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  1. The role of similarity in categorization: providing a groundwork.Robert L. Goldstone - 1994 - Cognition 52 (2):125-157.
  • Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • From individual to social counterintuitiveness: how layers of innovation weave together to form multilayered tapestries of human cultures.M. Afzal Upal - 2011 - Mind and Society 10 (1):79-96.
    The emerging field of cognition and culture has had some success in explaining the spread of counterintuitive religious concepts around the world. However, researchers have been reluctant to extend its findings to explain the widespread occurrence of culturally counterintuitive ideas in general. This article develops a broader notion of social counterintuitiveness to include ideas that violate shared expectations of a group of people and argues that the notion of social counterintuitiveness is more crucial to explaining cultural success of surprising ideas (...)
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  • Which theoretical concepts do children use?Andrew Woodfield - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (1):1-20.
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  • Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):195-206.
    Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts.Doing without Concepts(Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length inDoing without Concepts.
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  • Talking to yourself about what is where: What is the vocabulary of preattentive vision?Jeremy M. Wolfe - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):254-255.
  • “What” and “where” in spatial language and spatial cognition.Barbara Landau & Ray Jackendoff - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):217-238.
    Fundamental to spatial knowledge in all species are the representations underlying object recognition, object search, and navigation through space. But what sets humans apart from other species is our ability to express spatial experience through language. This target article explores the language ofobjectsandplaces, asking what geometric properties are preserved in the representations underlying object nouns and spatial prepositions in English. Evidence from these two aspects of language suggests there are significant differences in the geometric richness with which objects and places (...)
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  • Immediate and Reflective Senses.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado & Dena Shottenkirk (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. pp. 187-209.
    This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses are what we understand of an intentional mental state's (putative) referent upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate (...)
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  • The Ordinary Concept of Valuing.Joshua Knobe & Erica Preston-Roedder - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):131-147.
    This paper relates an empirical study demonstrating asymmetry in the concept of valuing.
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  • Précis of Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction.G. E. Zuriff - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):687-699.
    The conceptual framework of behaviorism is reconstructed in a logical scheme rather than along chronological lines. The resulting reconstruction is faithful to the history of behaviorism and yet meets the contemporary challenges arising from cognitive science, psycholinguistics, and philosophy. In this reconstruction, the fundamental premise is that psychology is to be a natural science, and the major corollaries are that psychology is to be objective and empirical. To a great extent, the reconstruction of behaviorism is an elaboration of behaviorist views (...)
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  • Conceptual reconstruction: A reconstruction.G. E. Zuriff - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):716-723.
  • Human and nonhuman systems are adaptive in a different sense.Tamás Zétényi - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):507-508.
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  • The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
  • Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
  • Arguments over Intuitions?Tomasz Wysocki - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):477-499.
    Deutsch 2010 (The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 447–460) claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example, he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that there’s no deep difference between evaluating the Gettier case with (...)
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  • Implicit Theories and Issue Characteristics as Determinants of Moral Awareness and Intentions.Kurt Wurthmann - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 142 (1):93-116.
    Individuals’ implicit theories that people’s character is fixed versus malleable are associated with their holding beliefs that morality is primarily determined by fulfilling prescribed duties versus upholding basic rights of others, respectively. Three studies provide evidence that the ability to recognize that a situation can legitimately be considered from a moral point of view is interactively dependent upon the nature of perceivers’ implicit theories and the extent to which the issue involves a violation that emphasizes a failure to fulfill a (...)
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  • Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.
  • On the Interaction of Theory and Data in Concept Learning.Edward J. Wisniewski & Douglas L. Medin - 1994 - Cognitive Science 18 (2):221-281.
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  • Are there really two types of learning?Yorick Wilks - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):671-671.
  • Control and abilities to do otherwise.Ann Whittle - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):1210-1230.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, I shall explore the relationship between the control required for action and the control required for moral responsibility. I shall argue that there is an incongruity between Frankfurt’s account of guidance control presented in his theory of action and his commitment to the claim that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility. This inconsistency centres around the role of abilities to do otherwise in our analyses of action and moral responsibility. After outlining the problem for (...)
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  • The plurality of concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
    Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, (...)
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  • Specifying the scope of 13-month-olds' expectations for novel words.Sandra R. Waxman - 1999 - Cognition 70 (3):35-50.
  • Paul Thagard, Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press1996. Pp. xi + 213. [REVIEW]Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):587-608.
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  • Paul Thagard, Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press1996. Pp. xi + 213. [REVIEW]Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):587-608.
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  • The hard questions about noninductive learning remain unanswered.Eric Wanner - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):670-670.
  • Categorization Method Affects the Typicality Effect: ERP Evidence from a Category-Inference Task.Xiaoxi Wang, Yun Tao, Tobias Tempel, Yuan Xu, Siqi Li, Yu Tian & Hong Li - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Causal models and the acquisition of category structure.Michael R. Waldmann, Keith J. Holyoak & Angela Fratianne - 1995 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 124 (2):181.
  • From observations on language to theories of visual perception.Johan Wagemans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):253-254.
  • The rare preference effect: Statistical information influences social affiliation judgments.Natalia Vélez, Sophie Bridgers & Hyowon Gweon - 2019 - Cognition 192 (C):103994.
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  • Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • Bayesian Rationality Revisited: Integrating Order Effects.Pierre Uzan - 2023 - Foundations of Science 28 (2):507-528.
