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Friederike Moltmann (2013). Reference to Numbers in Natural Language.

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  1.  10
    Should Metaphysics Care About Linguistics?Tobias Rosefeldt - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2):161-178.
    Naturalized metaphysics is based on the idea that philosophy should be guided by the sciences. The paradigmatic science that is relevant for metaphysics is physics because physics tells us what fundamental reality is ultimately like. There are other sciences, however, that de facto play a role in philosophical inquiries about what there is, one of them being the science of language, i.e. linguistics. In this paper I will be concerned with the question what role linguistics should and does play for (...)
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  2.  5
    Cardinals, Ordinals, and the Prospects for a Fregean Foundation.Eric Snyder, Stewart Shapiro & Richard Samuels - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:77-107.
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  3.  77
    Talking About Numbers: Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism. [REVIEW]Richard Lawrence - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (4):390-394.
  4.  7
    Ontological Trivialism?Seyed N. Mousavian - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):38-68.
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  5.  23
    Number Sentences and Specificational Sentences.Robert Schwartzkopff - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2173-2192.
    Frege proposed that sentences like ‘The number of planets is eight’ be analysed as identity statements in which the number words refer to numbers. Recently, Friederike Moltmann argued that, pace Frege, such sentences be analysed as so-called specificational sentences in which the number words have the same non-referring semantic function as the number word ‘eight’ in ‘There are eight planets’. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Moltmann fails to show that such sentences should be analysed (...)
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  6.  81
    Number Words and Reference to Numbers.Katharina Felka - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):261-282.
    A realist view of numbers often rests on the following thesis: statements like ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ are identity statements in which the copula is flanked by singular terms whose semantic function consists in referring to a number (henceforth: Identity). On the basis of Identity the realists argue that the assertive use of such statements commits us to numbers. Recently, some anti-realists have disputed this argument. According to them, Identity is false, and, thus, we may deny (...)
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    Extraction, Displacement, and Focus.Thomas Hofweber - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (3):263-267.
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    Reply to Critics.Agustín Rayo - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):498-534.
    Cameron, Eklund, Hofweber, Linnebo, Russell and Sider have written critical essays on my book, The Construction of Logical Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Here I offer some replies.
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  9.  82
    Defusing Easy Arguments for Numbers.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):447-461.
    Pairs of sentences like the following pose a problem for ontology: (1) Jupiter has four moons. (2) The number of moons of Jupiter is four. (2) is intuitively a trivial paraphrase of (1). And yet while (1) seems ontologically innocent, (2) appears to imply the existence of numbers. Thomas Hofweber proposes that we can resolve the puzzle by recognizing that sentence (2) is syntactically derived from, and has the same meaning as, sentence (1). Despite appearances, the expressions ‘the number of (...)
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