In Norman, Price, and Jones , we argued that the ability to apply two sets of grammar rules flexibly from trial to trial on a “mixed-block” AGL classification task indicated strategic control over knowledge that was less than fully explicit. Jiménez suggested that our results do not in themselves prove that participants learned – and strategically controlled – complex properties of the structures of the grammars, but that they may be accounted for by learning of simple letter frequencies. We first (...) explain why our main conclusions regarding strategic control and conscious awareness are a separable issue to this criticism. We then report additional data which show that our participants’ ability to discriminate between the two grammars was not attributable to differences in simple letter frequencies. (shrink)

Norman et al. reported that participants exposed in succession to two artificial grammars could be able to learn implicitly about them, and could apply their knowledge strategically to select which string corresponds to one of these two grammars. In this commentary, I identify an artifact that could account for the learning obtained not only in this study, but also in some previous studies using the same procedures. I claim that more methodological control is needed before jumping to conclusions on the (...) kind of strategic control that could be achieved unconsciously. (shrink)

A series of five experiments investigated the extent of subliminal processing of negation. Participants were presented with a subliminal instruction to either pick or not pick an accompanying noun, followed by a choice of two nouns. By employing subjective measures to determine individual thresholds of subliminal priming, the results of these studies indicated that participants were able to identify the correct noun of the pair – even when the correct noun was specified by negation. Furthermore, using a grey-scale contrast method (...) of masking, Experiment 5 confirmed that these priming effects were evidenced in the absence of partial awareness, and without the effect being attributed to the retrieval of stimulus–response links established during conscious rehearsal. (shrink)