    Bayes’ inference cannot reliably account for uncertainty in mental processes. The reason is that Bayes’ inference is based on the assumption that the order in which the relevant features are evaluated is indifferent, which is not the case in most of mental processes. Instead of Bayes’ rule, a more general, probabilistic rule of inference capable of accounting for these order effects is established. This new rule of inference can be used to improve the current Bayesian models of cognition. Moreover, it (...)
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  • Prepositions aren't places.Barbara Tversky & Herbert H. Clark - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):252-253.
  • Folk intuitions, asymmetry, and intentional side effects.Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):214-219.
    An agent S wants to A and knows that if she A-s she will also bring about B. S does not care at all about B. S then A-s, also bringing about B. Did she intentionally bring B about? Joshua Knobe (2003b) has recently argued that, according to the folk concept of intentional action, the answer depends on B's moral significance. In particular, if B is reprehensible, people are more likely to say that S intentionally brought it about. Knobe defends (...)
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  • Computational resources do constrain behavior.John K. Tsotsos - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):506-507.
  • Temporal construal.Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman - 2003 - Psychological Review 110 (3):403-421.
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  • Knowledge-based artificial neural networks.Geoffrey G. Towell & Jude W. Shavlik - 1994 - Artificial Intelligence 70 (1-2):119-165.
  • Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.
  • Rejecting induction: Using occam's razor too soon.J. T. Tolliver - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):669-670.
  • Water is and is not H 2 O.Kevin P. Tobia, George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (2):183-208.
    The Twin Earth thought experiment invites us to consider a liquid that has all of the superficial properties associated with water (clear, potable, etc.) but has entirely different deeper causal properties (composed of “XYZ” rather than of H2O). Although this thought experiment was originally introduced to illuminate questions in the theory of reference, it has also played a crucial role in empirically informed debates within the philosophy of psychology about people’s ordinary natural kind concepts. Those debates have sought to accommodate (...)
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  • Water is and is not H 2 O.Kevin P. Tobia, George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (2):183-208.
    The Twin Earth thought experiment invites us to consider a liquid that has all of the superficial properties associated with water (clear, potable, etc.) but has entirely different deeper causal properties (composed of “XYZ” rather than of H2O). Debates about natural kind concepts have sought to accommodate an apparent fact about ordinary people's judgments: Intuitively, the Twin Earth liquid is not water. We present results showing that people do not have this intuition. Instead, people tend to judge that there is (...)
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  • Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.
  • Relational learning re-examined.Chris Thornton & Andy Clark - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):83-83.
    We argue that existing learning algorithms are often poorly equipped to solve problems involving a certain type of important and widespread regularity that we call “type-2 regularity.” The solution in these cases is to trade achieved representation against computational search. We investigate several ways in which such a trade-off may be pursued including simple incremental learning, modular connectionism, and the developmental hypothesis of “representational redescription.”.
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  • Is the Mystery of Thought Demystified by Context‐Dependent Categorisation? Towards a New Relation Between Language and Thought.Michael S. C. Thomas, Harry R. M. Purser & Denis Mareschal - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):595-618.
    We argue that are no such things as literal categories in human cognition. Instead, we argue that there are merely temporary coalescences of dimensions of similarity, which are brought together by context in order to create the similarity structure in mental representations appropriate for the task at hand. Fodor contends that context‐sensitive cognition cannot be realised by current computational theories of mind. We address this challenge by describing a simple computational implementation that exhibits internal knowledge representations whose similarity structure alters (...)
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  • Extensional Superposition and Its Relation to Compositionality in Language and Thought.Chris Thornton - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (5):e12929.
    Semantic composition in language must be closely related to semantic composition in thought. But the way the two processes are explained differs considerably. Focusing primarily on propositional content, language theorists generally take semantic composition to be a truth‐conditional process. Focusing more on extensional content, cognitive theorists take it to be a form of concept combination. But though deep, this disconnect is not irreconcilable. Both areas of theory assume that extensional (i.e., denotational) meanings must play a role. As this article demonstrates, (...)
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  • Concept Appraisal.Sapphira R. Thorne, Jake Quilty-Dunn, Joulia Smortchkova, Nicholas Shea & James A. Hampton - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (5):e12978.
    This paper reports the first empirical investigation of the hypothesis that epistemic appraisals form part of the structure of concepts. To date, studies of concepts have focused on the way concepts encode properties of objects and the way those features are used in categorization and in other cognitive tasks. Philosophical considerations show the importance of also considering how a thinker assesses the epistemic value of beliefs and other cognitive resources and, in particular, concepts. We demonstrate that there are multiple, reliably (...)
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  • Understanding the What and When of Analogical Reasoning Across Analogy Formats: An Eye‐Tracking and Machine Learning Approach.Jean-Pierre Thibaut, Yannick Glady & Robert M. French - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (11):e13208.
    Starting with the hypothesis that analogical reasoning consists of a search of semantic space, we used eye-tracking to study the time course of information integration in adults in various formats of analogies. The two main questions we asked were whether adults would follow the same search strategies for different types of analogical problems and levels of complexity and how they would adapt their search to the difficulty of the task. We compared these results to predictions from the literature. Machine learning (...)
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  • The pragmatics of induction.Paul Thagard - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):668-669.
  • Contrasting effects of feature-based statistics on the categorisation and basic-level identification of visual objects.Kirsten I. Taylor, Barry J. Devereux, Kadia Acres, Billi Randall & Lorraine K. Tyler - 2012 - Cognition 122 (3):363-374.
  • Ontological Constraints in Children's Inductive Inferences: Evidence From a Comparison of Inferences Within Animals and Vehicles.Andrzej Tarlowski - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • From perception to cognition.Michael J. Tarr - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):251-252.