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Epistemic Emotions

In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. pp. 385--399 (2010)

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  1. The Platonic Conception of Intellectual Virtues: Its Significance for Virtue Epistemology.Alkis Kotsonis - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    Several contemporary virtue scholars trace the origin of the concept of intellectual virtues back to Aristotle. In contrast, my aim in this paper is to highlight the strong indications showing that Plato had already conceived of and had begun developing the concept of intellectual virtues in his discussion of the ideal city-state in the Republic. I argue that the Platonic conception of rational desires satisfies the motivational component of intellectual virtues while his dialectical method satisfies the success component. In addition, (...)
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  • Moods Between Intelligibility and Articulability. Re-Examining Heidegger’s and Hegel’s Accounts of Affective States.Lucian Ionel - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1587-1598.
    Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences is possible only due (...)
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  • Virtues of Art.Peter Goldie - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):830-839.
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  • What's Lacking in Online Learning? Dreyfus, Merleau‐Ponty and Bodily Affective Understanding.Dave Ward - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy of Education.
  • Concerns and the Seriousness of Emotion.John M. Monteleone - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):181-207.
    Some philosophers have claimed that emotions are states of mind where an object is taken seriously. Seriousness, as this paper understands it, involves both a phenomenological change in attention and non-indifference towards an object. The paper investigates how contemporary theories of emotion can explain the seriousness of emotion. After rejecting explanations based on feeling, desire, and concern, the paper argues that the seriousness of an emotion can be explained as the manifestation of a concern in an outwardly directed feeling. Given (...)
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  • Loss of Affect in Intellectual Activity.Peter Goldie - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):122-126.
    In this article I will consider how loss of affect in our intellectual lives, through depression for example, can be as debilitating as loss of affect elsewhere in our lives. This will involve showing that there are such things as intellectual emotions, that their role in intellectual activity is not merely as an aid to the intellect, and that loss of affect changes not only one’s motivations, but also one’s overall evaluative take on the world.
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