The internet presents not just opportunities but also risks that range, to name a few, from online abuse and misinformation to the polarisation of public debate. Given the increasingly digital nature of our societies, these risks make it essential for users to learn how to wisely use digital technologies as part of a more holistic approach to promoting human flourishing. However, insofar as they are exacerbated by both the affordances and the political economy of the internet, this article argues that (...) a new understanding of wisdom that is germane to the digital age is needed. As a result, we propose a framework for conceptualising what we call cyber-wisdom, and how this can be cultivated via formal education, in ways that are grounded in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and that build on three prominent existing models of wisdom. The framework, according to which cyber-wisdom is crucial to navigating online risks and opportunities through the deployment of character virtues necessary for flourishing online, suggests that cyber-wisdom consists of four components: cyber-wisdom literacy, cyber-wisdom reasoning, cyber-wisdom self-reflection, cyber-wisdom motivation. Unlike the models on which it builds, the framework accounts for the specificity of the digital age and is both conceptual and practical. On the one hand, each component has conceptual implications for what it means to be wise in the digital age. On the other hand, informed by character education literature and practice, it has practical implications for how to cultivate cyber-wisdom in the classroom through teaching methods that match its different components. (shrink)

In this paper, I examined whether evidence from the neuroscience of morality supports the standard models of phronesis, i.e., Jubilee and Aretai Centre Models. The standard models explain phronesis as a multifaceted construct based on interaction and coordination among functional components. I reviewed recent neuroscience studies focusing on brain networks associated with morality and their connectivity to examine the validity of the models. Simultaneously, I discussed whether the evidence helps the models address challenges, particularly those from the phronesis eliminativism. Neuroscientific (...) evidence supported the importance of brain networks, i.e., the default mode, salience, and central executive functioning networks, in moral functioning in general. The findings favorably supported the multifaceted and integrative nature of phronesis proposed by the standard models. Finally, I considered how the two models could explain the mechanisms of phronesis more integratively based on neuroscientific findings. At the end of this paper, with the evidence, I proposed several practical ideas to promote the cultivation of phronesis, e.g., the consideration of coordination among components for moral functioning and the use of moral exemplars. (shrink)

What is the nature and structure of phronesis or practical wisdom? According to the view widely held by philosophers and psychologists, a person S is wise if and only if S knows how to live well. Given this view of practical wisdom, the guiding question is this: What exactly is “knowing how to live well”? It seems that no one has a clear idea of how to answer this simple but fundamental question. This paper explores knowing how to live well (...) (or “life know-how”) by showing how its nature and structure can be understood through contemporary epistemology of knowledge-how. I will achieve this by doing the following. In Section I, I highlight the two as-yet unanswered “integration questions” about life know-how. In Section II, I explain why the epistemology of knowledge-how has good potential to address the integration questions. In Sections III and IV, I construct two positions—intellectualism and anti-intellectualism—for the epistemology of life know-how and show how they address the two integration questions. In Section V, I show how the epistemology of life know-how established in the previous sections can be used in the philosophy of wisdom and the psychology of wisdom. (shrink)

I explored the association between components constituting the basis for moral and optimal human functioning, i.e., moral reasoning, moral identity, empathy, and purpose, via network analysis. I employed factor scores instead of composite scores that most previous studies used for better accuracy in score estimation in this study. Then, I estimated the network structure among collected variables and centrality indicators. For additional information, the structure and indicators were compared between two groups, participants who engaged in civic activities highly versus lowly. (...) The results demonstrated significant intra- and inter-scale associations in the network. The network structure was invariant across the two groups. Despite the network invariance, I found that the global connectivity between and centrality indicators of examined factors were higher among the high civic engagement group in general. I discussed the implications of the findings in research on moral functioning based on moral psychology and virtue ethics. (shrink)