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Me chantek: The development of self-awareness in a signing orangutan

In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press (1994)

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  1. Reflections on the "human behaviourome": Mind mapping and its futures.Arthur Saniotis - 2007 - World Futures 63 (8):611 – 622.
    The completion of the human genome has given rise to a genre of mapping that enables scientists to explore biological life systems at a molecular level. Influenced by the human genome project, the human brain mapping project is underway with the goal in understanding the molecular basis of human cognition. In November 2002, scientists Daryl Macer and Masakazu Inaba developed a mental mapping project called the "human behaviourome" in order to map the broad spectrum of human ideas. Although the aim (...)
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  • A General Model for the Adaptive Function of Self-Knowledge in Animals and Humans.Sue Taylor Parker - 1997 - Consciousness and Cognition 6 (1):75-86.
    This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. (...)
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  • Automata, receptacles, and selves.Paola Cavalieri & Harlan B. Miller - 1999 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5.
    After rejecting Carruthers' conflation of levels of consciousness as implausible and conceptually muddled, and Carruthers' claim that nonhumans are automata as undermined by evolutionary and ethological considerations, we develop a general criticism of contemporary philosophical approaches which, though recognizing nonhuman consciousness, still see animals as mere receptacles of experiences. This is, we argue, due to the fact that, while in the case of humans we grant a self - something that has not only a descriptive but also a prescriptive side, (...)
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