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Stephen Mumford (2005). Kinds, Essences, Powers.

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  1.  11
    Anchoring in Ecosystemic Kinds.Matthew H. Slater - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1487-1508.
    The world contains many different types of ecosystems. This is something of a commonplace in biology and conservation science. But there has been little attention to the question of whether such ecosystem types enjoy a degree of objectivity—whether they might be natural kinds. I argue that traditional accounts of natural kinds that emphasize nomic or causal–mechanistic dimensions of “kindhood” are ill-equipped to accommodate presumptive ecosystemic kinds. In particular, unlike many other kinds, ecosystemic kinds are “anchored” to the contingent character of (...)
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  2. Can Bare Dispositions Explain Categorical Regularities?Tyler Hildebrand - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):569-584.
    One of the traditional desiderata for a metaphysical theory of laws of nature is that it be able to explain natural regularities. Some philosophers have postulated governing laws to fill this explanatory role. Recently, however, many have attempted to explain natural regularities without appealing to governing laws. Suppose that some fundamental properties are bare dispositions. In virtue of their dispositional nature, these properties must be (or are likely to be) distributed in regular patterns. Thus it would appear that an ontology (...)
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  3.  22
    A Challenge for Lowe and Ellis' Differentiation of Kinds as Substantive Universals.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):73 - 94.
    I question here the differentiation of kinds as substantive universals in Lowe and Ellis' metaphysics, by taking up, for the argument's sake, two extreme approaches on kind differentiation and kind change, a Heraclitan and a Spinozan approach. I show that, as things currently stand, Heraclitanism or Spinozism about kinds is consistent with the broad tenets of Lowe and Ellis' metaphysics of kinds.
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    A Challenge for Lowe and Ellis’ Differentiation of Kinds as Substantive Universals.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):73-94.
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  5.  19
    Cell Types as Natural Kinds.Matthew H. Slater - 2013 - Biological Theory 7 (2):170-179.
    Talk of different types of cells is commonplace in the biological sciences. We know a great deal, for example, about human muscle cells by studying the same type of cells in mice. Information about cell type is apparently largely projectible across species boundaries. But what defines cell type? Do cells come pre-packaged into different natural kinds? Philosophical attention to these questions has been extremely limited [see e.g., Wilson (Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp 187–207, 1999; Genes and the Agents of Life, (...)
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  6.  29
    The Problem of Processes and Transitions: Are Diseases Phase Kinds? [REVIEW]Stefan Dragulinescu - 2012 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (1):79-89.
    In this paper I discuss a central objection against diseases being natural kinds—namely, that diseases are processes or transitions and hence they should not be conceptualized in the ‘substantish’ framework of natural kinds. I indicate that the objection hinges on conceiving disease kinds as phase kinds, in contrast to the non-phase, natural kinds of the exact sciences. I focus on somatic diseases and argue, via a representative comparison, that if disease kinds are phase kinds, then exact science kinds are phase (...)
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    Diseases as Natural Kinds.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):347-369.
    In this paper, I focus on life-threatening medical conditions and argue that from the point of view of natural properties, induction(s), and participation in laws, at least some of the ill organisms dealt with in somatic medicine form natural kinds in the same sense in which the kinds in the exact sciences are thought of as natural. By way of comparing two ‘divisions of nature’, viz., a ‘classical’ exact science kind (gold) and a kind of disease (Graves disease), I show (...)
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    The Ontology of Things, Properties and Powers.Steve Fleetwood - 2009 - Journal of Critical Realism 8 (3):343-366.
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    Introduction to the Special Issue.Ruth Groff - 2009 - Journal of Critical Realism 8 (3):267-276.
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  10.  95
    Universals, the Essential Problem and Categorical Properties.Brian Ellis - 2005 - Ratio 18 (4):462–472.
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