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Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2013). A New Argument Against Compatibilism.

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  1. Powers, Non‐Consent and Freedom.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):136-152.
    There are a number of dispositionalist solutions to the free will problem based on freedom consisting in the agent's exercise of a power. But if a subject a is free when they exercise their power P, there is an objection to be overcome from the possibility of power implantation. A brainwasher, rather than directly manipulating a subject's movements, can instead implant in them a desire, to be understood as a disposition to act, and allow the subject to exercise such a (...)
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  2. An Analysis of Anselm’s Philosophical Theology and the Problem of Man’s Freedom in His De Concordia.Rostislav Tkachenko - 2015 - Sententiae 32 (1):6-35.
    The purpose of this study is to discover, present and analyze the key ideas of Anselm of Canterbury concerning the notions of knowledge, will and mode of divine-human relations in the context of this “knowledge-will” framework which is important due to (a) somewhat insufficient attention to the medieval insights on the issue and (b) the peculiarity that Anselm’s intuitions have. More specifically, the object of the given paper is Anselmian understanding of relations between God’s foreknowledge and will, on the one (...)
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    Powers, Necessity, and Determinism.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):225-229.
    Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum have argued that a theory of free will that appeals to a powers-based ontology is incompatible with causal determinism. This is a surprising conclusion since much recent work on the intersection of the metaphysics of powers and free will has consisted of attempts to defend compatibilism by appealing to a powers-based ontology. In response I show that their argument turns on an equivocation of ‘all events are necessitated’.
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  4.  34
    Mumford and Anjum on Incompatibilism, Powers and Determinism.P. Mackie - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):593-603.
    Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As (...)
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