Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Attitudinal Control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.
    Beliefs are held to norms in a way that seems to require control over what we believe. Yet we don’t control our beliefs at will, in the way we control our actions. I argue that this problem can be solved by recognising a different form of control, which we exercise when we revise our beliefs directly for reasons. We enjoy this form of attitudinal control not only over our beliefs, but also over other attitudes, including intentions—that is, over the will (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Doxastic Deontology and Cognitive Competence.Gábor Forrai - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.
    The paper challenges William Alston’s argument against doxastic deontology, the view that we have epistemic duties concerning our beliefs. The core of the argument is that doxastic deontology requires voluntary control over our beliefs, which we do not have. The idea that doxastic deontology requires voluntary control is supposed to follow from the principle that ought implies can. The paper argues that this is wrong: in the OIC principle which regulates our doxastic duties the “can” does not stand for the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Doxastic Responsibility, Guidance Control, and Ownership of Belief.Robert Carry Osborne - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    The contemporary debate over responsibility for belief is divided over the issue of whether such responsibility requires doxastic control, and whether this control must be voluntary in nature. It has recently become popular to hold that responsibility for belief does not require voluntary doxastic control, or perhaps even any form of doxastic ‘control’ at all. However, Miriam McCormick has recently argued that doxastic responsibility does in fact require quasi-voluntary doxastic control: “guidance control,” a complex, compatibilist form of control. In this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Metaphilosophy (3):283-304.
    An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa’s (2017) recent thinking is that enhanced performances (e.g., the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance-enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. In this paper, I explore in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa’s wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Emotions, Attitudes, and Reasons.Kelly Epley - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):256-282.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - forthcoming - Noûs.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inference as Doxastic Agency. Part I: The Basics of Justification Stit Logic.Grigory K. Olkhovikov & Heinrich Wansing - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (1):167-194.
    In this paper we consider logical inference as an activity that results in proofs and hence produces knowledge. We suggest to merge the semantical analysis of deliberatively seeing-to-it-that from stit theory and the semantics of the epistemic logic with justification from. The general idea is to understand proving that A as seeing to it that a proof of A is available. We introduce a semantics of various notions of proving as an activity and present a number of valid principles that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency.Matthew Chrisman - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):508-529.
    On the assumption that genuinely normative demands concern things connected in some way to our agency, i.e. what we exercise in doing things with or for reasons, epistemologists face an important question: are there genuine epistemic norms governing belief, and if so where in the vicinity of belief are we to find the requisite cognitive agency? Extant accounts of cognitive agency tend to focus on belief itself or the event of belief-formation to answer this question, to the exclusion of the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Other People’s Problems: Student Distancing, Epistemic Responsibility, and Injustice.Matt Whitt - 2016 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 35 (5):427-444.
    In classes that examine entrenched injustices like sexism or racism, students sometimes use “distancing strategies” to dissociate themselves from the injustice being studied. Education researchers argue that distancing is a mechanism through which students, especially students of apparent privilege, deny their complicity in systemic injustice. While I am sympathetic to this analysis, I argue that there is much at stake in student distancing that the current literature fails to recognize. On my view, distancing perpetuates socially sanctioned forms of ignorance and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Why Doxastic Responsibility is Not Based on Direct Doxastic Control.Andrea Kruse - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2811-2842.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that doxastic responsibility, i.e., responsibility for holding a certain doxastic attitude, is not based on direct doxastic control. There are two different kinds of direct doxastic control to be found in the literature, intentional doxastic control and evaluative doxastic control. Although many epistemologists agree that we do not have intentional doxastic control over our doxastic attitudes, it has been argued that we have evaluative doxastic control over the majority of our doxastic attitudes. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epistemic Justification and the Ignorance Excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.
    One of the most common excuses is ignorance. Ignorance does not always excuse, however, for sometimes ignorance is culpable. One of the most natural ways to think of the difference between exculpating and culpable ignorance is in terms of justification; that is, one’s ignorance is exculpating only if it is justified and one’s ignorance is culpable only if it not justified. Rosen :591–610, 2008) explores this idea by first offering a brief account of justification, and then two cases that he (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Belief as an Act of Reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.
    Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):4-28.
    We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxastic responsibility. First, it emphasizes (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.
    This paper attempts to answer two questions: What is epistemic agency? And what are the motivations for having this concept? In response to the first question, it is argued that epistemic agency is the agency one has over one’s belief-forming practices, or doxastic dispositions, which can directly affect the way one forms a belief and indirectly affect the beliefs one forms. In response to the second question, it is suggested that the above conception of epistemic agency is either implicitly endorsed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.
    What makes certain mental states subject to evaluation with respect to norms of rationality and justification, and others arational? In this paper, I develop and defend an account that explains why belief is governed by, and so appropriately subject to, evaluation with respect to norms of rationality and justification, one that does justice to the complexity of our evaluative practice in this domain. Then, I sketch out a way of extending the account to explain when and why other kinds of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Emotional Regulation and Responsibility.Tom Roberts - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):487-500.
    I argue that one’s responsibility for one’s emotions has a two-fold structure: one bears direct responsibility for emotions insofar as they are the upshot of first-order evaluative judgements concerning reasons of fit; and one bears derivative responsibility for them insofar as they are consequences of activities of emotional self-regulation, which can reflect one’s take on second-order reasons concerning the strategic, prudential, or moral desirability of undergoing a particular emotion in a particular context.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation