Citations of work:

Friederike Moltmann (2004). Properties and Kinds of Tropes: New Linguistic Facts and Old Philosophical Insights.

9 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  8
    Ontological Trivialism?Seyed N. Mousavian - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):38-68.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  29
    The Naïve Conception of Properties.Benjamin Schnieder - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):322-342.
    The semantic rules that govern ordinary property discourse appear to give rise to a version of Russell's antinomy. Do we therefore have an inconsistent conception of properties? This paper firstly develops a consistent conception of properties and secondly argues that we may indeed interpret ordinary property discourse as expressing the consistent conception rather than an inconsistent one.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Predication as Ascription.David Liebesman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):517-569.
    I articulate and defend a necessary and sufficient condition for predication. The condition is that a term or term-occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its designatum, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, I draw out these consequences and show how they favour the ascription view. I then develop the view and elicit a number of its virtues.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  9
    Reference to and Via Properties: The View From Dutch.Louise McNally & Henriëtte de Swart - 2015 - Linguistics and Philosophy 38 (4):315-362.
    Many languages offer a surprisingly complex range of options for referring to entities using expressions whose main descriptive content is contributed by an adjective, such as Dutch de blinde ‘the blind,’ het besprokene, ‘the discussed,’ or het ongewone van het niet roken ‘the strange about not smoking.’ In this paper, we present a case study of the syntax and compositional semantics of three such constructions in Dutch, one of which we argue has not previously been identified in the literature. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  72
    Inexpressible Properties and Grelling's Antinomy.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):369 - 385.
    The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p ’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of that property.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6. Degree Structure as Trope Structure: A Trope-Based Analysis of Positive and Comparative Adjectives.Friederike Moltmann - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (1):51-94.
    This paper explores a novel analysis of adjectives in the comparative and the positive based on the notion of a trope, rather than the notion of a degree. Tropes are particularized properties, concrete manifestations of properties in individuals. The point of departure is that a sentence like ‘John is happier than Mary’ is intuitively equivalent to ‘John’s happiness exceeds Mary’s happiness’, a sentence that expresses a simple comparison between two tropes, John’s happiness and Mary’s happiness. The analysis received particular support (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  7.  81
    Making the Lightness of Being Bearable: Arithmetical Platonism, Fictional Realism and Cognitive Command.Bill Wringe - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 453-487.
    In this paper I argue against Divers and Miller's 'Lightness of Being' objection to Hale and Wright's neo-Fregean Platonism. According to the 'Lightness of Being' objection, the neo-Fregean Platonist makes existence too cheap: the same principles which allow her to argue that numbers exist also allow her to claim that fictional objects exist. I claim that this is no objection at all" the neo-Fregean Platonist should think that fictional characters exist. However, the pluralist approach to truth developed by WQright in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Events, Tropes, and Truthmaking.Friederike Moltmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):363-403.
    Nominalizations are expressions that are particularly challenging philosophically in that they help form singular terms that seem to refer to abstract or derived objects often considered controversial. The three standard views about the semantics of nominalizations are [1] that they map mere meanings onto objects, [2] that they refer to implicit arguments, and [3] that they introduce new objects, in virtue of their compositional semantics. In the second case, nominalizations do not add anything new but pick up objects that would (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  9.  93
    The Importance of 'Being Earnest'.Benjamin Schnieder - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):40-55.
    Reference to properties is normally achieved by the use of nominalizations of predicative expressions. I examine the relation between different kinds of these: while, traditionally, the terms 'wisdom' and 'the property of being wise' were thought to be co-referential, in certain contexts they do not seem to be interchangeable salva veritate. Observing this, Friederike Moltmann claims that abstract nouns such as 'wisdom' do not refer to properties. I argue that her theory is flawed and that the existence of the problematic (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations