In constructive mathematics it is of interest to consider a more general, but classically equivalent, notion of linear order, a so-called pseudo-order. The prime example is the order of the constructive real numbers. We examine two kinds of constructive completions of pseudo-orders: order completions of pseudo-orders and Cauchy completions of ordered groups and fields. It is shown how these can be predicatively defined in type theory, also when the underlying set is non-discrete. Provable choice principles, in particular a generalisation of (...) dependent choice, are used for showing set-representability of cuts. (shrink)

The axiomatic presentation of modal systems and the standard formulations of natural deduction and sequent calculus for modal logic are reviewed, together with the difficulties that emerge with these approaches. Generalizations of standard proof systems are then presented. These include, among others, display calculi, hypersequents, and labelled systems, with the latter surveyed from a closer perspective.

A way is found to add axioms to sequent calculi that maintains the eliminability of cut, through the representation of axioms as rules of inference of a suitable form. By this method, the structural analysis of proofs is extended from pure logic to free-variable theories, covering all classical theories, and a wide class of constructive theories. All results are proved for systems in which also the rules of weakening and contraction can be eliminated. Applications include a system of predicate logic (...) with equality in which also cuts on the equality axioms are eliminated. (shrink)

Two mereological theories are presented based on a primitive apartness relation along with binary relations of mereological excess and weak excess, respectively. It is shown that both theories are acceptable from the standpoint of constructive reasoning while remaining faithful to the spirit of classical mereology. The two theories are then compared and assessed with regard to their extensional import.

This paper extends the axiomatic treatment of intuitionistic mereology introduced in Maffezioli and Varzi (_Synthese, 198_(S18), 4277–4302 2021 ) by examining the behavior of constructive notions of overlap and disjointness. We consider both (i) various ways of defining such notions in terms of other intuitionistic mereological primitives, and (ii) the possibility of treating them as mereological primitives of their own.

This paper is a sequel to the papers Baaz and Iemhoff [4] and [6] in which an alternative skolemization method called eskolemization was introduced that, when restricted to strong existential quantifiers, is sound and complete for constructive theories. In this paper we extend the method to universal quantifiers and show that for theories satisfying the witness property it is sound and complete for all formulas. We obtain a Herbrand theorem from this, and apply the method to the intuitionistic theory of (...) equality and the intuitionistic theory of monadic predicates. (shrink)

We prove a generalization of Maehara’s lemma to show that the extensions of classical and intuitionistic first-order logic with a special type of geometric axioms, called singular geometric axioms, have Craig’s interpolation property. As a corollary, we obtain a direct proof of interpolation for (classical and intuitionistic) first-order logic with identity, as well as interpolation for several mathematical theories, including the theory of equivalence relations, (strict) partial and linear orders, and various intuitionistic order theories such as apartness and positive partial (...) and linear orders. (shrink)

We give a direct proof of admissibility of cut and contraction for the contraction-free sequent calculus G4ip for intuitionistic propositional logic and for a corresponding multi-succedent calculus: this proof extends easily in the presence of quantifiers, in contrast to other, indirect, proofs. i.e., those which use induction on sequent weight or appeal to admissibility of rules in other calculi.

The concept of “necessity of thought” plays a central role in Dag Prawitz’s essay “Logical Consequence from a Constructivist Point of View” (Prawitz 2005). The theme is later developed in various articles devoted to the notion of valid inference (Prawitz, 2009, forthcoming a, forthcoming b). In section 1 I explain how the notion of necessity of thought emerges from Prawitz’s analysis of logical consequence. I try to expound Prawitz’s views concerning the necessity of thought in sections 2, 3 and 4. (...) In sections 5 and 6 I discuss some problems arising with regard to Prawitz’s views. (shrink)