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The Big Book of Concepts

MIT Press (2004)

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  1. The Logic of God: A Pluralistic Representational Theory of Concepts.Ricardo Sousa Silvestre - forthcoming - Logica Universalis.
    In this paper I present a formalization of the theory of ideal concepts applied to the concept of God. It is done within a version of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML) and attempts to solve three meta-problems related to the concept of God: the unicity of extension problem, the homogeneity/heterogeneity problem and the problem of conceptual unity.
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  • The Theory-Theory of Moral Concepts.John Jung Park - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (2).
    There are many views about the structure of concepts, a plausible one of which is the theory-theory. Though this view is plausible for concrete concepts, it is unclear that it would work for abstract concepts, and then for moral concepts. The goal of this paper is to provide a plausible theory-theory account for moral concepts and show that it is supported by results in the moral psychology literature. Such studies in moral psychology do not explicitly contend for the theory-theory of (...)
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  • Don’t Give Up on Basic Emotions.Andrea Scarantino & Paul Griffiths - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (4):444-454.
    We argue that there are three coherent, nontrivial notions of basic-ness: conceptual basic-ness, biological basic-ness, and psychological basic-ness. There is considerable evidence for conceptually basic emotion categories (e.g., “anger,” “fear”). These categories do not designate biologically basic emotions, but some forms of anger, fear, and so on that are biologically basic in a sense we will specify. Finally, two notions of psychological basic-ness are distinguished, and the evidence for them is evaluated. The framework we offer acknowledges the force of some (...)
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  • Art, the brain, and family resemblances: Some considerations on neuroaesthetics.Marcello Frixione - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):699 - 715.
    The project of neuroaesthetics could be interpreted as an attempt to identify a ?neural essence? of art, i.e., a set of necessary and sufficient conditions formulated in the language of neuroscience, which define the concept art . Some proposals developed within this field can be read in this way. I shall argue that such attempts do not succeed in individuating a neural definition of art. Of course, the fact that the proposals available for defining art in neural terms do not (...)
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  • Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts.Gregory Salmieri - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
  • Science education & the tightrope between scientism and relativism: a Wittgensteinian balancing act.Renia Gasparatou - 2023 - In Paul Standish & A. Skilbeck (eds.), Wittgenstein and Education: On Not Sparing Others the Trouble of Thinking,. Wiley. pp. 56-66.
    Mentalities like scientism and relativism idealise or belittle science respectively, and thus hurt science education and our literacy. However, it seems very hard to avoid the former mentality without sliding to the latter, and vise versa. I will suggest that part of what makes balancing between the two so difficult, is a representational account of meaning that science educators, like most of us really, usually endorse. Scientism then, arises from the assumption that ​there is such a thing called science​. Relativism, (...)
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  • How do people use and appraise concepts?James A. Hampton (ed.) - forthcoming - Switzerland: Springer Nature.
    To approach the many challenges involved in the notion of engineering concepts, it is important to have a clear idea of the starting point – the concepts that people use in their everyday lives, in conversations and in expressing beliefs, desires, intentions and so forth. The first Section of this chapter introduces evidence that I have accumulated over the last many years concerning the flexibility, context-dependence, and vagueness of such common concepts. The concept engineer needs to understand the structure of (...)
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  • Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.
    Abstract In slogan form, the thesis of this paper is that beliefs are self-verifying fictions: We make them up, but in so doing, they come to exist, and so the fiction of belief is in fact true. This picture of belief emerges from a combination of three independently motivated views: (1) a phenomenal intentionalist picture of intentionality, on which phenomenal consciousness is the basis of intentionality; (2) what I will call a “self-ascriptivist” picture of derived representation, on which non-fundamental representational (...)
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  • Tercera Cultura: #TheLibro - Una brevísima introducción a las Ciencias Cognitivas y a la Tercera Cultura.Remis Ramos - 2015 - Santiago: Tercera Cultura.
    Tercera Cultura: #TheLibro es una introducción a las ciencias cognitivas -Psicología, Lingüística, Filosofía, Neurociencia, Antropología, Inteligencia Artificial- escrita en un lenguaje simple y claro, ilustrado con ejemplos de la cultura popular, dirigido a estudiantes y geeks de todas las edades.
