Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Taking Stock of Engineering Epistemology: Multidisciplinary Perspectives.Vivek Kant & Eric Kerr - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (4):685-726.
    How engineers know, and act on that knowledge, has a profound impact on society. Consequently, the analysis of engineering knowledge is one of the central challenges for the philosophy of engineering. In this article, we present a thematic multidisciplinary conceptual survey of engineering epistemology and identify key areas of research that are still to be comprehensively investigated. Themes are organized based on a survey of engineering epistemology including research from history, sociology, philosophy, design theory, and engineering itself. Five major interrelated (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Technological Knowledge-That As Knowledge-How: A Comment.Stephen Hetherington - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):567-572.
    Norström has argued that contemporary epistemological debates about the conceptual relations between knowledge-that and knowledge-how need to be supplemented by a concept of technological knowledge—with this being a further kind of knowledge. But this paper argues that Norström has not shown why technological knowledge-that is so distinctive because Norström has not shown that such knowledge cannot be reduced conceptually to a form of knowledge-how. The paper thus applies practicalism to the case of technological knowledge-that. Indeed, the paper shows why Norström’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Against Norström’s Argument for Technological Knowing How Not Being an Instance of Knowing That.Morgan Luck - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):573-579.
    In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norström in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson’s proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think that there are problems with Norström’s argument.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark