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  1. Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7.Matthew Duncombe - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (4):436-461.
    AtCategories7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives, but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s attitude to relatives, since he immediately returns to using R1. I propose a non-extensional reading. R1 and R2 do not (...)
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  • Thrasymachus’ Unerring Skill and the Arguments of Republic 1.Tamer Nawar - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):359-391.
    In defending the view that justice is the advantage of the stronger, Thrasymachus puzzlingly claims that rulers never err and that any practitioner of a skill or expertise (τέχνη) is infallible. In what follows, Socrates offers a number of arguments directed against Thrasymachus’ views concerning the nature of skill, ruling, and justice. Commentators typically take a dim view of both Thrasymachus’ claims about skill (which are dismissed as an ungrounded and purely ad hoc response to Socrates’ initial criticisms) and Socrates’ (...)
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  • Platonic Know‐How and Successful Action.Tamer Nawar - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):944-962.
    In Plato's Euthydemus, Socrates claims that the possession of epistēmē suffices for practical success. Several recent treatments suggest that we may make sense of this claim and render it plausible by drawing a distinction between so-called “outcome-success” and “internal-success” and supposing that epistēmē only guarantees internal-success. In this paper, I raise several objections to such treatments and suggest that the relevant cognitive state should be construed along less than purely intellectual lines: as a cognitive state constituted at least in part (...)
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  • Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism: Essays in Ancient Philosophy III By Jonathan Barnes Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 720, £85, HB ISBN: 9780199577538. [REVIEW]Tamer Nawar - 2015 - Philosophy 90 (3):539-544.
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