctive way of doing philosophy seriously. The 1980s have also seen the emergence of a body of work on Wittgenstein that makes extensive use of the unpublished Wittgenstein papers. This work on Wittgenstein's method and his way of writing are the main themes of (...)
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    The Philosophical Psychologism of the Tractatus.Richard McDonough - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):425-447.
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  30.  53
    Modest Scepticism About Rule-Following.T. Shogenji - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500.
  31.  78
    Beyond the Private Language Argument.Paul K. Moser - 1992 - Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):77-89.
  32.  13
    Wittgenstein and Infinite Linguistic Competence.Ian Niles - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):193-213.
  33.  22
    Empathy and Evaluation: Understanding the Private Meanings of Behavior. [REVIEW]H. A. Alexander - 1991 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 11 (2):123-134.
  34.  67
    Kripke and McGinn on Wittgensteinian Rule-Following.Stephen C. Hetherington - 1991 - Philosophia 21 (1-2):89-100.
  35.  74
    Models of Memory: Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science.David G. Stern - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):203-18.
  36. Odors and Private Language: Observations on the Phenomenology of Scent. [REVIEW]Uri Almagor - 1990 - Human Studies 13 (3):253-274.
  37.  18
    Social Science and the Mental.Alan J. Nelson - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):194-209.
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  38.  18
    Wittgenstein on Rules: Implications for Authority and Discipline in Education.James D. Marshall - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 19 (1):3–11.