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  • A Framework for the Psychology of Norms.Chandra Sripada & Stephen Stich - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Volume 2: Culture and Cognition. , US: Oxford University Press.
    Humans are unique in the animal world in the extent to which their day-to-day behavior is governed by a complex set of rules and principles commonly called norms. Norms delimit the bounds of proper behavior in a host of domains, providing an invisible web of normative structure embracing virtually all aspects of social life. People also find many norms to be deeply meaningful. Norms give rise to powerful subjective feelings that, in the view of many, are an important part of (...)
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  • On the nature of thought experiments and a core motivation of experimental philosophy.Joseph Shieber - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):547-564.
    In this paper I discuss some underlying motivations common to most strands of experimental philosophy, noting that most forms of experimental philosophy have a commitment to the claim that certain empirical evidence concerning the level of agreement on intuitive judgments across cultures, ethnic groups or socioeconomic strata impugns the role that intuitions play in traditional “armchair” philosophy. I then develop an argument to suggest that, even if one were to grant the truth of the data adduced by experimentalists regarding the (...)
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  • Douglas Hofstadter's Gödelian Philosophy of Mind.Theodor Nenu - 2022 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 9 (2):241-266.
    Hofstadter [1979, 2007] offered a novel Gödelian proposal which purported to reconcile the apparently contradictory theses that (1) we can talk, in a non-trivial way, of mental causation being a real phenomenon and that (2) mental activity is ultimately grounded in low-level rule-governed neural processes. In this paper, we critically investigate Hofstadter’s analogical appeals to Gödel’s [1931] First Incompleteness Theorem, whose “diagonal” proof supposedly contains the key ideas required for understanding both consciousness and mental causation. We maintain that bringing sophisticated (...)
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  • Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):195-206.
    Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts.Doing without Concepts(Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length inDoing without Concepts.
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  • Clusters: On the structure of lexical concepts.Agustín Vicente - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):79-106.
    The paper argues for a decompositionalist account of lexical concepts. In particular, it presents and argues for a cluster decompositionalism, a view that claims that the complexes a token of a word corresponds to on a given occasion are typically built out of a determinate set of basic concepts, most of which are present on most other occasions of use of the word. The first part of the paper discusses some explanatory virtues of decompositionalism in general. The second singles out (...)
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  • Ontologies, Disorders and Prototypes.Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione, Antonio Lieto & Greta Adamo - 2016 - In Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione, Antonio Lieto & Greta Adamo (eds.), Proceedings of IACAP 2016.
    As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field (such as, in the first place, the Web Ontology Language - OWL) do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms (...)
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  • Immediate and Reflective Senses.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado & Dena Shottenkirk (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. pp. 187-209.
    This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses are what we understand of an intentional mental state's (putative) referent upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate (...)
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  • Ontologies, Mental Disorders and Prototypes.Maria Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione, Antonio Lieto & Greta Adamo - 2019 - In Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag. pp. 189-204.
    As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, the need of representing concepts in terms of (...)
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  • Heterogeneous Proxytypes Extended: Integrating Theory-like Representations and Mechanisms with Prototypes and Exemplars.Antonio Lieto - 2018 - In Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, Springer. Springer.
    The paper introduces an extension of the proposal according to which conceptual representations in cognitive agents should be intended as heterogeneous proxytypes. The main contribution of this paper is in that it details how to reconcile, under a heterogeneous representational perspective, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning. In particular, it provides a novel theoretical hypothesis - as well as a novel categorization algorithm called DELTA - showing how to integrate the representational and reasoning assumptions of the theory-theory (...)
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  • Causing Trouble: Theories of Reference and Theory of Mind.J. Robert Thompson - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):119-130.
    Michael and MacLeod’s paper on theories of reference for intentional concepts addresses neglected connections between theories of reference and Theory of Mind debates. Unfortunately, their paper neither shows the negative effects of descriptivism on theories of reference for intentional concepts nor provides an adequate picture of how the sort of theory they advocate might explain either the reference of intentional concepts or the puzzles of development on which they focus. In this article, I give reasons to think that the prospects (...)
