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Harold W. Noonan (2001). Hume on Knowledge.

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  1.  23
    Hume's Distinction Between Impressions and Ideas.Samuel C. Rickless - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1222-1237.
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  2.  54
    The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume's Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):263-287.
    Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume’s psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume’s recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we (...)
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  3.  58
    On Hume's Supposed Rejection of Resemblance Between Objects and Impressions.Annemarie Butler - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2):257 – 270.
  4. Humes Old and New: Four Fashionable Falsehoods, and One Unfashionable Truth.Peter Millican - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):163-199.
    Hume has traditionally been understood as an inductive sceptic with positivist tendencies, reducing causation to regular succession and anticipating the modern distinctions between analytic and synthetic, deduction and induction. The dominant fashion in recent Hume scholarship is to reject all this, replacing the ‘Old Hume’ with various New alternatives. Here I aim to counter four of these revisionist readings, presenting instead a broadly traditional interpretation but with important nuances, based especially on Hume’s later works. He asked that we should treat (...)
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  5.  7
    I—Peter Millican: Humes Old and New Four Fashionable Falsehoods, and One Unfashionable Truth.Peter Millican & Helen Beebee - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):163-199.
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  6. Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument About Induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
    Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference (...)
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  7.  26
    Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument About Induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321-338.
    Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume's central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout "Treatise" Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference (...)
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  8.  79
    Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification.Louis E. Loeb - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):279-303.
    Hume’s claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined---though without his remarking on this fact---with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume’s view, are steady dispositions , nature’s provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume’s epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief’s influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris (...)
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