This paper returns to the question of how to think of justice through Teubner’s recent definition of what he calls juridical justice. Juridical justice is defined as distinct from political, moral, social and theological conceptions of justice. Teubner attempts to think of an imaginary space for a juridical justice ‘beyond the sites of natural and positive law’ and searches for a conception of justice as the ‘law’s self-subversive principle’. This article reviews Teubner’s conception of juridical justice and further proposes a (...) distinction between juridical and non-juridical understandings of justice. (shrink)

In one of the essays in his recent book on Christianity, La déclosion (2005), Nancy discusses the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. Nancy opens this discussion with a reference to Lyotard’s book on this relationship: Un trait d’union (1993). Both Lyotard and Nancy examine a very early figure in the emergence of Christianity from Judaism—whereas Lyotard focuses on the epistles of Paul, Nancy reads the epistle of James. Lyotard concludes that the hyphen in the expression ‘Judeo-Christian’ actually conceals ‘the most (...) impenetrable abyss within Western thought’. With this abyss, Lyotard refers to the point of departure of Judaism: the event in which a Voice has left behind letters, inaugurating an interminable work of interpretation. For Nancy, however, it is rather Christianity, and therefore, Western culture, which is deconstructive in nature. Its composition is co-original with a decomposition, and therefore, with an openness. In James, Nancy finds an emphasis on praxis, in such a way that existence is to be understood as transcendent within itself. With this reading of James, Nancy seems to deny that there is a fundamental difference between Judaism and Christianity. In order to clarify the differences between Lyotard and Nancy, it is shown that, in Lyotard’s view, an unsublatable alterity comes with aisthèsis, whereas in Nancy’s view, alterity comes with existence as such. (shrink)

Recently, Judith Butler refused to accept an award for civil courage at the Berlin Christopher Street Day, because she felt the event had become too commercial, and the event's organization had failed to distance itself from certain discriminatory statements. This, as well as many of her works, suggests that more than any other contemporary feminist author, Butler is aware of the risk of implication in exclusionary politics; a risk she might therefore successfully avoid. However, in this essay I argue that (...) to the extent her theory of performativity has become a hegemonic framework within the field of gender studies, it leads to the foreclosure of certain possible gendered identities. Using Nancy's notion of finite thinking, I argue that a different approach to universality may lead to a less exclusionary way of conceptualizing gender. (shrink)

In 2016, the international community, in reaction to the growing number of ‘tragedies’ occurring as people attempted to move across borders, met to discuss large movements of refugees and migrants. The outcome of this meeting was an agreement to negotiate two Global Compacts, one on refugees and one on migrants, with the aim of facilitating ‘orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people’. This article explores how responsibility in the Global Compact on Migrant is expressive of a changed (...) way of ‘doing’ migration. The language of ‘responsibility’ raises questions about how the international community views international migration and, by extension, prepares the ground for policy and practice on international migration. Taking a genealogical, jurisprudential approach, we follow the logic which brings migration, development and human rights language together to construct a new subjectivity: that of the ‘responsible’ migrant. The migrant human will be a rights-bearer because they will contribute to development in particular gendered ways. We argue that assuming a narrow understanding of responsibility misses expressive dynamics in the normalizing of international migration within a new framing to inform international law making. (shrink)

The last few years have seen the emergence of a more political, ‘post-Derridean’ generation, critical of the impotent messianism of the politics of deconstruction. As Žižek would have it: ‘Derrida's notion of ‘deconstruction as ethics’ seems to rely on a utopian hope which sustains the spectre of ‘infinite justice’, forever postponed, always to come’ (Žižek 2008: 225). The promise of redemption, it follows, would reside in an insubstantial promissory value, in the writing of irredeemable cheques that, if cashed in, could (...) only ever lead to default. With its ethos of play and over-investment in an empty promise, deconstruction starts to look symptomatic of the now-bankrupt age of excess. Does the current financial crisis not entail a crisis of Derrida? This reading contrives to elide what is genuinely political in Derrida, and thereby fails to recognise the deconstruction of economic theodicy implicit in his work. Jean-Luc Nancy has argued that the concept of sacrifice is irreducibly linked to the short-circuiting of the political. We see in Derrida, however, that sacrifice is at the heart of politics, a response to undecidability that is precisely opposed to the fantasy of economics without sacrifice. Furthermore, sacrificial politics is the condition of possibility of the promise, which is constructed and contingent, rather than a priori. If there is a problem with this, it is that Derrida does not sufficiently entertain the prospect of the promise becoming so distant as to be effectively meaningless. Drawing on Bernard Stiegler, this article argues for an expansion of Derrida's account, to show not only that politics is sacrifice, but moreover that the promise of redemption cannot live on in the absence of sacrifice. (shrink)

The present article deals with Heidegger’s research into boredom. The phenomenon cannot be simply described as an emotion but as a fundamental attunement, which represented a pathway to being qua being for Heidegger. Many scholars have argued that the philosopher’s treatment of the phenomenon led to sublimation or transgression in describing it beyond its phenomenological limits. While I agree with the general assessment, I also believe that there is a need to expand the argument further. I will argue that the (...) cause of such transgression lies mainly in Heidegger’s inability to separate the truth from the notion of meaning or sense. (shrink)

Dignity, according to some recent arguments, is a useless concept, giving vague expression to moral intuitions that are better captured by other, better defined concepts. In this paper, I defend the concept of dignity against such skeptical arguments. I begin with a description of the defining features of the Kantian conception of dignity. I then examine one of the strongest arguments against that conception, advanced by Arthur Schopenhauer in On the Basis of Morality. After considering some standard accounts of dignity, (...) showing how they fail adequately to address Schopenhauer’s concern, I propose and defend a new account of dignity, drawing on the ontology of Jean-Luc Nancy. (shrink)

This paper makes a case for love as a powerful force for ‘transforming power’ in our educational institutions and everyday lives, and proposes that ‘revolutionary love’ serves as a moral and strategic compass for concrete individual and collective actions in critical education. The paper begins by reviewing current conceptualizations of love in critical education and identifies the potential for further theorization of the concept of love. It continues by theorizing love as a transformational political concept, focusing on six different perspectives (...) about love; love as an emotion, love as choice, and love as response, love as relational, love as political, and love as praxis. The paper concludes by discussing what “transforming power” with a “loving revolution” could mean for educators who engage with critical education. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the varying conceptions of ethics underpinning the accounts of community in Blanchot, Nancy, and Esposito. A focus on ethics brings into relief points of divergence amongst accounts of community that otherwise overlap and share in many significant ways. Furthermore, it provides a basis to better assess Esposito's contribution. I focus on the concepts of difference and transcendence and the figure of the lovers, a shared topos in Nancy and Blanchot, to demonstrate these subtle variations. In turning to (...) Esposito, Kantian-inflected notions of duty, obligation, and law shape a community where others recede into the background and the lovers lose their visibility. I suggest that Esposito's focus on duty has consequences that give cause for further reflection. The law renders each of us other, but in its universality it risks losing a sense of the exceptional. Relying etymologically on the notion of duty as that which, following his reading of Kant, undermines the subject and renders possible the impossible community, grounds the Communitas in a law that risks congealing the meaning of community around this impossible obligation. (shrink)

This essay responds to the Nancean account of presentation, evoked in the opening citation, in order to trace out in Nancy's enquiries a disruption of Husserlian presentation, and a re-thinking of materiality on the edge of classical phenomenology. It stages a non-encounter between the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy and of Jacques Derrida in relation to a third term, the Lacanian conception of the ‘real’. Thereby it can be shown how these writings touch on each other, in response to phenomenology and (...) to psychoanalytical theory, but do not engage. All the same, the claim to be made is that the writings of Nancy and Derrida converge in forming a third option, alongside the secularised phenomenologies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and the Christian phenomenologies of Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry, by marking up the event of Lacan's reformulation of Freud's psychoanalytical theorising. (shrink)