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  • The Logic of the Concept of God.Silvestre Ricardo - 2023 - In Vestrucci Andrea (ed.), Beyond Babel: Religion and Linguistic Pluralism. Springer Verlag.
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  • Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
    Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in (...)
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  • Book: Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds.Antonio Lieto - 2021 - London, UK: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Ltd.
    Book Description (Blurb): Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds explains the crucial role that human cognition research plays in the design and realization of artificial intelligence systems, illustrating the steps necessary for the design of artificial models of cognition. It bridges the gap between the theoretical, experimental and technological issues addressed in the context of AI of cognitive inspiration and computational cognitive science. -/- Beginning with an overview of the historical, methodological and technical issues in the field of Cognitively-Inspired Artificial Intelligence, (...)
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  • Vagueness as Arbitrariness: Outline of a Theory of Vagueness.Sagid Salles - 2021 - Springer.
    This book proposes a new solution to the problem of vagueness. There are several different ways of addressing this problem and no clear agreement on which one is correct. The author proposes that it should be understood as the problem of explaining vague predicates in a way that systematizes six intuitions about the phenomenon and satisfies three criteria of adequacy for an ideal theory of vagueness. The third criterion, which is called the “criterion of precisification”, is the most controversial one. (...)
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  • Language and scientific explanation: Where does semantics fit in?Eran Asoulin - 2020 - Berlin, Germany: Language Science Press.
    This book discusses the two main construals of the explanatory goals of semantic theories. The first, externalist conception, understands semantic theories in terms of a hermeneutic and interpretive explanatory project. The second, internalist conception, understands semantic theories in terms of the psychological mechanisms in virtue of which meanings are generated. It is argued that a fruitful scientific explanation is one that aims to uncover the underlying mechanisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena are made possible, and that a scientific (...)
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  • Communication and content.Prashant Parikh - 2019 - Berlin, Germany: Language Science Press.
    Communication and content presents a comprehensive and foundational account of meaning based on new versions of situation theory and game theory. The literal and implied meanings of an utterance are derived from first principles assuming little more than the partial rationality of interacting agents. New analyses of a number of diverse phenomena – a wide notion of ambiguity and content encompassing phonetics, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and beyond, vagueness, convention and conventional meaning, indeterminacy, universality, the role of truth in communication, semantic (...)
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  • Engineering Social Concepts: Labels and the Science of Categorization.Eleonore Neufeld - manuscript
    One of the core insights from Eleanor Rosch’s work on categorization is that human categorization isn’t arbitrary. Instead, two psychological principles constrain possible systems of classification for all human cultures. According to these principles, the task of a category system is to provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort, and the perceived world provides us with structured rather than arbitrary features. In this paper, I show that Rosch's insights give us important resources for making progress on the 'feasibility question' (...)
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  • Engineering Social Concepts: Feasibility and Causal Models.Eleonore Neufeld - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    How feasible are conceptual engineering projects of social concepts that aim for the engineered concept to be widely adopted in ordinary everyday life? Predominant frameworks on the psychology of concepts that shape work on stereotyping, bias, and machine learning have grim implications for the prospects of conceptual engineers: conceptual engineering efforts are ineffective in promoting certain social-conceptual changes. Specifically, since conceptual components that give rise to problematic social stereotypes are sensitive to statistical structures of the environment, purely conceptual change won’t (...)
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  • Smell's puzzling discrepancy: Gifted discrimination, yet pitiful identification.Benjamin D. Young - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (1):90-114.
  • Naturalized truth and Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism.Feng Ye - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):27-46.
    There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism, the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low; (2) the same conditional probability given reductive or non-reductive materialism is still low; (3) the most popular naturalistic theories of content and truth are not admissible for naturalism. I argue that Plantinga’s argument for (1) presupposes an anti-materialistic conception of content, and it therefore begs the question against (...)
