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  1. Dedekind and Cassirer on Mathematical Concept Formation†.Audrey Yap - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 25 (3):369-389.
    Dedekind's major work on the foundations of arithmetic employs several techniques that have left him open to charges of psychologism, and through this, to worries about the objectivity of the natural-number concept he defines. While I accept that Dedekind takes the foundation for arithmetic to lie in certain mental powers, I will also argue that, given an appropriate philosophical background, this need not make numbers into subjective mental objects. Even though Dedekind himself did not provide that background, one can nevertheless (...)
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  • The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the Neo-Kantian Paradigm.David Sullivan - 2002 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 5 (1):77-95.
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  • ‘Let's Look at It Objectively’: Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized.Dermot Moran - 2013 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:89-115.
    In recent years there have been attempts to integrate first-person phenomenology into naturalistic science. Traditionally, however, Husserlian phenomenology has been resolutely anti-naturalist. Husserl identified naturalism as the dominant tendency of twentieth-century science and philosophy and he regarded it as an essentially self-refuting doctrine. Naturalism is a point of view or attitude (a reification of the natural attitude into the naturalistic attitude) that does not know that it is an attitude. For phenomenology, naturalism is objectivism. But phenomenology maintains that objectivity is (...)
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  • Paul Natorp and the Emergence of Anti-Psychologism in the Nineteenth Century.Scott Edgar - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):54-65.
    This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism make sense. This (...)
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  • Editorial Introduction.Damian Veal - 2005 - Angelaki 10 (1):1 – 31.
  • Realism, Functions, and the a Priori: Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Science.Jeremy Heis - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 48:10-19.