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Natural goodness and natural evil

Ratio 19 (2):199–213 (2006)

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  1. Gute Gründe und natürliche Zwecke: Rosalind Hursthouses Beitrag zum ethischen Naturalismus.Sascha Settegast - 2017 - In Martin Hähnel (ed.), Aristotelischer Naturalismus. Springer. pp. 173-183.
  • Ethical Naturalism and the Constitution of Agency.John Hacker-Wright - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):13-23.
  • Aristotelian Naturalism Vs. Mutants, Aliens and the Great Red Dragon.Scott Woodcock - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):313-328.
    In this paper I present a new objection to the Aristotelian Naturalism defended by Philippa Foot. I describe this objection as a membership objection because it reveals the fact that AN invites counterexamples when pressed to identify the individuals bound by its normative claims. I present three examples of agents for whom the norms generated by AN are not obviously authoritative: mutants, aliens, and the Great Red Dragon. Those who continue to advocate for Foot's view can give compelling replies to (...)
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  • Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the Indeterminacy Objection.Scott Woodcock - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):20-41.
    Philippa Foot’s virtue ethics remains an intriguing but divisive position in normative ethics. For some, the promise of grounding human virtue in natural facts is a useful method of establishing normative content. For others, the natural facts on which the virtues are established appear naively uninformed when it comes to the empirical details of our species. In response to this criticism, a new cohort of neo-Aristotelians like John Hacker-Wright attempt to defend Foot by reminding critics that the facts at stake (...)
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  • Moral Reasoning as Naturally Good: A Qualified Defense of Foot's Conception of Practical Rationality.Steven Hendley - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):427-449.
    Philippa Foot 's version of ethical naturalism, centered on the idea of “natural goodness,” has received a good deal of critical scrutiny. One pervasive criticism contends that less than virtuous modes of conduct may be described as naturally good or, at least, not naturally defective on her account. If true, this contradicts the most ambitious aspect of Foot 's naturalistic approach to ethics: to show that judgments of moral goodness are a subclass of judgments of natural goodness. But even if (...)
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