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  • Credibility Excess and the Social Imaginary in Cases of Sexual Assault.Audrey S. Yap - 2017 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):1-24.
    Open Access: This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, criticisms of Fricker (...)
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  • The plurality of concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
    Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, (...)
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  • Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):313-338.
    Mechanistic explanation has an impressive track record of advancing our understanding of complex, hierarchically organized physical systems, particularly biological and neural systems. But not every complex system can be understood mechanistically. Psychological capacities are often understood by providing cognitive models of the systems that underlie them. I argue that these models, while superficially similar to mechanistic models, in fact have a substantially more complex relation to the real underlying system. They are typically constructed using a range of techniques for abstracting (...)
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  • Are philosophers expert intuiters?Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.
    Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people (...)
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  • Basic Concepts: A Cognitive Approach.Wiesław Walentukiewicz - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):155-177.
    This article seeks to describe concepts of a special kind, these being ones that count as basic, while at the same time referring to the results of research in logic, the philosophy of language, and empirically pursued cognitive psychology. The key issue addressed is this: on what grounds are such basic concepts formed? It thus investigates issues pertaining to their formation and operation, especially in small children. Such concepts can take the form of mental representations of objects, properties and relations. (...)
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  • The ‘niche’ in niche-based theorizing: much ado about nothing.Samantha Wakil & James Justus - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (2):1-21.
    The niche is allegedly the conceptual bedrock underpinning the most prominent, and some would say most important, theorizing in ecology. We argue this point of view is more aspirational than veridical. Rather than critically dissect existing definitions of the concept, the supposedly significant work it is thought to have done in ecology is our evaluative target. There is no denying the impressive mathematical sophistication and theoretical ingenuity of the ecological modeling that invokes ‘niche’ terminology. But despite the pervasive labeling, we (...)
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  • Temporal dynamics of categorization: forgetting as the basis of abstraction and generalization.Haley A. Vlach & Charles W. Kalish - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • The Big Concepts Paper: A Defence of Hybridism.Agustín Vicente & Fernando Martínez Manrique - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):59-88.
    The renewed interest in concepts and their role in psychological theorizing is partially motivated by Machery’s claim that concepts are so heterogeneous that they have no explanatory role. Against this, pluralism argues that there is multiplicity of different concepts for any given category, while hybridism argues that a concept is constituted by a rich common representation. This article aims to advance the understanding of the hybrid view of concepts. First, we examine the main arguments against hybrid concepts and conclude that, (...)
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  • Chomskyan Arguments Against Truth-Conditional Semantics Based on Variability and Co-predication.Agustín Vicente - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):919-940.
    In this paper I try to show that semantics can explain word-to-world relations and that sentences can have meanings that determine truth-conditions. Critics like Chomsky typically maintain that only speakers denote, i.e., only speakers, by using words in one way or another, represent entities or events in the world. However, according to their view, individual acts of denotations are not explained just by virtue of speakers’ semantic knowledge. Against this view, I will hold that, in the typical cases considered, semantic (...)
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  • Acquiring Contextualized Concepts: A Connectionist Approach.Saskia van Dantzig, Antonino Raffone & Bernhard Hommel - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (6):1162-1189.
    Conceptual knowledge is acquired through recurrent experiences, by extracting statistical regularities at different levels of granularity. At a fine level, patterns of feature co-occurrence are categorized into objects. At a coarser level, patterns of concept co-occurrence are categorized into contexts. We present and test CONCAT, a connectionist model that simultaneously learns to categorize objects and contexts. The model contains two hierarchically organized CALM modules (Murre, Phaf, & Wolters, 1992). The first module, the Object Module, forms object representations based on co-occurrences (...)
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  • Is the Mystery of Thought Demystified by Context‐Dependent Categorisation? Towards a New Relation Between Language and Thought.Michael S. C. Thomas, Harry R. M. Purser & Denis Mareschal - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):595-618.
    We argue that are no such things as literal categories in human cognition. Instead, we argue that there are merely temporary coalescences of dimensions of similarity, which are brought together by context in order to create the similarity structure in mental representations appropriate for the task at hand. Fodor contends that context‐sensitive cognition cannot be realised by current computational theories of mind. We address this challenge by describing a simple computational implementation that exhibits internal knowledge representations whose similarity structure alters (...)
