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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Why Arguments from Expert Opinion are Weak Arguments
Informal Logic 33 (1):57-79 (2013)
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Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony puts subjects in a better position than non-expert testimony to obtain knowledge about a subject matter. I offer three arguments showing that veritism is an inadequate account of expert authority because the reliable access condition renders expertise incapable of performing its social role. I then develop (...) |
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This paper combines three computational argumentation systems to model the sequence of argumentation in a famous murder trial and the appeal procedure that followed. The paper shows how the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion can be built into a testing procedure whereby an argument graph is used to interpret, analyze and evaluate evidence-based natural language argumentation of the kind found in a trial. It is shown how a computational argumentation system can do this by combining argument schemes with (...) |
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This paper takes an argumentation approach to find the place of trust in a method for evaluating arguments from expert opinion. The method uses the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion along with its matching set of critical questions. It shows how to use this scheme in three formal computational argumentation models that provide tools to analyse and evaluate instances of argument from expert opinion. The paper uses several examples to illustrate the use of these tools. A conclusion of (...) |
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In a paper published in this journal Martin Hinton aims to show that the struggle between Moti Mizrahi and me about whether arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments rests on misunderstandings (Hinton 2015). Let me emphasize that I generally appreciate Hinton’s intention to settle the dispute between Mizrahi and myself in this way. 1 Furthermore, I also agree with Hinton’s conclusion that if Mizrahi is interpreted in the way Hinton does, then Mizrahi’s “claim becomes far less controversial, but also (...) |
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In this paper, I argue that many arguments from expert opinion are strong arguments. Therefore, in many cases it is rational to rely on experts since in many cases the fact that an expert says that p makes it highly likely that p is true. I will defend this claim by providing 5 arguments that illuminate and elaborate on 5 crucial claims about expertise. In this way, I aim to undermine recent attempts to establish a rampant scepticism about arguments from (...) |
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A background assumption of this paper is that the repertoire of inference schemes available to humanity is not fixed, but subject to change as new schemes are invented or refined and as old ones are obsolesced or abandoned. This is particularly visible in areas like health and environmental sciences, where enormous societal investment has been made in finding ways to reach more dependable conclusions. Computational modeling of argumentation, at least for the discourse in expert fields, will require the possibility of (...) |
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ABSTRACT Fallacies are traditionally defined as potentially deceptive failures of rationality or reasonableness. Fallacy theories seek to model this failure by formulating standards of rationality or reasonableness that arguers must observe when engaging in argumentative interaction. Yet it remains relatively easy to reject or avoid fallacy judgments even in the most clear-cut cases. In this article, I argue for a pluralist approach to criticism in which the fallacy accusation is only the starting point for a more complex form of criticism. (...) No categories |
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This article seeks, first, to show that much of the existing normative work on argument from expert opinion (AEO) is problematic for failing to be properly informed by empirical findings on expert performance. Second, it seeks to show how, with the analytic tool of Bayesian reasoning, the problem diagnosed can be remedied to circumvent some of the problems facing the scheme-based treatment of AEOs. To establish the first contention, we will illustrate how empirical studies on factors conditioning expert reliability can (...) |
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In a paper and a reply to critics published in _Informal Logic_, I argue that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. To appeal to expert opinion is to take an expert’s judgment that _p_ is the case as evidence for _p_. Such appeals to expert opinion are weak, I argue, because the fact that an expert judges that _p_ does not make it significantly more likely that _p_ is true or probable, as evidence from empirical studies on expert performance (...) |
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Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert (...) |
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In one of his papers, Moti Mizrahi argues that arguments from an expert opinion are weak arguments. His thesis may seem controversial due to the consensus on this topic in the field of informal logic. I argue that its controversy is framework-dependent, and if translated into a different framework, it appears to be a correct, however trivial, claim. I will use a framework based on Douglas Walton’s argumentation scheme theory and his conception of examination dialogue to demonstrate that it is (...) |
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Recent disputes :57–79, 2013; Mizrahi in Inform Logic 36:238–252, 2016; Mizrahi in Argumentation 32:175–195, 2018; Seidel in Inform Logic 34:192–218, 2014; Seidel in Inform Logic 36:253–264, 2016; Hinton in Inform Logic 35:539–554, 2015) on the strength of arguments from expert opinion give rise to a potential legitimacy crisis of it. Mizrahi :57–79, 2013; Inform Logic 36:238–252; Argumentation 32:175–195, 2018) claims that AEO are weak arguments by presenting two independent arguments. The first argument is that AEO are weak arguments because empirical (...) No categories |
