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  1. "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • Visual Information Processing and Phenomenal Consciousness.Ansgar Beckermann - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states (...)
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  • Health and Autonomy.Jukka Varelius - 2004 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 8 (2):221-230.
    Individual autonomy is a prominent value in Western medicine and medical ethics, and there it is often accepted that the only way to pay proper respect to autonomy is to let the patients themselves determine what is good for them. Adopting this approach has, however, given rise to some unwanted results, thus motivating a quest for an objective conception of health. Unfortunately, the purportedly objective conceptions of health have failed in objectivity, and if a conception of health is not acceptable (...)
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  • Token-Identity, Consciousness, and the Connection Principle.Jürgen Schröder - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):615-616.
    Searle's (1990) argument for the seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.
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  • Patterns.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.
  • Reconsidering Pain.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):325-43.
    In 1986, I argued that pains are essentially not phenomenal states. Using a Wittgen-steinian son of argument, I showed that the same sort of phenomena can be had on different occasions, and on one occasion persons be in pain, while on another occasion persons not be in pain. I also showed that very different phenomena could be experienced and, yet, organisms have the same sort of pain. I supported my arguments with empirical data from both laboratory and clinical studies. There (...)
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  • Searle's Argument That Intentional States Are Conscious States.Norton Nelkin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):614-615.
  • The Ontology of Aspectual Shape.Martin Kurthen & Detlef B. Linke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):612-614.
    Searle (1990) argues that unconscious intrinsic intentional states must be accessible to consciousness because (1) all intrinsic intentional states have aspectual shape, the of which cannot be explained in a third-person (e.g., neurophysiological) vocabulary, and (2) ontologically, unconscious mental states are neurophysiological processes. This argument confuses three senses of namely, factuality, individuative properties, and phenomenological presence.
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