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  • Why Cognitive Science Needs Philosophy and Vice Versa.Paul Thagard - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):237-254.
    Contrary to common views that philosophy is extraneous to cognitive science, this paper argues that philosophy has a crucial role to play in cognitive science with respect to generality and normativity. General questions include the nature of theories and explanations, the role of computer simulation in cognitive theorizing, and the relations among the different fields of cognitive science. Normative questions include whether human thinking should be Bayesian, whether decision making should maximize expected utility, and how norms should be established. These (...)
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  • The self as a system of multilevel interacting mechanisms.Paul Thagard - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology (2):1-19.
    This paper proposes an account of the self as a multilevel system consisting of social, individual, neural, and molecular mechanisms. It argues that the functioning of the self depends on causal relations between mechanisms operating at different levels. In place of reductionist and holistic approaches to cognitive science, I advocate a method of multilevel interacting mechanisms. This method is illustrated by showing how self-concepts operate at several different levels.
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  • Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker and Xian Chen the cognitive structure of scientific revolutions.Paul Thagard - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):843-847.
  • Eighty phenomena about the self: representation, evaluation, regulation, and change.Paul Thagard & Joanne V. Wood - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Explanatory Identities and Conceptual Change.Paul Thagard - 2014 - Science & Education 23 (7):1531-1548.
    Although mind-brain identity remains controversial, many other identities of ordinary things with scientific ones are well established. For example, air is a mixture of gases, water is H2O, and fire is rapid oxidation. This paper examines the history of 15 important identifications: air, blood, cloud, earth, electricity, fire, gold, heat, light, lightning, magnetism, salt, star, thunder, and water. This examination yields surprising conclusions about the nature of justification, explanation, and conceptual change.
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  • Reforming intuition pumps: when are the old ways the best?Brian Talbot - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):315-334.
    One mainstream approach to philosophy involves trying to learn about philosophically interesting, non-mental phenomena—ethical properties, for example, or causation—by gathering data from human beings. I call this approach “wide tent traditionalism.” It is associated with the use of philosophers’ intuitions as data, the making of deductive arguments from this data, and the gathering of intuitions by eliciting reactions to often quite bizarre thought experiments. These methods have been criticized—I consider experimental philosophy’s call for a move away from the use of (...)
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  • Philosophy of psychiatry after diagnostic kinds.Kathryn Tabb - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2177-2195.
    A significant portion of the scholarship in analytic philosophy of psychiatry has been devoted to the problem of what kind of kind psychiatric disorders are. Efforts have included descriptive projects, which aim to identify what psychiatrists in fact refer to when they diagnose, and prescriptive ones, which argue over that to which diagnostic categories should refer. In other words, philosophers have occupied themselves with what I call “diagnostic kinds”. However, the pride of place traditionally given to diagnostic kinds in psychiatric (...)
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  • Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categories.Shelbie L. Sutherland, Andrei Cimpian, Sarah-Jane Leslie & Susan A. Gelman - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1021-1046.
    Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal (...)
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  • Where do Bayesian priors come from?Patrick Suppes - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):441-471.
    Bayesian prior probabilities have an important place in probabilistic and statistical methods. In spite of this fact, the analysis of where these priors come from and how they are formed has received little attention. It is reasonable to excuse the lack, in the foundational literature, of detailed psychological theory of what are the mechanisms by which prior probabilities are formed. But it is less excusable that there is an almost total absence of a detailed discussion of the highly differentiating nature (...)
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  • Why the Method of Cases Doesn’t Work.Christopher Suhler - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):825-847.
    In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of whether philosophy actually makes progress. This discussion has been prompted, in no small part, by the depth and persistence of disagreement among philosophers on virtually every major theoretical issue in the field. In this paper, I examine the role that the Method of Cases – the widespread philosophical method of testing and revising theories by comparing their verdicts against our intuitions in particular cases – plays in creating and sustaining theoretical disagreements (...)
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