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In their book Commitment in Dialogue, Walton and Krabbe claim that formal dialogue systems for conversational argumentation are “not very realistic and not easy to apply”. This difficulty may make argumentation theory less well adapted to be employed to describe or analyse actual argumentation practice. On the other hand, the empirical study of real-life arguments may miss or ignore insights of more than the two millennia of the development of philosophy of language, rhetoric, and argumentation theory. In this paper, we (...) No categories |
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ABSTRACTIn order to properly understand how expert disagreement should be dealt with, it is essential to grasp how expert opinion is used in the reasoning process by which humans reach conclusions and make decisions. This paper utilises the tools of argumentation theory, specifically Douglas Walton’s argument schemes, and variations upon them, in order to examine how patterns of reasoning are affected by the presence of conflicting testimony. This study suggests that although it may be supplemented with the construction of epistemic (...) |
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In this paper I describe the apparent differences between the views of Mizrahi and Seidel on the strength of arguments from expert opinion. I show that most of Seidel's objections rely on an understanding of the words 'expert' and 'opinion' different from those which Mizrahi employs. I also discuss certain inconsistencies found in both papers over the use of these key terms. The paper concludes by noting that Mizrahi is right to suggest that evidence shows expert predictions to be unreliable, (...) |
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We discuss the relationship between expertise, expert authority, and trust in the case of vaccine research and policy, with a particular focus on COVID-19 vaccines. We argue that expert authority is not merely an epistemic notion, but entails being trusted by the relevant public and is valuable if it is accompanied by expert trustworthiness. Trustworthiness requires, among other things, being transparent, acknowledging uncertainty and expert disagreement (e.g., around vaccines’ effectiveness and safety), being willing to revise views in response to new (...) |
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IntroductionIn addition to being a source of valuable nutrients, meat consumption has several negative consequences; for the environment, for animal welfare, and for human health. To persuade people to lower their meat consumption, it is assumed that the personal relevance of the topic of lowering meat consumption is important as it determines how people perceive the quality of the arguments.MethodIn an experimental exploratory field study, participants recruited from the general Italian population were randomized to one of the four conditions with (...) |
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In this paper I will argue that there is an inductive and a non-inductive argument from position to know, and will characterise the latter as an argument from authority because of providing content-independent reasons. I will also argue that both types of argument should be doubt-preserving: testimony cannot justify a stronger cognitive attitude in the arguer than the expert herself expresses when she testifies. Failure to appreciate this point undercuts Mizrahi’s claim that arguments from expert opinion are weak. |
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This volume presents a selection of papers reflecting key theoretical issues in argumentation theory. Its six sections are devoted to specific themes, including the analysis and evaluation of argumentation, argument schemes and the contextual embedding of argumentation. The section on general perspectives on argumentation discusses the trends of empiricalization, contextualization and formalization, offers descriptions of the analytical and evaluative tools of informal logic, and highlights selected principles that argumentation theorists do and do not agree upon. In turn, the section on (...) |
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The chapter presents the prototyping of a thinking routine designed to foster good inference habits in children ages 6 to 11. The prototyping was developed at Ninho, an educational project for children from underprivileged households in Brazil. The thinking routines by Ritchhart and colleagues (2006) served as our starting point. Following a Virtue Education (VE) approach, we supposed that the repeated application would conduce to habituation. In addition, to increase peer-to-peer interactions, the teacher applying the routines worked as a facilitator (...) |
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Appeals to authority have a long tradition in the history of argumentation theory. During the Middle Age they were considered legitimate and sound arguments, but after Locke’s treatment in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding their legitimacy has come under question. Traditionally, arguments from authority were considered informal arguments, but since the important work of Charles Hamblin many attempts to provide a form for them have been done. The most convincing of them is the presumptive form developed by Douglas Walton and (...) No categories |
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The existing classifications of arguments are unsatisfying in a number of ways. This paper proposes an alternative in the form of a Periodic Table of Arguments. The newly developed table can be used as a systematic and comprehensive point of reference for the analysis, evaluation and production of argumentative discourse as well as for various kinds of empirical and computational research in the field of argumentation theory. |
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In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental (...) |
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