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  1. Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity.Thomas Szanto & Joel Krueger - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):153-162.
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  • Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action.Matti Heinonen - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):168-188.
    I distinguish two kinds of contribution that have been made by recent minimalist accounts of joint action in philosophy and cognitive science relative to established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “complementarists” seek to analyze a functionally different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “constitutionalists” seek to expose mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, without taking a definite stance on which functional characterization (...)
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  • Empathy≠Sharing: Perspectives From Phenomenology and Developmental Psychology.Dan Zahavi & Philippe Rochat - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:543-553.
  • On the Awareness of Joint Agency: A Pessimistic Account of the Feelings of Acting Together.James M. Dow - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):161-182.
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  • Viewing Others as Equals: The Non-Cognitive Roots of Shared Intentionality.Alejandro Rosas & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):485-502.
    We propose two adjustments to the classic view of shared intentionality as based on conceptual-level cognitive skills. The first one takes into account that infants and young children display this capacity, but lack conceptual-level cognitive skills. The second one seeks to integrate cognitive and non-cognitive skills into that capacity. This second adjustment is motivated by two facts. First, there is an enormous difference between human infants and our closest living primate relatives with respect to the range and scale of goal (...)
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  • How Does It Really Feel to Act Together? Shared Emotions and the Phenomenology of We-Agency.Mikko Salmela & Michiru Nagatsu - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):449-470.
    Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first reconstruct Pacherie’s account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two problems, namely the necessary trade-off between the sense of self- (...)
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  • What Are Shared Emotions ?John Michael - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Shared Emotions: A Steinian Proposal.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):997-1015.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...)
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  • Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
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