Smullyan in [Smu61] identified the recursion theoretic essence of incompleteness results such as Gödel's first incompleteness theorem and Rosser's theorem. Smullyan showed that, for sufficiently complex theories, the collection of provable formulae and the collection of refutable formulae are effectively inseparable—where formulae and their Gödel numbers are identified. This paper gives a similar treatment for proof speed-up. We say that a formal system S1is speedable over another system S0on a set of formulaeAiff, for each recursive functionh, there is a formulaαinAsuch (...) that the length of the shortest proof ofαin S0is larger thanhof the shortest proof ofαin S1. We characterize speedability in terms of the inseparability by r.e. sets of the collection of formulae which are provable in S1but unprovable in S0from the collectionA–where again formulae and their Gödel numbers are identified. We provide precise definitions of proof length, speedability and r.e. inseparability below.We follow the terminology and notation of [Rog87] with borrowings from [Soa87]. Below,ϕis an acceptable numbering of the partial recursive functions [Rog87] andΦa complexity measure associated withϕ[Blu67], [DW83]. (shrink)

Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...) 1998; Ketland in Mind 108:69–94, 1999). We consider two defences of conservative deflationism, respectively proposed by Waxman :429–463, 2017) and Tennant :551–582, 2002), and argue that they are both unsuccessful. In Waxman’s hands, deflationists are committed either to a non-purely expressive notion of truth, or to a conception of mathematics that does not allow them to justifiably exclude non-conservative theories of truth. Tennant’s conservative deflationism fares no better: if deflationist truth must be conservative over arithmetic, it can be shown to collapse into a non-conservative variety of deflationism. (shrink)

Proof-theoretic reflection principles are schemas which attempt to express the soundness of arithmetical theories within their own language, e.g., ${\mathtt{{Prov}_{\mathsf {PA}} \rightarrow \varphi }}$ can be understood to assert that any statement provable in Peano arithmetic is true. It has been repeatedly suggested that justification for such principles follows directly from acceptance of an arithmetical theory $\mathsf {T}$ or indirectly in virtue of their derivability in certain truth-theoretic extensions thereof. This paper challenges this consensus by exploring relationships between reflection principles (...) and principles of mathematical and transfinite induction as well as the status of the latter with respect to various foundational characterizations of number theory. (shrink)

This paper discusses lower bounds for proof length, especially as measured by number of steps (inferences). We give the first publicly known proof of Gödel's claim that there is superrecursive (in fact. unbounded) proof speedup of (i + 1)st-order arithmetic over ith-order arithmetic, where arithmetic is formalized in Hilbert-style calculi with + and · as function symbols or with the language of PRA. The same results are established for any weakly schematic formalization of higher-order logic: this allows all tautologies as (...) axioms and allows all generalizations of axioms as axioms. Our first proof of Gödel's claim is based on self-referential sentences: we give a second proof that avoids the use of self-reference based loosely on a method of Statman. (shrink)