Peter Fitzpatrick’s intellectual relationship with Jean-Luc Nancy centred on the related problems of myth and community. In this article, I will explicate the ‘restlessness of the negative’ that Nancy describes in Hegel, in order to further develop Fitzpatrick’s notion of ‘law as resistance’. Set against the backdrop of myth and community, law can be understood as a community’s fragmentary attempt to explicate its essence. Modern law becomes an artefact of the negative twisting through a community’s attempts to construct itself through (...) a Nancian ontology of ‘being singular plural’. In this manner, one might understand Fitzpatrick’s claim that there is ‘always more to be done’ as affirming the necessity of some extra-formal legality—that is, the political—that must be opened through the resistance wrought by negativity. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Nancy has not written a single work dedicated entirely to the problem of justice or related themes, but nevertheless, topics such as right, justice, judgement or law appear in various places in Nancy’s work. Besides ‘Lapsus judicii’ and ‘Dies irae’, the theme of justice particularly comes up and in two small texts: ‘Cosmos Basileus’ and ‘Human Excess’. These texts are crucial to understand Nancy’s point of view in juridical matters but are largely left aside in secondary literature, probably because (...) of their enigmatic character. In this article we explore the cluster of juridical questions in ‘Cosmos Basileus’ and ‘Human Excess’ and argue why today, for Nancy, an ontological perspective is needed to cope with juridical questions. For him, justice is in the first place bound up with the fact of our co-existence, with what is unique about every existence in its co-existence with other creations. He claims, first, that freedom is responsibility and the act of doing justice to existence and, second, that sharing the world is the law of the world. We will discuss these two claims and conclude with Nancy’s plead for ontological reflection within juridical topics. (shrink)

Resumen El concepto de amor historicamente ha ruborizado a la filosofia, pues se mantiene totalmente ajeno a las exigencias de dar una explication critica de si mismo. El amor ha respondido con resistencia muda a los interrogatorios del pensamiento critico. De hecho, parece existir un consenso respecto de que el amor se situa en un territorio mas alla de lo pensable y en la doxa romantica se ha establecido que el amor es un tipo de intensidad que no puede reducirse (...) a ningun principio regulador. Como senala Alain Badiou, es "lo que se sustrae de la teoria". En este ensayo me opongo a una postura tan antifilosofica y exploro el parentesco del amor con el pensamiento y la verdad. Basado principalmente en la obra de Jean-Luc Nancy y Alain Badiou, sondeo la relation entre amor y pensamiento, pues ello constituye una ocasion para que nos percatemos de la "connivencia intima entre el amor y el pensar", en palabras de Nancy. En un momento en que el amor se ve amenazado por acusaciones de no ser nada mas que un "optimismo cruel", sugiero que Nancy y Badiou hacen una defensa filosofica del amor al subrayar su parentesco con el pensamiento y la verdad.The concept of love has historically been somewhat of an embarrassment for Philosophy because it remains relentlessly oblivious to the demands for it to present a critical account of itself. Against the interrogations of critical thought, it has only responded with mute resistance. indeed, the consensus seems to be that love dwells in the domain beyond the thinkable, and it is ensconced in the Romantic doxa that it is a form of intensity that is not subject to any organizing principle. As Alain Badiou observes, it is "what is subtracted from theory". In this essay, I oppose such an "anti-philosophical" position, and offer an exploration of love's kinship with thought and truth. Drawing primarily from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Alain Badiou, I explore the relationship oflove and thought, for it is an occasion that obligates one to realize the "intimate connivance between love and thinking," to use the words of Nancy. At a time when love is threatened by accusations ofbeing nothing more than a "cruel optimism", I suggest that Nancy and Badiou offer a philosophical defense of love by underscoring its kinship to thought and to truth. (shrink)

This article explores the manner in which politico-legal language makes use of metaphors of violence and destruction in order to describe state/legal functions and actions. It argues that although such use of a militaristic hyperbole is generally regarded as normal and appropriate, it is in fact harmful in the way that it presents complex and specific problems as being simple and abstract. From a semiotic point of view, and using the work of Roland Barthes, law is regarded as a system (...) of signs and ‘combative’ legal language can be seen as ideological manipulation through the technique of so-called second-level signification (myth). Although it is conceded that law, similar to all other interpretive systems, cannot avoid the use of metaphoric language, it is argued that we should resist regarding legal language as neutral and ‘natural’ and that we should rather retain the memory of legal concepts and categories as historical, man-made, and therefore always open to revision. (shrink)

