Switch to: References

Citations of:

Craig on the actual infinite

Religious Studies 38 (2):147-166 (2002)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Finitism, Divisibilty, and the Beginning of the Universe: Replies to Loke and Dumsday.Stephen Puryear - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):808-813.
    Some philosophers contend that the past must be finite in duration, because otherwise reaching the present would have involved the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events, which they regard as impossible. I recently developed a new objection to this finitist argument, to which Andrew Ter Ern Loke and Travis Dumsday have replied. Here I respond to the three main points raised in their replies.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Craig’s Kalam Cosmology.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Philo 12 (2):200-216.
    Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Heartbreak at Hilbert's Hotel.Landon Hedrick - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (1):27-46.
    William Lane Craig's defence of the kalam cosmological argument rests heavily on two philosophical arguments against a past-eternal universe. In this article I take issue with one of these arguments, what I call the – namely, that the metaphysical absurdity of an actually infinite number of things existing precludes the possibility of a beginningless past. After explaining this argument, I proceed to raise some initial doubts. After setting those aside, I show that the argument is ineffective against proponents of presentism. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Finitism and Divisibility: A Reply to Puryear.Travis Dumsday - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):596-601.
    Puryear develops an objection against a prominent attempt to show that the universe must have a temporal beginning. Here I formulate a reply.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe: A Reply to Stephen Puryear.Andrew Ter Ern Loke - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):591-595.
    ABSTRACTStephen Puryear argues that William Lane Craig's view, that time as duration is logically prior to the potentially infinite divisions that we make of it, involves the idea that time is prior to any parts we conceive within it. He objects that PWT entails the Priority of the Whole with respect to Events, and that it subverts the argument, used by proponents of the Kalam Cosmological Argument such as Craig, against an eternal past based on the impossibility of traversing an (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe.Stephen Puryear - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):619-629.
    Many philosophers have argued that the past must be finite in duration because otherwise reaching the present moment would have involved something impossible, namely, the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events. In reply, some philosophers have objected that there can be nothing amiss in such an occurrence, since actually infinite sequences are ‘traversed’ all the time in nature, for example, whenever an object moves from one location in space to another. This essay focuses on one of the two (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Objection.Jacobus Erasmus & Anné Hendrik Verhoef - 2015 - Sophia 54 (4):411-427.
    In this article, we evaluate various responses to a noteworthy objection, namely, the infinite God objection to the kalām cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalām argument face a dilemma—either an actual infinite cannot exist or God cannot be infinite. More precisely, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinite with God knowing an actually infinite number of future events or abstract objects, such as mathematical truths. We argue, however, that the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations