The movement known as Deutsche Physik (German physics) evolved hand in hand with National Socialism. It represented a marginal but vocal group of German scientists and science scholars who profiled themselves as defenders of “Aryan” science and called for the elimination of the “Jewish spirit” that they saw as epitomized by Albert Einstein’s relativity theory and as dominating the natural sciences, even in Nazi Germany. This infamous movement is most associated with the Nobel laureate physicists Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark, (...) who founded it and gave it its initial political impetus during the early years of the Third Reich. However, in its main and final phase, between 1937 and 1943, the movement was no longer led by Lenard and Stark but by the philosopher of science Hugo Dingler (1881–1954) and his Munich-based circle. Tracing the development of his career until 1937, this article examines how Dingler came to play this role both despite and because of the significant differences between his and the better known Lenard-Stark strand of Deutsche Physik. Special attention is paid to Dingler’s subversive use of theoretical principles—particularly his framing of his work as a radical search for certainty—to advance the movement’s antiscientific agenda. (shrink)

It is not the aim of the present essay to defend the principle of empiricism against apriorism or anti-empiricist metaphysics. Taking empirism for granted, we wish to discuss, the question what is meaningful. The word ‘meaning’ will here be taken in its empiricist sense; an expression of language has meaning in this sense if we know how to use it in speaking about empirical facts, either actual or possible ones. Now our problem is what expressions are meaningful in this sense. (...) We may restrict this question to sentences because expressions other than sentences are meaningful if and only if they can occur in a meaningful sentence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: what does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as (...) Hermann Weyl and Kurt Gödel, the overall objective is systematic in nature: to offer a plausible approach towards mathematics. (shrink)