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  1. Causal Reasoning in Economics: A Selective Exploration of Semantic, Epistemic and Dynamical Aspects.François Claveau - unknown
    Economists reason causally. Like many other scientists, they aim at formulating justified causal claims about their object of study. This thesis contributes to our understanding of how causal reasoning proceeds in economics. By using the research on the causes of unemployment as a case study, three questions are adressed. What are the meanings of causal claims? How can a causal claim be adequately supported by evidence? How are causal beliefs affected by incoming facts? In the process of answering these semantic, (...)
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  • A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of Unification.Wayne Myrvold - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (2):399-423.
    A Bayesian account of the virtue of unification is given. On this account, the ability of a theory to unify disparate phenomena consists in the ability of the theory to render such phenomena informationally relevant to each other. It is shown that such ability contributes to the evidential support of the theory, and hence that preference for theories that unify the phenomena need not, on a Bayesian account, be built into the prior probabilities of theories.
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  • The Confirmational Significance of Agreeing Measurements.Casey Helgeson - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):721-732.
    Agreement between "independent" measurements of a theoretically posited quantity is intuitively compelling evidence that a theory is, loosely speaking, on the right track. But exactly what conclusion is warranted by such agreement? I propose a new account of the phenomenon's epistemic significance within the framework of Bayesian epistemology. I contrast my proposal with the standard Bayesian treatment, which lumps the phenomenon under the heading of "evidential diversity".
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  • Robustness and Independent Evidence.Jacob Stegenga & Tarun Menon - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):414-435.
    Robustness arguments hold that hypotheses are more likely to be true when they are confirmed by diverse kinds of evidence. Robustness arguments require the confirming evidence to be independent. We identify two kinds of independence appealed to in robustness arguments: ontic independence —when the multiple lines of evidence depend on different materials, assumptions, or theories—and probabilistic independence. Many assume that OI is sufficient for a robustness argument to be warranted. However, we argue that, as typically construed, OI is not a (...)
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  • Explaining the Limits of Olsson's Impossibility Result.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):136-150.
    In his groundbreaking book, Against Coherence (2005), Erik Olsson presents an ingenious impossibility theorem that appears to show that there is no informative relationship between probabilistic measures of coherence and higher likelihood of truth. Although Olsson's result provides an important insight into probabilistic models of epistemological coherence, the scope of his negative result is more limited than generally appreciated. The key issue is the role conditional independence conditions play within the witness testimony model Olsson uses to establish his result. Olsson (...)
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  • Focused Correlation and Confirmation.Gregory Wheeler - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):79-100.
    This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation . This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology (...)
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  • The Diversity Phenomenon.Riccardo Viale & Daniel Osherson - 2001 - Foundations of Science 5 (2).
  • Coherence and Confirmation Through Causation.Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):135-170.
    Coherentism maintains that coherent beliefs are more likely to be true than incoherent beliefs, and that coherent evidence provides more confirmation of a hypothesis when the evidence is made coherent by the explanation provided by that hypothesis. Although probabilistic models of credence ought to be well-suited to justifying such claims, negative results from Bayesian epistemology have suggested otherwise. In this essay we argue that the connection between coherence and confirmation should be understood as a relation mediated by the causal relationships (...)
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  • The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn't rely epistemically on other people's say-so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should (...)
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  • Accounting for Dependence: Relative Consilience as a Correction Factor in Cumulative Case Arguments.Lydia McGrew - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):560-572.
    I propose a measure of dependence that relates a set of items of evidence to an hypothesis H and to H's negation. I dub this measure relative consilience and propose a method for using it as a correction factor for dependence among items of evidence. Using RC, I examine collusion and testimonial independence, the value of diverse evidence, and the strengthening of otherwise weak or non-existent cases. RC provides a valuable tool for formal epistemologists interested in analyzing cumulative case arguments.
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  • On the Evidential Import of Unification.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (1):92-114.
    This paper discusses two senses in which a hypothesis may be said to unify evidence. One is the ability of the hypothesis to increase the mutual information of a set of evidence statements; the other is the ability of the hypothesis to explain commonalities in observed phenomena by positing a common origin for them. On Bayesian updating, it is only mutual information unification that contributes to the incremental support of a hypothesis by the evidence unified. This poses a challenge for (...)
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  • Bayes' Theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Bayes' Theorem is a simple mathematical formula used for calculating conditional probabilities. It figures prominently in subjectivist or Bayesian approaches to epistemology, statistics, and inductive logic. Subjectivists, who maintain that rational belief is governed by the laws of probability, lean heavily on conditional probabilities in their theories of evidence and their models of empirical learning. Bayes' Theorem is central to these enterprises both because it simplifies the calculation of conditional probabilities and because it clarifies significant features of subjectivist position. Indeed, (...)
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  • A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S123-.
    outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C.S. Peirce. When we want to consider how degree of confirmation varies with changing I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of con-.
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  • Unification and Confirmation.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (1):107-123.
    According to the traditional requirement, formulated by William Whewell in his account of the “consilience of inductions” in 1840, a scientific hypothesis should have unifying power in the sense that it explains and predicts several mutually independent phenomena. Variants of this notion of consilience or unification include deductive, inductive, and approximate systematization. Inference from surprising phenomena to their theoretical explanations was called abduction by Charles Peirce. As a unifying theory is independently testable by new kinds of phenomena, it should also (...)
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  • Scientific Discovery From the Point of View of Acceptance.Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson - unknown
    In the four papers available on our web site (of which this is the first), we propose to develop an inductive logic. By “inductive logic” we mean a set of principles that distinguish between successful and unsuccessful strategies for scientific inquiry. Our logic will have a technical character, since it is built from the concepts and terminology of (elementary) model theory. The reader may therefore wish to know something about the kind of results on offer before investing time in definitions (...)
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  • Focused Correlation, Confirmation, and the Jigsaw Puzzle of Variable Evidence.Maximilian Schlosshauer & Gregory Wheeler - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (3):376-92.
    Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true. A difference between the confirmation lent to a hypothesis by one evidence set and the confirmation lent to that hypothesis by another evidence set is robustly tracked by a difference in focused correlations of those evidence sets on that hypothesis, provided that all the individual pieces of evidence are equally, positively relevant to that hypothesis. (...)
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  • The Role of Coherence of Evidence in the Non-Dynamic Model of Confirmation.Tomoji Shogenji - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):317-333.
    This paper examines the role of coherence of evidence in what I call the non-dynamic model of confirmation. It appears that other things being equal, a higher degree of coherence among pieces of evidence raises to a higher degree the probability of the proposition they support. I argue against this view on the basis of three related observations. First, we should be able to assess the impact of coherence on any hypothesis of interest the evidence supports. Second, the impact of (...)
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  • Does Evidential Variety Depend on How the Evidence is Described?Greg Novack - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):701-711.
    The Variety of Evidence Thesis (VET) says that (ceteris paribus) the more diverse (or varied) of two bodies of evidence is the more confirmatory of a hypothesis H. Two recent types of Bayesian explication of VET account for the intuitive force of VET by defining variety as some function of the probabilities of the propositions which collectively constitute a body of evidence. I show that these two accounts of VET are not tracking a meaningful property of bodies of evidence, but (...)
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  • Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):521-553.
    Probabilistic dependence and independence are among the key concepts of Bayesian epistemology. This paper focuses on the study of one specific quantitative notion of probabilistic dependence. More specifically, section 1 introduces Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and shows how it is related to pivotal aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, the explanatory and unificatory power of theories, and the diversity of evidence. The intimate connection between Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and scientific reasoning raises the question of how Keynes’s coefficient (...)
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  • The Independence Condition in the Variety-of-Evidence Thesis.François Claveau - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):94-118.
  • Evidential Diversity and Premise Probability in Young Children's Inductive Judgment.Yafen Lo, Ashley Sides, Joseph Rozelle & Daniel Osherson - 2002 - Cognitive Science 26 (2):181-206.
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  • Bayes Factors All the Way: Toward a New View of Coherence and Truth.Lydia McGrew - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):329-350.
    A focus on the conjunction of the contents of witness reports and on the coherence of their contents has had negative effects on the epistemic clarity of the Bayesian coherence literature. Whether or not increased coherence of witness reports is correlated with higher confirmation for some H depends upon the hypothesis in question and upon factors concerning the confirmation and independence of the reports, not directly on the positive relevance of the contents to each other. I suggest that Bayesians should (...)
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  • The Lovely and the Probable. [REVIEW]Christopher Hitchcock - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):433–440.
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  • A Normative Framework for Argument Quality: Argumentation Schemes with a Bayesian Foundation.Ulrike Hahn & Jos Hornikx - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1833-1873.
    In this paper, it is argued that the most fruitful approach to developing normative models of argument quality is one that combines the argumentation scheme approach with Bayesian argumentation. Three sample argumentation schemes from the literature are discussed: the argument from sign, the argument from expert opinion, and the appeal to popular opinion. Limitations of the scheme-based treatment of these argument forms are identified and it is shown how a Bayesian perspective may help to overcome these. At the same time, (...)
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  • Reasons, Cognition and Society.Raymond Boudon & Riccardo Viale - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (1):41-56.
    Homo sociologicus and homo oeconomicus are, for different reasons, unsatisfactory models for the social sciences. A third model, called “rational model in the broad sense”, seems better endowed to cope with the many different expressions of rationality of the social agent. Some contributions by Weber, Durkheim and Marx are early examples of the application of this model of social explanation based on good subjective reasons. According to this model and to the evidence of cognitive anthropology, it is possible to reconcile (...)
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  • Coherence of the Contents and the Transmission of Probabilistic Support.Tomoji Shogenji - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2525-2545.
    This paper examines how coherence of the contents of evidence affects the transmission of probabilistic support from the evidence to the hypothesis. It is argued that coherence of the contents in the sense of the ratio of the positive intersection reduces the transmission of probabilistic support, though this negative impact of coherence may be offset by other aspects of the relations among the contents. It is argued further that there is no broader conception of coherence whose impact on the transmission (...)
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