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Thomas Nagel (1998). Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.

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  1.  9
    A New Understanding of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives.Alla Choifer - forthcoming - Philosophical Papers:1-39.
    Characterizing the first- and third-person perspectives is essential to the study of consciousness, yet we lack a rigorous definition of or criteria for these two perspectives. Our intuitive understanding of how personal pronouns help to specify the perspectives gives rise to mutually exclusive notions of the first-person perspective. This contradiction thwarts our progress in studying consciousness. We can resolve the current ambiguity of the first-person perspective by introducing a new distinction between the first-person and third-person perspectives, based on two modes (...)
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  2.  3
    Liberal Naturalism and Non-Epistemic Values.Ricardo F. Crespo - forthcoming - Foundations of Science:1-27.
    The ‘value-free ideal’ has been called into question for several reasons. It does not include “epistemic values”—viewed as characteristic of ‘good science’—and rejects the so-called ‘contextual’, ‘non-cognitive’ or ‘non-epistemic’ values—all of them personal, moral, or political values. This paper analyzes a possible complementary argument about the dubitable validity of the value-free ideal, specifically focusing on social sciences, with a two-fold strategy. First, it will consider that values are natural facts in a broad or ‘liberal naturalist’ sense and, thus, a legitimate (...)
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  3.  6
    El Problema de la Conciencia Para la Filosofía de la Mente y de la Psiquiatría.Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3).
    Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría.
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  4. Undefeated Dualism.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  5.  40
    Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.
    Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it (...)
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  6. Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
    It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concept" by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such phenomenal ways of thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending (...)
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  7.  29
    Structuring Ends.Jon Garthoff - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):691-713.
    There is disagreement among contemporary theorists regarding human well-being. On one hand there are “substantive good” views, according to which the most important elements of a person’s well-being result from her nature as a human, rational, and/or sentient being. On the other hand there are “agent-constituted” views, which contend that a person’s well-being is constituted by her particular aims, desires, and/or preferences. Each approach captures important features of human well-being, but neither can provide a complete account: agent-constituted theories have difficulty (...)
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  8.  44
    An Alternative to Working on Machine Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):1-18.
  9.  68
    How to Understand Consciousness: The Strength of the Phenomenological Method.Maria Armezzani - 2009 - World Futures 65 (2):101 – 110.
    Analyzing the outline of the endless literature on consciousness, the separation between science and philosophy rather than being overcome, seems to come back in different shapes. According to this point of view, the hard problem seems to be how to study consciousness while avoiding a slip back to the old dualism. This article outlines the advantages of the phenomenological method. This method, more than getting over the mind-body separation, anticipates it through an open gaze, able to bring back the human (...)
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  10. Zombies and Epiphenomenalism.Andrew R. Bailey - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):129.
    RÉSUMÉ: Cette étude examine la relation entre la demande que les zombies sont logiquement/métaphysiquement possible et de la position que la conscience phénoménal est epiphenomenal. Il est souvent présumé que la première entraîne ce dernier, et que, par conséquent, toute implausibility dans la notion de conscience epiphenomenalism remet en question la possibilité réelle de zombies. Quatre façons dont les zombist pourrait répondre sont examinées, et je soutiens que les deux les plus fréquemment rencontrés sont insuffisantes, mais les autres—dont l’un est (...)
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  11.  22
    O paradoxo de Chalmers.Gustavo Leal-Toledo - 2009 - Trans/Form/Ação 32 (2):159-173.
    O Argumento dos Zumbis proposto por Chalmers, ao contrário de defender o dualismo, bane as qualia para um “mundo” onde elas não podem influenciar o julgamento que fazemos sobre nós mesmos. Por este motivo, pelo próprio argumento, podemos ser um zumbi e não saber. A isso Chalmers chamou de The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment. O problema é que ele aceita tal paradoxo como parte de sua própria teoria. No entanto, este movimento filosófico não é aceitável e este paradoxo mina a (...)
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  12. Constitution and the Explanatory Gap.Hagit Benbaji - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):183-202.
    Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to a phenomenal one. We fully understand the identity between water and H2O but the identity between pain and the firing of C-fibers is inconceivable. Mark Johnston [Journal of philosophy , 564–583] suggests that if water is constituted by H2O, not identical to it, then the explanatory gap becomes a pseudo-problem. This is because all (...)
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  13.  53
    Material Objects, Constitution, and Mysterianism.Hagit Benbaji - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-26.
    It is sometimes claimed that ordinary objects, such as mountains and chairs, are not material in their own right, but only in virtue of the fact that they are constituted by matter. As Fine puts it, they are “onlyderivatively material”. In this paper I argue that invoking “constitution” to account for the materiality of things that are not material in their own right explains nothing and renders the admission that these objects are indeed material completely mysterious. Although there may be (...)
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  14.  45
    Nagel Vs. Nagel on the Nature of Phenomenal Concepts.Janet Levin - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):293–307.
    In a footnote to his ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Thomas Nagel sketches a promising account of phenomenal concepts that purports to explain why mind-body identity statements, even if necessary, will always seem contingent. Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have recently developed this sketch into a more robust theory. In Nagel's more recent work, however, he suggests that the only adequate theory of phenomenal concepts is one that makes the relation between phenomenal and physical states intelligible, or (...)
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  15. The Cogito and the Metaphysics of Mind.Nick Treanor - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):247-71.
    That there is an epistemological difference between the mental and the physical is well- known. Introspection readily generates knowledge of one’s own conscious experience, but fails to yield evidence for the existence of anything physical. Conversely, empirical investigation delivers knowledge of physical properties, but neither finds nor requires us to posit conscious experience. In recent decades, a series of neo-Cartesian arguments have emerged that rest on this epistemological difference and purport to demonstrate that mind-brain identity is false and that consciousness (...)
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  16.  4
    Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness.Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):133-162.
  17.  79
    The Trouble with Mary.Victoria McGeer - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):384-393.
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  18. The Epistemic/Ontic Divide.Barbara Montero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404 - 418.
    A number of philosophers think that, while we cannot explain how the mind is physical, we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, looses its force. For if one takes physical/nonphysical causation and ontological physicalism (...)
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  19. Nagel's Case Against Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):91-108.
  20.  14
    Nagel's Case Against Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2).
    This paper is an attempt to understand and assess Thomas Nagel's influential case against physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I show that Nagel has claimed that experience is "subjective", or "essentially connected with a single point of view" in at least three different senses: first, in the sense that it is essential to every experience that there be something it is like to have it; second, in the sense that what an experience is like for its possessor cannot be (...)
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