Switch to: References

Citations of:

Truth and freedom

Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57 (2009)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Eternity, Knowledge, and Freedom.Joseph Diekemper - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):45-64.
    This article addresses the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom by developing a modified version of Boethius' solution to the problem – one that is meant to cohere with a dynamic theory of time and a conception of God as temporal. I begin the article by discussing the traditional Boethian solution, and a defence of it due to Kretzmann and Stump. After canvassing a few of the objections to this view, I then go on to offer my own modified (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Two Kinds of Soft Facts.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):34-53.
    _ Source: _Page Count 20 The concept of soft facts is crucial for the Ockhamistic analysis of the divine knowledge of future contingents; moreover, this notion is important in itself because it concerns the structure of the facts that depend—in some sense—on other future facts. However, the debate on soft facts is often flawed by the unaware use of two different notions of soft facts. The facts of the first kind are supervenient on temporal facts: By bringing about a temporal (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Propositional Attitudes?Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.
  • Prophets Against Ockhamism. Or: Why the Hard Fact/Soft Fact Distinction is Irrelevant to the Problem of Foreknowledge.Raphael van Riel - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):119-135.
    In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a solution to the problem (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Fatalism and Future Contingents.Giacomo Andreoletti - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy:1-14.
    In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time.John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.
    Nelson Pike’s article, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” is one of the most influential pieces in contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Published over forty years ago, it has elicited many different kinds of replies. We shall set forth some of the main lines of reply to Pike’s article, starting with some of the “early” replies. We then explore some issues that arise from relatively recent work in the philosophy of time; it is fascinating to note that views suggested by recent work (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.
    Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument employs the concept of accidental necessity. But an opponent of this argument might challenge it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Merricks (Philos Rev 118:29–57, 2009, Philos Rev 120:567–586, 2011a) and Zagzebski (Faith Philos 19(4):503–519, 2002, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. In this paper, I aim to show that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Shabo on Logical Versions of the Direct Argument.P. Turner - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2125-2132.
    In a recent paper, Seth Shabo sets out to show that logical renderings of the Direct Argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism, an influential incompatibilist argument for this conclusion, fail. In particular, Shabo argues that the Direct Argument—cashed out in logical terms—fails because it rests on an invalid rule of inference, Rule B. Shabo argues that Rule B, rendered logically, is subject to a counterexample that he constructs. If he’s right about this, it follows that logical versions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Time, Foreknowledge, and Alternative Possibilities.Jeffrey Green & Katherin Rogers - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (2):151 - 164.
    In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker's critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson's claim that Anselmian freedom is incompatible with free will because it entails that our actions are 'ontologically necessary'. In defending Anselmian freedom we argue (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.
    The Consequence Argument has elicited various responses, ranging from acceptance as obviously right to rejection as obviously problematic in one way or another. Here we wish to focus on one specific response, according to which the Consequence Argument begs the question. This is a serious accusation that has not yet been adequately rebutted, and we aim to remedy that in what follows. We begin by giving a formulation of the Consequence Argument. We also offer some tentative proposals about the nature (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
    Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past.John Fischer - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.
    I seek to clarify the notion of the fixity of the past appropriate to Pike’s regimentation of the argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. Also, I discuss Alvin Plantinga’s famous example of Paul and the Ant Colony in light of Pike’s argument.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Logic of the Compatibility of God's Foreknowledge and Human Freewill.J. Westphal - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):746-748.
    A central argument for the view that God's necessary omniscience [( Bgf p )] precludes freewill is unsound, because the necessity of the consequence is not the necessity of the consequent, and nor is Bgf true. God's belief in some particular proposition f about what I will do is not necessary, as I might do something that makes ~ f true. Fischer and Tognazzini claim that this counterargument argument assumes that I must freely do the something that makes f true. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Free Will, Foreknowledge, and Future‐Dependent Beliefs.Raphael van Riel - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):500-520.
    Recently, a time-honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on. This argument is interesting (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):346-367.
    Several theorists (Merricks, Westphal, and McCall) have recently claimed to offer a novel way to respond to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, rooted in Molina's insight that God's beliefs depend on what we do, rather than the other way around. In this paper we argue that these responses either beg the question, or else are dressed-up versions of Ockhamism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.
    In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft facts’ (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations