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  1. Wittgenstein's ‘Relativity’: Training in Language‐Games and Agreement in Forms of Life.Jeff Stickney - 2008 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5):621-637.
    Taking Wittgenstein's love of music as my impetus, I approach aporetic problems of epistemic relativity through a round of three overlapping inquiries delivered in contrapuntal registers. I first take up the question of scepticism surrounding ‘groundless knowledge’ and contending paradigms in On Certainty with attention given to the role of ‘bedrock’ certainties in providing stability amidst the Heraclitean flux. I then look into the formation of sedimented bedrock knowledge, or practices of knowing, by comparing Wittgenstein's remarks on animal habituation and (...)
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  • The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- Tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
  • Why Undermining Evolutionary Debunkers is Not Enough.Andrew del Rio - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    Denying the conclusion of a valid argument is not generally permissible if one suspends on one premise of the argument and believes the other premise. This can happen when one’s only critique of an argument is to undermine one premise. There is incoherence there. Here I examine how this is relevant to the debate on evolutionary debunking of our moral knowledge. I argue that one significant line of response to the debunker is unsuccessful: merely undermining the debunker’s empirical claim. It (...)
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  • A Different Kind of Dream-Based Skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.
    Sextus Empiricus offers an underappreciated and under-discussed version of dream-based skepticism. Most philosophers interested in dreams and skepticism focus on the question of how you know you are not currently dreaming. Sextus points out that our waking experiences and dreams often conflict. And, the challenge goes, what reason do you have to trust the one over the other? This question presupposes that dreams and waking experiences are distinguishable. Thus the kinds of responses typically offered against dream-based skepticism do not apply. (...)
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  • Meaning and Reference: Some Chomskian Themes.Robert J. Stainton - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 913--940.
    This article introduces three arguments that share a single conclusion: that a comprehensive science of language cannot describe relations of semantic reference, i.e. word–world relations. Spelling this out, if there is to be a genuine science of linguistic meaning, then a theory of meaning cannot involve assigning external, real-world, objects to names, nor sets of external objects to predicates, nor truth values to sentences. Most of the article tries to explain and defend this broad conclusion. The article also presents, in (...)
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  • Against the Conditional Correctness of Scepticism.Kaplan Hasanoglu - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):82-91.
    Stroud has argued for many years that skepticism is conditionally correct. We cannot, he claims, both undergo a Cartesian-style examination of the extent of our knowledge as well as avoid skepticism. One reason Stroud's position appears quite plausible is the so-called "totality condition" imposed for this kind of examination: as inquiring philosophers we are called upon to assess all of our knowledge, all at once. However, in this paper I argue that Stroud's apparent understanding of the totality condition is mistaken. (...)
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  • The Moral Permissibility of Nudges.Valerie Joly Chock - 2020 - Florida Philosophical Review 19 (1):33-47.
    Nudging is the idea that people’s decisions and behaviors can be influenced in predictable, non-coercive ways by making small changes to the choice architecture. In this paper, I differentiate between type-1 nudges and type-2 nudges according to the thinking processes involved in each. With this distinction in hand, I present the libertarian paternalistic criteria for the moral permissibility of intentional nudges. Having done this, I motivate an objection to type-1 nudges. According to this objection, type-1 nudges do not appear to (...)
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  • A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  • Reading 'On Certainty' Through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of Our Believing'.Chantal Bax - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On (...)
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  • Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
    G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying (...)
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  • An Ecumenical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-22.
    The purpose of this paper is to get clear on how we should think about Mooreanism. I will argue that Mooreanism is best understood as a metaphilosophical response to skepticism rather than a particular position on specialized debates in first-order epistemology. This ecumenical understanding of Mooreanism implies that a broad array of epistemologists is free to be Moorean. In Sect. 2 I discuss several non-Moorean responses to skepticism. In Sect. 3 I provide an exposition of Mooreanism itself. In Sect. 4 (...)
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  • Rethinking the Human Condition: Skepticism, Realism, and Transactional Pragmatism.Frank X. Ryan - 2016 - Contemporary Pragmatism 13 (3):263-297.
    For several decades, renewed interest in the connection between perception and knowledge has sustained a robust debate over external world skepticism. Recently, however, a growing consensus claims the skeptical challenge has been substantially met, and that realism in some robust form has emerged a clear victor. I invite us to rethink this consensus in a two-part response. The first forges a temporary alliance with skepticism against prominent forms of contemporary realism. That these fail to rebuff ews bolsters Barry Stroud’s call (...)
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  • Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception.Lucas Thorpe - 2015 - In Rebecca Copenhaver & Todd Buras (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-123.
  • Cognitive Goods, Open Futures and the Epistemology of Education.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2):449-466.
    What cognitive goods do children plausibly have a right to in an education? In attempting to answer this question, I begin with a puzzle centred around Feinberg’s observation that a denial of certain cognitive goods can violate a child’s right to an open future. I show that propositionalist, dispositionalist and objectualist characterisations of the kinds of cognitive goods children have a right to run in to problems. A promising alternative is then proposed and defended, one that is inspired in the (...)
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  • Should Moore Have Followed His Own Method?Daniel Stoljar - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):609-618.
    I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken.
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  • Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.
    This paper considers the analogies and disanalogies between a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about free will and a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about the external world. In the case of free will, I offer the ancient Lazy Argument and an argument of my own, which I call the Agency Argument, as examples of the relevant genre; and in the case of the external world, I consider Moore’s alleged proof of an external world. (...)
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  • Three Things to Do with Knowledge Ascriptions.Tammo Lossau - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):99-110.
    Any good theory of knowledge ascriptions should explain and predict our judgments about their felicity. I argue that any such explanation must take into account a distinction between three ways of using knowledge ascriptions: to suggest acceptance of the embedded proposition, to explain or predict a subject's behavior or attitudes, or to understand the relation of knowledge as such. The contextual effects on our judgments about felicity systematically differ between these three types of uses. Using such a distinction is, in (...)
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  • Theory of Inquiry.Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • Common Sense and Skepticism: A Lecture.Lehrer Keith - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    This is an essay on G. E. Moore’s argument in defense of common sense against David Hume’s theory. However, the burden of essay is to show that, though Moore derived has argument from Thomas Reid, it was the latter who noted that the defense of common sense required more than showing that Hume’s theory conflicted with common sense. It required supplying a better theory than that of Hume’s of the operations of the human mind, and especially, a better theory of (...)
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  • Safety, Domination, and Differential Support.Charles Neil - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1139-1152.
    In a recent paper “Safety, Sensitivity, and Differential Support” (Synthese, December 2017), Jose Zalabardo argues that (contra Sosa in Philos Perspect 33(13):141–153,1999) sensitivity can be differentially supported as the correct requirement for propositional knowledge. Zalabardo argues that safety fails to dominate sensitivity; specifically: some cases of knowledge failure can only be explained by sensitivity. In this paper, I resist Zalabardo’s conclusion that domination failure confers differential support for sensitivity. Specifically, I argue that counterexamples to sensitivity undermine differential support for sensitivity. (...)
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  • Why I Have No Hands.Eric T. Olson - 1995 - Theoria 61 (2):182-197.
    Trust me: my chair isn't big enough for two. You may doubt that every rational, conscious being is a person; perhaps there are beings that mistakenly believe themselves to be people. If so, read ‘rational, conscious being’ or the like for 'person'.
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  • Experimental Evidence for the Existence of an External World.Eric Schwitzgebel & Alan T. Moore - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):564--582.
    In the first experiment, I exhibit unreliable judgment about the primeness or divisibility of four-digit numbers, in contrast to a seeming Excel program. In the second experiment, I exhibit an imperfect memory for arbitrary-seeming three-digit number and letter combinations, in contrast to my seeming collaborator with seemingly hidden notes. In the third experiment, I seem to suffer repeated defeats at chess. In all three experiments, the most straightforward interpretation of the experiential evidence is that something exists in the universe that (...)
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  • Lewis's Philosophical Method.Daniel Nolan - 2015 - In B. Loewer & J. Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to Lewis. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 25-39.
    Lewis is famous as a contemporary philosophical system-builder. The most obvious way his philosophy exhibited a system was in its content: Lewis’s metaphysics, for example, provided answers to many metaphysical puzzles in an integrated way, and there are illuminating connections to be drawn between his general metaphysical views and, for example, his various views about the mind and its place in nature.
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  • Inference and Scepticism.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2014 - In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    I focus on a family of inferences that are intuitively incapable of producing knowledge of their conclusions, although they appear to satisfy sufficient conditions for inferential knowledge postulated by plausible epistemological theories. They include Moorean inferences and inductive-bootstrapping inferences. I provide an account of why these inferences are not capable of producing knowledge. I argue that the reason why these inferences fail to produce knowledge of their conclusions is that inferential knowledge requires that the subject is more likely to believe (...)
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  • A Priori Bootstrapping.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori In Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 226-246.
    This paper explores the problems that are raised by a certain traditional sceptical paradox. The conclusion will be that the most challenging problem raised by this paradox does not primarily concern the justification of beliefs; it concerns the justification of belief-forming practices. This conclusion is supported by showing that if we can solve the sceptical problem for belief-forming practices, then it will be a relatively straightforward matter to solve the problem that concerns the justification of beliefs.
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  • Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments move from a premise about the influence of evolutionary forces on our moral beliefs to a skeptical conclusion about those beliefs. My primary aim is to clarify this empirically grounded epistemological challenge. I begin by distinguishing among importantly different sorts of epistemological attacks. I then demonstrate that instances of each appear in the literature under the ‘evolutionary debunking’ title. Distinguishing them clears up some confusions and helps us better understand the structure and potential of evolutionary debunking arguments.
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  • Why Skeptical Theists Are Not in a Scenario of Olly-Style Deception.Francis Jonbäck - 1970 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 23 (1):59-68.
    According to Michael Bergmann, Skeptical Theism consists of two components: firstly, the belief that there is an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good immaterial person who created the world, and secondly, the skeptical claim that we have no reason to believe that the possible goods and evils we know of are representative of the goods and evils that exist. According to the Global Skepticism Objection, Skeptical Theism entails that we should not be surprised if we are radically deceived by God: there (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on Certainty: A. J. Ayer.A. J. Ayer - 1973 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 7:226-245.
    Wittgenstein's book On Certainty which was first published in 1969, eighteen years after his death, is a collection of notes which he composed during the last eighteen months of his life. As his editors explain in their preface, these notes, which were written at four different periods, are all in the form of a first draft. They are more repetitive than they no doubt would have been if Wittgenstein had been able to revise them. Even so, they are characteristically succinct (...)
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  • Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations Rather Than Non-Representational Qualia.Işık Sarıhan - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):5-32.
    Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states (...)
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  • What Evidence Do You Have?Ram Neta - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):89-119.
    Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that various proposed (...)
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  • Advantages and Paradoxes of Regarding Omniscience as Subjective Certainty in Wittgenstein’s Sense.José María Ariso - forthcoming - Sophia:1-10.
    In this paper, I try to facilitate the understanding of the concept of ‘omniscience’ by taking into account the terminology developed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Thus, I start by explaining why omniscience can be regarded neither as grounded knowledge nor as ungrounded or objective certainty. Instead, omniscience might be considered as subjective certainty, which has the advantage of leaving scope for a doubt that enables and strengthens religious faith. Lastly, I clarify how God’s omniscience would be enriched if He (...)
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  • Imprecise Probability in Epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitat
    There is a growing interest in the foundations as well as the application of imprecise probability in contemporary epistemology. This dissertation is concerned with the application. In particular, the research presented concerns ways in which imprecise probability, i.e. sets of probability measures, may helpfully address certain philosophical problems pertaining to rational belief. The issues I consider are disagreement among epistemic peers, complete ignorance, and inductive reasoning with imprecise priors. For each of these topics, it is assumed that belief can be (...)
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  • Between Classical and Quantum.Nicolaas P. Landsman - 2007 - Handbook of the Philosophy of Science 2:417--553.
    The relationship between classical and quantum theory is of central importance to the philosophy of physics, and any interpretation of quantum mechanics has to clarify it. Our discussion of this relationship is partly historical and conceptual, but mostly technical and mathematically rigorous, including over 500 references. For example, we sketch how certain intuitive ideas of the founders of quantum theory have fared in the light of current mathematical knowledge. One such idea that has certainly stood the test of time is (...)
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  • Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
    I lay out the framework for my theory of sensory imagination in “Imagining as a guide to possibility.” Sensory imagining involves mental imagery , and crucially, in describing the content of imagining, I distinguish between qualitative content and assigned content. Qualitative content derives from the mental image itself; for visual imaginings, it is what is “pictured.” For example, visually imagine the Philadelphia Eagles defeating the Pittsburgh Steelers to win their first Super Bowl. You picture the greenness of the field and (...)
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  • The Nature of Delusion: An Analysis of the Contemporary Philosophical Debates.Paredes Aline Aurora Maya - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Central Lancashire
    The present thesis surveys different philosophical approaches to the nature of delusions: specifically, their ontology. However, since none of the various theories of the nature of delusions succeeds, I argue that there must be something problematic about the form of the analyses commonly offered. My general conclusion is that one cannot characterize delusions without taking away what it is distinctive about them.
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  • Variedades del escepticismo y del antiescepticismo.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2016 - Análisis Filosófico 36 (1):7-27.
