In the introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes famously defends the anthropological point of departure of his theory of the state by invoking the Delphic injunction ‘Know thyself!’ of which he presents a peculiar reading thereafter. In this paper, I present a reading of the anthropology of the Leviathan that takes this move seriously. In appealing to Delphic injunction, Hobbes wanted to prompt a particular way of reading his anthropology for which it is crucial that the reader relate the presented anthropological (...) views to his self-conception. The anthropology of the Leviathan is thus a kind of manual for a certain kind of self-reflection by which the reader's self-knowledge is to be improved. Furthermore, I will argue that Hobbes' interpretation of the Delphic injunction illuminates several theoretical issues relevant to the epistemology of that kind of ‘self-knowledge’ that was demanded by the Delphic injunction. While Hobbes does not solve all the epistemological problems related with the ideal appealed to by this inscription, he does provide some interesting insights into some general requirements that any epistemological account of Socratic self-knowledge has to meet. (shrink)

Vyplývá z bezvadně provedeného důkazu také závazek počítat ve svém dalším rozvažování a jednání s jeho závěrem? V předložené studii se zabývám Hobbesovým Leviathanem coby „literární technologií“, která čtenáře staví do role autora v Leviathanu rozvíjené argumentace. V tomto smyslu kriticky navazuji jednak na interpretaci Hobbesova vědeckého stylu, kterou nabízejí S. Shapin a S. Schaffer, jednak na výklad Q. Skinnera, který se podrobně zabývá Hobbesovou rétorickou praxí. Nabízím tezi, podle níž se Hobbes v kontaktu se svým publikem nespokojuje s předvedením (...) vědeckého důkazu, nýbrž své čtenáře nechává na vytváření vědecké argumentace a jejím závěru osobně participovat. (shrink)

This paper challenges the colonial reading of Thomas Hobbes’s use of America. Firstly, by analysing all the references and allusions to America in Hobbes’s writings, I claim that Hobbes simply uses America to support his central theory of the state of nature, showing the fundamental significance of a large and lasting society to our being and well-being. Secondly, I argue that Hobbes’s use of America does not serve a second purpose that is similar to Locke’s justification of English land appropriation. (...) Even extending such a Lockean colonial theme from Hobbes’s theory would fail due to Hobbes’s unique property theory. Lastly, with a more nuanced contextual analysis of Hobbes’s involvement in the Virginia Company and relevant textual analysis, I propose that Hobbes is not only not a supporter of English colonialism, but rather an opponent of the Virginia Company, imperial expansion, and colonial conquest. I am not denying the fact that later thinkers like Locke develop Hobbes’s notion of the American state of nature to justify European colonization in America. However, the received history should not be confused with Hobbes’s own writing purpose. Nor should we ignore Hobbes’s opposition to imperial expansion. (shrink)