This article underlines and draws attention to critical insights Esposito makes regarding the prospects of rethinking community in a globalized world. Alongside Agamben and Nancy, Esposito challenges the property prejudice found in mainstream models of community. In identity politics, collective identity is converted into a form of communal property. Borders, sovereign territories, and exclusive rights are fiercely defended in the name of communal property. Esposito responds to this problem by developing what I call a “deontological communal contract” where being and (...) ethics are prioritized over having and economics. I examine this new perspective on community in relation to mainstream models found in contemporary and classical social theory. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to look at the discussion of the singularity in Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy as a quest to imagine a new concept of a common existence that negates the differentiation between “I” and the “other.” In the age of subjectivity, the main indicator of existence is the “subjectivity” that differs from the contingency and perceives itself as a whole in its autonomous singularity. This singularity-centralized perception of existence causes the negation of the being of the otherness (...) and its ethical being that is the core element of establishing the subjectivity. Nancy, one of the leading philosophers offering new approaches on ethical subjectivity, tries to reflect upon a new idea about community (which is called in Nancy’s philosophy “being-in-common”), where the subjects can open themselves to the otherness. This article aims to claim that the idea of “being-in-common” is the only ethical opportunity to overcome the crisis that results from the sense of existence reduced to subjectivity. In Nancy’s thought, the ethical possibility of being-in-common should be interiorized within the concept of a communist democracy. A communist democracy is an opening of the being to its perfectibility in which the otherness is ontologically placed within the idea of the community. (shrink)

Touching on Nancy and Derrida offers a glimpse not only into the thesis both of Jean-Luc Nancy's critique of touch and of Derrida's Le Toucher, but also into the threshold of a technology of (the) sense to come. This glimpse is an interrogation, and one that is both historic and historical, in the sense that Derrida, in addressing Jean-Luc Nancy's work, has presented us with an encyclopedic history of touch in the philosophic tradition from Aristotle to Nancy, one in which (...) what Derrida calls “transcendental archifacticity” is accorded its proper value, and within which any seeming anthropological privilege, as an inherent aspect of the Phenomenological Reduction is, as Derrida says, ‘overshadowed.’ Such an overshadowing is both strategic, in terms of a historical phenomenological project, and tactical, in Derrida's investigative sense: tactical in terms of implementation, manifestation, manipulation (i.e. through the application of the hand, manus) and in terms of tact, tactility; to which must be tacked on, à la Nancy, con-tact, ‘with touch,’ a ‘with-touch’ in which a béance, a gash or dash, opens out in-between, ‘at the very point’ to use Derrida's repeated specification, of bifurcation and of con-tact, at the junction point of the ‘spacing out’ of a laminated différance con-noting more than it has or had ever done in Derrida's work itself. *. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Nancy takes the concept of "essence" in order to indicate its drawbacks on the singularity of being. The concept of essence is not a universal and necessary origin, but contingent and historical meanings for Nancy. This historicity in meaning leads Nancy to question the concept of the individual and the rules of the social/public sphere allocated through individuality. Nancy's argument on the ontological environment of finite beings aims to highlight those beings are mixed singular, not belonging to a universal (...) unit. This allows us to discover that being is singular and also singular-plural to the extent that it is with the other. Thus, essential historical concepts invalidate individual or social organizations at this point. Nancy calls this “finitude” which is the only transcendental concept that makes possible the “being with” (Mitsein). It is possible to think that finitude is the only property to make a community of singularities rather than ready-made concepts of social sciences. I argue that this position is methodological for an alternative socio-ontology. (shrink)

Hölzl palpates an ontology of fracture. Unlike original ontologies that are concerned with essence rather than being, the ontology proposed here does not believe in its originality. This project is concerned with becoming as such rather than with its Wesen. With the indefinite striving for remaining in itself. This ontology is a fissure, fissuring itself.