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Harold W. Noonan (1993). Object-Dependent Thoughts: A Case of Superficial Necessity but Deep Contingency?

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  1.  91
    Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
    Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general factive mental (...)
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  2. Sufficient Absences.S. Sawyer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):202-208.
  3. Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought: M. G. F. Martin.M. G. F. Martin - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:173-214.
    A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented with this thing in front of me, which looks to me to be a duck. Furthermore, (...)
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    Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought.M. G. F. Martin - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:173-214.
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  5.  47
    The Epistemic Divide.Sarah Sawyer - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):385-401.
  6.  90
    Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 1996 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):121-139.
    Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind?body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ?in the head? and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument (...)
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