    El objetivo de este artículo es proporcionar elementos para una comprensión apropiada de las diversas dialécticas entre escepticismo y antiescepticismo en epistemología. En particular, demostrar que cierta tesis escéptica es falsa o que es imposible defenderla coherentemente puede resultar insuficiente para solucionar el problema conceptual derivado de un determinado argumento escéptico a favor de dicha tesis. Incluyo una discusión sobre la fuerza y los límites de los argumentos trascendentales, así como un análisis de su estructura, ilustrado por el argumento de (...)
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  • A Moorean Argument for the Full Moral Status of Those with Profound Intellectual Disability.Benjamin Curtis & Simo Vehmas - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):41-45.
    This paper is about the moral status of those human beings with profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs). We hold the common sense view that they have equal status to ‘normal’ human beings, and a higher status than any non-human animal. We start with an admission, however: we don’t know how to give a fully satisfying theoretical account of the grounds of moral status that explains this view. And in fact, not only do we not know how to give such an account, (...)
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  • A Modest Argument Against Scepticism.Tobies Grimaltos Mascaros & Carlos J. Moya Espí - 2020 - Quaderns de Filosofia 7 (1):33.
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  • Moore's Proof, Liberals, and Conservatives : Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way?Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is worth (...)
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  • Epistemic Internalism and Perceptual Content: How a Fear of Demons Leads to an Error Theory of Perception.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2153-2170.
    Despite the fact that many of our beliefs are justified by perceptual experience, there is relatively little exploration of the connections between epistemic justification and perceptual content. This is unfortunate since it seems likely that some views of justification will require particular views of content, and the package of the two might be quite a bit less attractive than either view considered alone. I will argue that this is the case for epistemic internalism. In particular, epistemic internalism requires a view (...)
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  • Denialism as Applied Skepticism: Philosophical and Empirical Considerations.Matthew H. Slater, Joanna K. Huxster, Julia E. Bresticker & Victor LoPiccolo - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):871-890.
    The scientific community, we hold, often provides society with knowledge—that the HIV virus causes AIDS, that anthropogenic climate change is underway, that the MMR vaccine is safe. Some deny that we have this knowledge, however, and work to undermine it in others. It has been common to refer to such agents as “denialists”. At first glance, then, denialism appears to be a form of skepticism. But while we know that various denialist strategies for suppressing belief are generally effective, little is (...)
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  • Lit From Within: First-Person Thought and Illusions of Transcendence.Léa Salje - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):735-749.
    Philosophical treatments of the self in a range of different traditions have positioned it outside the realm of ordinary worldly objects. This paper argues that part of the explanation for this seemingly widespread and persistent temptation to mystify the self is that the epistemic properties of I-thought are apt to give rise to an illusion of transcendence about their objects—that is, about ourselves.
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  • A Plea for the Theist in the Street.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (1):102-128.
    It can be easy to assume that since the “theist in the street” is unaware of any of the traditional arguments for theism, he or she is not in position to offer independent rational support for believing that God exists. I argue that that is false if we accept with William Alston that “manifestation beliefs” can enjoy rational support on the basis of suitable religious experiences. I make my case by defending the viability of a Moorean-style proof for theism—a proof (...)
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  • Moore’s proof, theory-ladenness of perception, and many proofs.Mark Walker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2163-2183.
    I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim to support a substantive metaphysical conclusion, can be used to support Moore’s proof an external world, then we should accept that Moore’s Method can be used to support a variety of incompatible metaphysical conclusions. I shall refer to this as “the problem of many proofs”. The problem of many proofs, I claim, stems from the theory-ladenness of perception. I shall argue further that this plethora (...)
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  • Languages for the Analytic Tradition.Diana I. Pérez - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (1):49-69.
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  • The Action of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):67-87.
    I discuss an argument for the monistic idea that the cosmos is the one and only fundamental thing, drawing on the idea that the cosmos is the one and only thing that evolves by the fundamental laws.
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  • The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
    Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 (...)
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  • Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory.John Turri - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.
    This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.
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  • Inferencias mooreanas y fortaleza de la posición epistémica.José Alfonso Anaya Ruiz Esparza - 2016 - Signos Filosóficos 18 (36).
    En este artículo analizo el diagnóstico de Martin Smith sobre qué está mal con las inferencias mooreanas; de acuerdo con el cual, el defecto epistémico que exhiben estas inferencias consiste en que son incapaces de incrementar la fiabilidad de su conclusión. Smith considera que este defecto puede ser útil para explicar, a su vez, el fenómeno del fallo de transmisión del respaldo epistémico. Argumentaré que la propuesta de Smith proporciona se equivoca al suponer que la única manera en que puede (...)
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  • Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts.Guido Melchior - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):45-54.
    Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them. The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge. This (...)
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