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Burgess' PV Is Robinson's Q

Journal of Symbolic Logic 72 (2):619 - 624 (2007)

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  1. Finitistic Arithmetic and Classical Logic.Mihai Ganea - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (2):167-197.
    It can be argued that only the equational theories of some sub-elementary function algebras are finitistic or intuitive according to a certain interpretation of Hilbert's conception of intuition. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation of those restricted forms of equational reasoning to classical quantifier logic in arithmetic. The conclusion reached is that Edward Nelson's ‘predicative arithmetic’ program, which makes essential use of classical quantifier logic, cannot be justified finitistically and thus requires a different philosophical foundation, possibly (...)
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  • Sir Michael Anthony Eardley Dummett, 1925-2011.R. G. Heck - 2013 - Philosophia Mathematica 21 (1):1-8.
    A remembrance of Dummett's work on philosophy of mathematcis.
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  • The Strength of Abstraction with Predicative Comprehension.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 22 (1):105–120.
    Frege's theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in Hume's Principle and full impredicative comprehension. Hume's Principle is one example of an abstraction principle, while another paradigmatic example is Basic Law V from Frege's Grundgesetze. In this paper we study the strength of abstraction principles in the presence of predicative restrictions on the comprehension schema, and in particular we study a predicative Fregean theory which contains all the abstraction principles whose underlying equivalence relations can be proven to be equivalence (...)
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  • Term Models for Abstraction Principles.Leon Horsten & Øystein Linnebo - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (1):1-23.
    Kripke’s notion of groundedness plays a central role in many responses to the semantic paradoxes. Can the notion of groundedness be brought to bear on the paradoxes that arise in connection with abstraction principles? We explore a version of grounded abstraction whereby term models are built up in a ‘grounded’ manner. The results are mixed. Our method solves a problem concerning circularity and yields a ‘grounded’ model for the predicative theory based on Frege’s Basic Law V. However, the method is (...)
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  • Comparing Peano Arithmetic, Basic Law V, and Hume’s Principle.Sean Walsh - 2012 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (11):1679-1709.
    This paper presents new constructions of models of Hume's Principle and Basic Law V with restricted amounts of comprehension. The techniques used in these constructions are drawn from hyperarithmetic theory and the model theory of fields, and formalizing these techniques within various subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic allows one to put upper and lower bounds on the interpretability strength of these theories and hence to compare these theories to the canonical subsystems of second-order arithmetic. The main results of this paper (...)
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  • The Predicative Frege Hierarchy.Albert Visser - 2009 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 160 (2):129-153.
    In this paper, we characterize the strength of the predicative Frege hierarchy, , introduced by John Burgess in his book [J. Burgess, Fixing frege, in: Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005]. We show that and are mutually interpretable. It follows that is mutually interpretable with Q. This fact was proved earlier by Mihai Ganea in [M. Ganea, Burgess’ PV is Robinson’s Q, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 72 619–624] using a different proof. Another consequence of the our (...)
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