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  1. Knowledge of Moral Incapacity.Ryan Cox - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-23.
    Are the limits on what we can do, morally speaking—our “moral incapacities” as Bernard Williams calls them—imposed on us from within, by reason itself, or from without, by something other than reason? Do they perhaps have their source in the will, as opposed to reason? In this essay, I argue for a theory of moral incapacity on which our moral incapacities have their source in reason itself. The theory is defended on the grounds that it provides the best explanation of (...)
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  • A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  • Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...)
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  • Transparência, reflexão e vicissitude.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - 2011 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 52 (123):213-236.
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  • Containment and ‘Rational Health’: Moran and Psychoanalysis.Edward Harcourt - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):798-813.
    The paper focuses on Richard Moran's account of the distinction between attitudes that meet, and alternatively fail to meet, his transparency criterion for what he calls rational health, and compare this with the psychoanalytic distinction between contained and uncontained states of mind. On the face of it, Moran's distinction appears to be a useful theoretical deepening of the psychoanalytic distinction. On closer examination, however, it appears that rational health is a more demanding standard than containment, so the rationally unhealthy contains (...)
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